Eliezer’s Shadchanut as a Model for
Divine Service
R. Yaakov Bieler
Parashat Chayei Sara, 5770
The central theme of Parashat Chayei Sara is the search for a suitable wife for Yitzchak, described in the 67 verses of Beraishit 24. A most curious aspect of this text is that the devoted and faithful servant to whom Avraham entrusts this mission is never mentioned by name, but rather as (Ibid. 24:2) “Avdo, Zekan Beito” (his servant, the elder of his house); (Ibid. 5, 9, 10, 17, 53, 65 [2x], 66) “HaEved” (the servant); (Ibid., 21, 22, 26, 29, 30 [2x], 32, 58, 61 “HaIsh” (the man); (Ibid. 34, 52, 59) “Eved Avraham” (the servant of Avraham). While in light of an earlier comment by Avraham, (Ibid. 15:2) “…and the steward of my house is Eliezer of Damascus”, it is reasonable to assume that Eliezer is also the servant referred to in Beraishit 24, it is most curious why his name should not be used in the text anywhere in that chapter. An insight by R. Amnon Bazak[1] profoundly addresses this apparent lacuna; however, in my opinion, some background material to set the context for his approach is called for.
Technically, Avraham appoints Eliezer to serve as a “Shaliach”, a surrogate/messenger, to act on his behalf with respect to finding a mate for his son Yitzchak. While the actual Mitzva would consist of actually getting married—while a Shaliach could stand in for the establishment of the legal relationship between a husband and wife by either giving the bridal gift or document on behalf of the groom, or receiving them on behalf of the bride, the actual Mitzva would occur when the marriage is consummated; consequently the actions carried out by Eliezer were at best a Hechsher Mitzva (a prerequisite for the performance of this particular Mitzva.) nevertheless, that does not mean that even such preparations and efforts are not ideally undertaken directly by the parties who are marrying one another. The Baraita in Kiddushin 29a listing the responsibilities of a father to his son, includes “U’LeHaSi’oh Isha” (and to cause/assist him to marry a woman.) If one were to accept the standard Rabbinical view of Yitzchak’s age at the time of Akeidat Yitzchak (the Binding of Isaac described in Beraishit 22), i.e., thirty-seven,[2] which in turn implies that he marries only three years afterwards—(Beraishit 25:20) “And Yitzchak was forty years old when he married Rivka, the daughter of Betuel …”—one might wonder why Yitzchak did not take matters into his own hands at some earlier point with regard to seeking someone to marry, as do his sons Eisav[3] and Yaakov.[4] In terms of both Yitzchak himself, as well as his father Avraham, the Halachic principle enunciated in Kiddushin 41a could be invoked, i.e., “Mitzva Bo Yoteir MiBeShlucho” (fulfilling a Commandment is done preferably by oneself, as opposed to delegating the responsibility to a surrogate.) Such a priority is eminently understandable with respect to carrying out Divinely Imposed responsibilities when one assumes that engaging in these behaviors strengthens one’s personal connection to God in general and that the activity itself is intended to have a positive affect upon the individual who devotes time and energy to such exalted use of one’s time and energy.[5] Avraham’s relatively[6] advanced age, 137,[7] could be cited as the reason that he does not personally undertake the journey to Charan; as for Yitzchak, while the Akeida may very well have traumatized him to the point where it became difficult for him to function normally with respect to interpersonal relationships going forward (see the alternate interpretation in RaShI on Beraishit 27:1), we are given no information about what Yitzchak’s personality was like before Beraishit 22,[8] [9] that might account for his initial reticence or simple lack of interest in matrimony.
While there is a preference for one to carry out his own meritorious acts rather than delegating them to a surrogate, that does not mean that using a surrogate is either prohibited or has no effect. The biblical source for the effectiveness and propriety of using a representative appears within the context of the Pesach sacrifice:
Shemot 12:6
And it (the animal intended for
the Pascal sacrifice) will be guarded by you until the 14th of this
month (Nissan) and they, the entire congregation of
The verse engenders the following Talmudic comment:
Kiddushin 41b
It was taught: R. Yehoshua ben
Korcha says, “’…They, the entire congregation of
The principle that a surrogate can help one fulfill Commandments that the latter is obligated to perform is applied by at least one Tanna to even as personal a Mitzva as prayer, at least during the Yomim Noraim:[12]
Rosh HaShana 33b
(Mishna)…(Tanna Kamma) In the same manner as the Shliach Tzibbur (surrogate of the community) is obligated (in prayer), so too every individual (is obligated to pray for himself.)[13]
Rabban Gamliel said: The representative of the congregation fulfills on behalf of the many their obligation.[14]
While there is no question that a Shliach Tzibbur for prayer on behalf of those incapable of praying by themselves is viewed as an extension of these individuals who then are considered vicariously to be in fact praying, and are thereby “participating”, in communal prayer, for an activity which is so grounded in the personal experience of each individual and situation,[15] it would obviously be highly preferable for each individual him/herself to stand before God and express in his/her own terms specific feelings and needs.
