Striving to Create a Climate of Respect
R. Yaakov Bieler
Parshat Emor, 5764
One of the more curious sections of Parshat Emor deals with the blasphemer (VaYikra 24:10-23). An individual of mixed parentage (1) becomes embroiled in a dispute with someone fully Jewish, and out of extreme frustration curses the Divine. Moshe, not knowing what consequence should be applied to the transgressor, is told by God that this is a capital offense punishable by stoning, and the incident is concluded by the Tora recording that the punishment is carried out in accordance with the instructions that Moshe receives from HaShem.
Jewish tradition maintain that the prohibition against blasphemy was known from the earliest moments of human civilization. A Baraita (2) in Sanhedrin 56a notes that “Bnai Noach” (the sons of Noach, a term that applies to all of Noach’s descendents, hence predating Avraham and his progeny) are obligated to observe seven commandments: a) the requirement to establish law courts, and the prohibitions against b) BLASPHEMY, c) idolatry, d) sexual immorality, e) murder, f) thievery and g) severing a limb from a living animal. R. Yochanan (Ibid.), by associating these seven laws with the verse containing God’s Instructions to Adam in the Garden of Eden (Beraishit 2:16), implies that these commandments predate even the time of Noach, and originate with the creation of the first human beings, Adam and Chava. While R. Yehuda ben Betaira disagrees with R. Yochanan regarding the interpretation of Beraishit 2:16, he nevertheless maintains that Adam HaRishon was prohibited from engaging in idolatry and blasphemy. Such a position is relatively easy to justify, since the Tora assumes that monotheism was the original manner in which humanity worshiped HaShem. If Adam directly experienced God’s Revelation, there could be no basis for him to develop a polytheistic system of belief, or, for that matter, be likely to evidence verbal disrespect for God. It is only when later generations no longer experience God first-hand via prophecy, that idolatrous religious understandings become possible—see RaShI on Beraishit 4:26 and RaMBaM, Hilchot Avoda Zora 1:1-2. The assumptions that prohibitions against idolatry and blasphemy would also apply to Noach, is similarly logical, since he too is the recipient of Divine Revelation with respect to the oncoming flood (6:13 ff.), and when he and his family set out to repopulate and recivilize the world after all other people have drowned (8:18 ff.), only monotheism is extent. However, these beliefs become countermanded once again during ensuing generations when God withdraws His overt Presence and does not Reveal Himself to prophets on an ongoing basis. (3)
While Jewish tradition posits that these same seven Noachide commandments remain in effect for non-Jews to this day, (4) another Baraita in Sanhedrin 56a states that at Mara (Shemot 15:25), a stop in the desert following the crossing of the Sea of Reeds, but prior to the Sinai experience, the phrase “…There He Gave them statute and law…” connotes that the Jews become obligated to observe ten commandments, (5) the seven that all of humanity were already required to fulfill, and an additional three: h) establishing law courts, (6,7) i) observing Shabbat, (8) and j) respecting one’s parents. Consequently, an explicit additional prohibition in the Tora against Jews blaspheming would appear to be unnecessary. Such an assumption leads to attempts to interpret Shemot 22:27, “Elohi’ you should not curse, and the prince among your people you should not revile” in a manner where it would not simply be reiterating an already extent prohibition against cursing the Divine.
R. Akiva, who in Sanhedrin 66a, insists that the first word in
R. Yishmael is of a different mind than R. Akiva, (10) and he claims that the first word in Shemot 22:27 is “Chol”, i.e. non-holy, not referring to God. (11) Basing himself not only upon the context of the second half of the verse that deals with a “Nasi” (prince or political leader), but also upon the connotations of “Elohim” in contexts where it would appear that what is being referred to is either powerful individuals or judges—e.g. Beraishit 6:2,4; Shemot 22:7-8, etc., R. Yishmael understands the prohibition as one which relates to the inappropriate disparagement of influential and prestigious individuals rather than of the Deity. Such an interpretation “bookends” nicely with VaYikra 19:14, where the Tora commands, “Do not curse the deaf…” thereby defining the range of individuals who should not be cursed from the most powerful to the most vulnerable and defenseless.
However, the sharp dichotomy between these two views whether “Elohi’” is Kodesh or Chol, is blurred by the application of a phrase implying blasphemy, “Killelat Elohi’”, to the case of the executed individual who is not buried in a timely fashion, in Devarim 21:23. While it is understandable why a public display of the body of an inveterate sinner who has lost his life at the hands of Beit Din is profoundly humiliating for the individual and his family, why should such a thing also be construed as a blow against God’s Dignity and Honor? RaShI in order to explain the analogy being made by the Tora between the sinful person whom society punishes for his crimes and cursing the Divine, offers the following parable: Identical twin brothers--one becomes the king, while the other becomes a bandit, is caught and executed. Whoever sees the latter, says, “The king has been executed.” The implication arising from calling the execution of a human being, however guilty, “blasphemy” is that since all people are created in the Image of God, even when deserving punishment is meted out, it is an offense against HaShem to dwell upon what has taken place. Just as God “deeply Regrets” having to bring a flood to destroy the world’s evil doers (an interpretation of Beraishit 6:6), so too the executed human being constitutes a demonstration of failed potential and misplaced hope and confidence on God’s part.