With respect to the nature of a surrogate carrying out a Commandment on
behalf of another, the Talmud raises a question about the role of the Priests
in the
Nedarim 35b
They asked them: These Priests, are they our surrogates (i.e., the individuals bringing the sacrifices are not permitted to offer them up on the alter, and turn to the Kohanim to carry out what they themselves are not able to do,) or are they surrogates of Heaven? (As soon as the Kohen receives the offering from the hands of the one offering it, proceeding to carry out the ritual protocol, it is as if God has already Taken charge of the sacrifice.)
While we can understand how the Halachic conception of the Kohanim’s role in the Temple service is extremely important in terms of specific Halachic contexts with respect to how they are to be viewed vis-à-vis their relationship with the rest of the Jewish people,[16] it is possible at least homiletically, if not existentially, to extend the metaphor to include every Jew, with the people being collectively referred to in Shemot 19:6 as a “kingdom of priests and a holy nation.” Consequently, we can think of each of us in some way as both priests and surrogates. While commentators have suggested that the role of the Jewish people as priests manifests itself in attempting to advance monotheism throughout the world by our self-conscious examples, much in the spirit of Avraham’s public activities,[17] it is less apparent how and to what end we might also be surrogates. R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik[18] engages in an extended rumination on how every human being is appointed at birth by God to be a Shliach for some special task(s) defined by the time/epoch during which he is born, the locale in which he finds himself and lives his life, the qualities and abilities with which he has been endowed, etc. But it seems to me that practically applying such a concept is challenging as long as we have no specific idea what it is that we are expected to do and on whose behalf. In this regard, the problem parallels a difficulty with which we are confronted during the Days of Judgment when we are told that we are on trial, but no one articulates the charges against us.[19] However, the ambiguity of our respective missions as surrogates can, in addition to being a source of consternation, also constitute an opportunity for personal fulfillment and development. Whereas a typical Shliach is not to do any more or less than what he has exactly been instructed by the Sholeach (sender),[20] we Jews are apparently left to our own devices to define the missions meant for us as well as the parameters that delineate them. It is as if we are simultaneously both the “sender” and the “surrogate”, first delineating our task and then seeking to carry it out. Furthermore, unlike a regular Shaliach, we can redefine and refocus our tasks while we are carrying them out. While some people as a result of so much ambiguity and lack of clarity, may have a tendency to set their “bars” too low while others aspire to things beyond their capacities with respect to actualizing their potential, nevertheless the freedom of choice and action that we are given in this regard at its best should prove exhilarating and inspiring.
Where R. Bazak’s approach to dealing with the absence of Eliezer’s name in the Parasha is helpful for our role as Shlichim authorized by God, with respect to the particular attitude that should accompany our efforts to meet our self-defined responsibilities. He interprets the impersonal references to Eliezer as reflecting an idealistic selflessness with which Avraham’s servant dispensed his mission:
…Eliezer left no room for person considerations. Just the opposite, his entire being was focused upon fulfilling his charge in the best way possible. From the perspective of admirable personal traits that he observed in Avraham’s home, he adds an element that he had not been commanded about at all, the aspect of the personal qualities of the chosen bride...[21]
Also when
the tired servant reaches the house (of Betuel and Lavan) and finds food set
before him, he resists and states, (Beraishit 24:33) “I will not eat until I
have spoken my message.” And when he finally begins to speak, he portrays
himself humbly, (Ibid. 34) “I am the servant of Avraham.”
R.
Bazak’s insight gains even greater power from two Rabbinic interpretations. On
the one hand, one Midrash suggests that Eliezer had always harbored hopes of
ending up as Avraham’s heir.[22]
Pirkei
D’Rabbi Eliezer, Chapt. 31
Yitzchak
was 37 when he went to
And
when it turns out that Yitzchak was alive, another Midrash suggests that
Eliezer had one more hope for benefiting at least in part from his master’s
wealth:
Beraishit
Rabba 59:9
…He
(Eliezer) would sit and consider whether or not his daughter was worthy of
Yitzchak…(Beraishit 24:5) “…Perhaps she (the girl that he will discover having
the qualities that would be appropriate for Yitzchak) will not be willing to
return…” and I will then give him (Yitzchak) my daughter…[23]
If Eliezer had such aspirations, and
nevertheless was able to put them behind him because he felt his mission
required him to act as an extension of Avraham rather than himself, we are
presented in his story of a model surrogate, a model to which we should aspire
when we engage in Shichut HaShem, making sure that our efforts are not for
self-promotion, but rather LeShem Shamayim.