The melding of the categories of cursing people and blasphemy is also reflected in the Tora’s delineating as a separate case, the instance when a child curses his parents, in Shemot
The realization that the Tora intertwines how one relates to God and how one relates to other people, can account for a curious section of the story of the blasphemer in Parshat Emor. Immediately after God Pronounces the sentence of death by stoning for the individual who had cursed Him (24:14-16), but prior to the carrying out of the punishment (24:23), He Lists an array of aggressive acts directed against others and their punishments. (14) In light of the preceding discussion, the Tora comes to teach that were one to respect God by assiduously keeping the commandments and not uttering anything reprehensible about Him, yet simultaneously engage in improper behavior towards his/her fellow human beings, s/he has missed the point entirely. Respecting God must per force result in care and concern for other people; being careful of other people’s persons and property should complement one’s spiritual sensibilities and aspirations. If not, figurative blasphemy, in terms of a violation of the spirit of the law, can take place even when the letter of the law has been carefully adhered to.
Shabbat Shalom, and may we honor HaShem not only by what we do and say on His behalf, but also how we treat the others with whom we interact.
(1) The Tora goes out of its way to note that this person’s mother was Jewish and his father was Egyptian.
(2) A source dating from the Mishnaic period that was not included in R. Yehuda HaNasi’s compilation of the Mishna.
(3) This period is thought to begin with the advent of Nimrod (10:8 ff.) in whose kingdom, Bavel, the
(4) Bava Kama 38a, based upon Chabakuk 3:6, posits that God Changed the level of expectation for the fulfillment of the Noachide commandments on the part of non-Jews, from one where they would be rewarded as though they were actually commanded to perform them, to the standard that while continuing to be obligated, they will only be rewarded as though they were not commanded to perform them.
(5) These ten were reiterated and included among the commandments that the Jews subsequently accepted at Sinai described in Shemot 19:1 ff.
(6) The use of the word “Mishpat” in
(7) According to RaMBaN on Beraishit 34:13, non-Jews, such as those in Shechem, are obligated to have courts in order to bring transgressors to justice; however, as opposed to the other six Noachide commandments, should they not establish such courts, it is not considered a capital offense since it is a positive rather than negative obligation. By implication from his comments, it might be concluded that Jews must establish courts regardless of the need to bring perpetrators to justice. There is a value in the study of the law for its own sake, rather than only when it requires to be applied.
(8) The textual basis for assuming that Shabbat and respect for parents were commanded at Mara arises from a comparison of the manner in which the Ten Commandments are presented in Shemot and Devarim. In Devarim
(9) Although corporeal punishment would not be meted out to someone who sins inadvertently, atonement via sacrifices and, where applicable, monetary restitution will have to be made, regardless of the degree of premeditation.
(10) R. Akiva and R. Yishmael argue in a number of places over whether or not “Dibra Tora B’Lashon B’nai Adam” (the words of the Tora are formulated in accordance to the common understanding and usage of language of human beings)—see e.g., Sifra Kedoshim 3:3; Sanhedrin 90b; Kritut 11a. The case in point provides an excellent example of their overall disagreement. R. Yishmael takes the more syntactical approach, and in light of verses like Shemot 22:7-8, coupled with the end of the verse which refers to a Nasi, i.e., a political leader, asserts that the word should not be understood as connoting God. R. Akiva, on the other hand, will look for a more esoteric interpretation, and interprets the first half of the verse from the perspective of the sin of blasphemy.
(11) RaShI in his commentary to Shemot 22:27 cites the views of both R. Akiva and R. Yishmael, thereby paralleling the statements in Tractates Sofrim 4:8 and Sefer Tora 4:4 to the effect that the word should be treated as both “Kodesh” and “Chol”. A practical implication would be whether or not the word could be erased once it is written.
(12) Belief in God; prohibitions against believing in, making, and worshipping other gods and taking God’s Name in vain, observance of Shabbat.
(13) Prohibitions against killing, committing adultery, stealing, testifying falsely, and coveting.
(14) 24:17 murder of people; 24:18 murder of animals belonging to another; 24:19-20 injury of people; 24:21 injury of animals, injury of parents*.
(*Since ordinarily injuries to other people are not punishable by death, the second portion of this verse is interpreted within the context of wounding a parent, which according to Shemot