[1] Nekudat Peticha, Tzomet, Alon Shevut, 5766, pp. 29-30.
[2] See e.g., RaShI on Beraishit 25:20.
[3] Beraishit 26:34; 28:9.
[4] Ibid. 29.
[5] RaMBaM, Mishna Tora, Hilchot Temura 4:13
“…And the majority of the laws of the Tora are recommendations from the Source of Great Recommendation (HaShem) to repair attitudes/opinions and to straighten all of one’s actions…
[6] Since Avraham is 175 when he dies (Beraishit 25:7), it is hard to say what sort of physical condition he was in at 137. While Sara is skeptical about her husband’s ability to father a child at the age of 100 (Ibid. 17:17), there does not necessarily have to be a direct relationship between this physiological problem and overall weakness. He does proceed to marry Ketura and father additional children according to Beraishit 25:1 ff.
[7] He is 100 at the time of Yitzchak’s birth (Beraishit 17:17), and combined with the presumption that Yitzchak was thirty-seven at the time of the Akeida see fn. 2 above, Avraham is 137.
[8] Would it be appropriate to speculate that his Sara’s protectiveness (Beraishit 21:10) could have inhibited Yitzchak’s readiness to marry and thereby move out of his parents’ sphere of influence (Ibid. 2:24)? It is only after Sara’s death that Yitzchak is prepared to marry and the text (Ibid. 24:67) emphasizes how his marriage to Rivka served as a comfort after his mother’s death.
[9] In an attempt to account for why Yitzchak was tested with the “Akeida” (in addition to the fact that Avraham was the one who was Commanded to carry out the sacrifice of his son, Yitzchak had to be willing to cooperate in this effort, and therefore the entire incident must be viewed as a powerful test for both father and son), the Rabbis suggest that Yitzchak possibly thought too much of himself and expressed his haughtiness as part of a sibling rivalry debate with his step-brother Yishmael:
RaShI on Beraishit 22:1
…And there are those who say, after the words of Yishmael who was bragging to Yitzchak that he had undergone circumcision at the age of thirteen and did not resist (Beraishit 17:25) (the implication being that this was a more sacrificial and meaningful act than Yitzchak’s circumcision which took place eight days after his birth, when it was impossible for him to understand what was happening to him.) Yitzchak then said to him, “With respect to one limb of your body you are attempting to intimidate me? If the Holy One Blessed Be He were to Say to me, ‘Sacrifice yourself before Me,’ I would not resist.”
While the Rabbis could have intended such a vignette to teach the lesson that one must be careful about what he says since his words could come back to haunt him, it is also possible that the story suggests an aspect of his personality that interfered with his ability to relate to other people due to what he considered his privileged status as the son of both Avraham and Sara. The assumption of a sense of superiority resulting in an individual thinking that he was too good for anyone who might marry him is attributed to Datan and Aviram in the Midrash:
Midrash Tanchuma Parashat Acharei Mot #7 on BaMidbar 3:4
…Said R. Levi: They were very arrogant, and they said, “Which women would
be appropriate for us?” There were many women who were unmarried and waited for
them. And they would say, “The brother of our father is a king; our father is
the High Priest; the brother of our mother is the Nasi (of our tribe); we are
the assistant Kohanim. Which women would be appropriate for us?”
[10] The
number of Jews comprising the Congregation of Israel is far greater than the
number of animals slaughtered as Pascal Lambs. Since each Jew is required to
consume a Kezayit (olive-sized piece) of Korban Pesach as part of the Seder
ritual, and there was a prohibition to leave over parts of the sacrifice until
morning since the meat would become Notar, a prohibited substance, the practice
was to have several people partner in the consumption of a single sacrifice.
Yet they couldn’t all be involved in the sacrifice’s actual slaughter.
Consequently, the verse views them all as having performed this action,
although only one of them actually did so, he serving as their surrogate.
[11] Consequently by virtue of each surrogate representing those that authorized him to perform the slaughter, the entire group gets credit as if they themselves slaughtered the animal.
[12] A distinction is made in Halachic literature between everyday prayer and those recited during the Days of Awe due to the latter’s extreme length and inclusion of citations that are customarily not part of prayer. Consequently the pool of those unable to pray effectively expands during Rosh HaShana and Yom HaKippurim. See fn. 14 below for example.
[13] The Tanna Kamma’s insistence upon personal prayer regardless of the level of education that a person may have achieved, calls to mind the various Chassidic stories about individuals reciting the Alef Beit, playing a flute, etc. to get credit for praying, despite their illiteracy.
[14] Although the Shulchan Aruch sides with R. Gamliel, the Aruch HaShulchan practically renders this view moot:
Aruch HaShulchan, Orech Chayim 591:2
We have established above in #124 that the congregation’s surrogate can only fulfill the Mitzvot on behalf of the congregation for those who are unable to pray for themselves. But anyone who could pray for himself, the surrogate does not affect his prayers. And this applies to the prayers throughout the year. However on Rosh HaShana and Yom HaKippurim, we reach the Halachic conclusion at the end of tractate Rosh HaShana, that just as the surrogate fulfills the Commandment for those who are not conversant with the law, he will similarly do so with regard to people who could have prayed for themselves, in light of the large numbers of blessings and the prayer is extremely lengthy. However even for this to be effective it is on condition that the person relying on the surrogate hears every word from beginning to end, and that he not interrupt with conversation at all. And since it is difficult to assure these conditions, therefore we require that everyone prays quietly the Musaf of Rosh HaShana along with the Shliach Tzibbur, the Shliach Tzibbur also having said the silent prayer, followed by the Shliach Tzibbur repeating the prayer as is done throughout the year...
Aruch HaShulchan’s comments resulting in the stringency that although according to the basic law, the uneducated person could simply rely on the surrogate, we insist that he also pray for himself since we lack confidence that he will be able to adequately focus his attention over the course of the entire repetition of the Amida, so too HaGahot Maimoniyot on RaMBaM, Mishna Tora, Hilchot Tefilla 4:15 rejects RaMBaM’s position that if one’s mind is unsettled he should not pray at all until he achieves a modicum of Yishuv HaDa’at, the commentator on the Mishna Tora dejectedly observes that such a Halachic position will result in people never praying because they never seem to be able to muster up the requisite Kavana, again a leniency whose stringency was restored as a result of a lack of confidence in the standards that individual’s would apply to themselves.
[15] One could argue that of all Commandments, prayer is one that must be performed by the pray-er him/herself. If special requests are being made, special circumstances invoked, pleas for atonement invoked, how can someone else represent one in such matters? If one has a young Shliach Tzibbur, is he capable of understanding what it is to be old? A wealthy Shliach Tzibbur similarly will have difficulty empathizing with the profoundly poor. Etc. (Mishlei 14:10) “The heart knows the bitterness of its soul and in its joy a stranger cannot participate.” On the other hand, as RaMBaM explains in Mishna Tora Hilchot Tefilla 1:4, there will be people who because of their unfamiliarity with Hebrew, inability to articulate their ideas, lack of religious education, will not be able to pray on their own and therefore some sort of support and means by which they could be included had to be devised.
[16] For example, can a Kohein against whom I have invoked a vow prohibiting myself from getting benefit from him—in an attempt to steer clear of such a person and his negative influences, whatever they may be—nevertheless participate in offering a sacrifice that I am presenting? Acting on my behalf would possibly constitute a violation of the vow, whereas if he is God’s Representative then there is no direct connection between myself and this individual, his role being defined as an extension of God Himself.
[17] See my
essay “Abraham: Pioneer Religious Educator , Paradigm for Contemporary Teachers
of Judaism” in Rav Chesed: Essays in honor of
[18]
“Shlichut” in Yemia Zicharon, Sifriyat Elinar,
[19] See my essay “The Importance of Engaging in Personal Inventories” at http://text.rcarabbis.org/?author=8 for a strategy to attempt to combat this problem.
[20] The
ultimate Shliach is a Malach (an angel, although the word Malach is synonymous
with Shliach.) Malachim are given a single task and when several things have to
be accomplished, as in the case of notifying Avraham about the impending birth
of Yitzchak, healing him following his circumcision, destroying
[21] In Beraishit 24:4, Avraham mentions nothing about personal qualities, only that the woman not be a Canaanite, and rather originate from Charan.
[22] Even Avraham, prior to his having given birth to first Yishmael and then Yitzchak, expressed a similar expectation in Beraishit 15:2.
[23] Although the context of the Midrash is a rejection of Eliezer and his daughter as unworthy of Yitzchak, this does not preclude that he entertained such ideas at one point of another.