Can One be Haunted by His/Her Future?

Rabbi Yaakov Bieler  

Erev Rosh HaShana, 5763

 

            The reason why most people would probably identify the Tora reading on Rosh HaShana as the story of Akeidat Yitzchak (the binding of Isaac, Beraishit 22), is the preponderance of references in the Rosh HaShana liturgy and rituals evoking  Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice his son, and  Yitzchak’s willingness to be sacrificed.

Examples of  prayers and practices highlighting the Akeida include, 1) the Mussaf service, during Zichronot,* when we recite, “VaTeiraeh Lefanecha Akeida SheAkad Avraham Avinu Et Yitzchak Beno Al Gabei HaMizbeach, VeKavash Rachamav La’asot Retzoncha BeLeivav Shalem, Kein Yichbeshu Rachamecha Et Ka’ascha MeiAleinu, U’BeTuvcha HaGadol Yashuv Charon Apcha MeiAmcha U’MeiIrcha U’Minachalatecha (And there should be seen before You the binding, whereby Avraham our father bound up his son Yitzchak on the altar, and he overcame his compassion in order to carry out Your Will with a full heart; so too You Should Overcome Your Anger against us, and by Your Great Goodness, let the heat of Your Wrath be turned away from Your people, from Your city, and from Your inheritance,  2) Rosh HaShana 16a explains that the reason why a ram’s horn is used to fulfill the commandment to blow the Shofar, is “in order that I (God) Will Remember on your behalf the Binding of Yitzchak ben Avraham, and based upon that remembrance, I Will Credit you with having bound yourselves in the same manner”, and 3)  Based upon Pesikta Rabbati Chapt. 40 that defines the specific day referenced in Beraishit 22:14, as Rosh HaShana, as well as RaShI on Beraishit 23:2 which interprets the juxtaposition of the story of the Binding of Yitzchak with the death of Sara, Arugot HaBosem posits that it was specifically on Rosh HaShana that Sara received a report concerning what was transpiring on Har HaMoriah. Understandably, she became hysterical, and the cries that she emitted that day prior to her tragic demise as a result of heartbreak and shock, are forever commemorated by the crying sounds of the Shofar, which will hopefully influence both ourselves to repent as well as HaShem  to forgive us for all our shortcomings.

However, the Akeida is in fact read on the SECOND day of Rosh HaShana. The Tora reading on the first day of Tishrei, is comprised of  the verses that immediately precede the Binding of Isaac, i.e., Beraishit 21:1-34. Since during the time when the Jewish calendar was determined by the testimony of witnesses, it was possible for there to be a single day of Rosh HaShana,** it is interesting to speculate which  of these two Tora portions would have been read.  Of course it would have been possible to simply expand the number of verses read for each Aliya, and thereby read both chapters on such a Rosh HaShana. Nevertheless there might just as soon have also been a deliberate attempt and preference to separate the stories in order that each of them would be given its due, and people would have the opportunity to read each story individually and reflect upon its implications. On the one hand, in light of the references cited above re liturgy and ritual, a case could be made for reading Beraishit 22 alone; yet the fact that the reading for the first day was established as specifically NOT the Akeida, shines a spotlight on Beraishit 21, and challenges us to find lessons and ideas particularly relevant to Rosh Hashana within it.***

The aspect of the story of Hagar and Yishmael that resonates deeply with me each time I hear and study it, is the Rabbinic discussion surrounding Beraishit 21:17. The commentators respond to the apparent superfluity of the phrase, “Ba’Asher Huh Sham” (in that he is there.) How does Yishmael’s location effect whether or not God Will Respond to his prayers? In order to answer this question,  RaShI, based upon Rav Yitzchak’s comment in Rosh HaShana 16b, to offer the following insight: “In accordance with what he is doing now, i.e., ‘where he is at now’, rather than what he may do in the future, is he judged. Because the ministering angels were accusing (much as Satan is assumed to accuse each of us on the Day of Judgement) and saying, ‘Master of the Universe, he (Yishmael) whose descendants are destined to kill Your Children (the Jewish people) by exploiting their thirst, why Should You Raise on his behalf a well (and thereby save his life)?’ And He Responded to them, ‘At this moment, what is he—a righteous or evil person?’ They said to Him, ‘A righteous person’…”****

God’s Characteristics include omniscience, the quality of being able to know all things, including future events and human choices. Putting aside the paradoxical dilemma of how can both free choice and Divine Omniscience coexist simultaneously, it follows that on Rosh HaShana, just as we plead with God to exercise His Mercy by remembering the sacrifices of Avraham and Yitzchak, we similarly invoke the Divine Attribute of sealing any and all of our future acts from scrutiny, while we are being judged both as individuals and collectively during the Days of Awe. 

While it is possible that were a current evildoer’s future repentance and Mitzva performance to be factored into his current evaluation, things would go easier with him, implying that by not looking to the future, God Was not Being as Merciful as He might Choose to be, on the other hand, were one who presently neither has done nor is doing objectionable things, but who God Can Tell will in the future  begin to behave in an inappropriate manner, as in the case of Yishmael, he would be spared at least for the time being any type of Divine Punishment.  Perhaps it could be assumed that even if there may be individual cases where a system calling for ignoring future sins is less than ideal, on balance, it is better for the community as a whole,   as well as for the Divine Reputation, Who in Avraham’s words (Beraishit 18:25), as Judge of the universe, must be seen, at least in some sense, to be just. 

But before we become overly enthusiastic regarding the advantageousness of the omission of any future misdeeds during the determination of our current standing at this time of year, another topic in the Tora would appear to serve as a counterexample. In Devarim 21:18 ff. we read about the stubborn and rebellious son, who after stealing food from his parents twice, is put to death (v. 21). The Mishna in Sanhedrin 71b states that he is executed not because of what he has done in the past—stealing food, even from one’s parents, is not inherently a capital offense—but what is anticipated he will do in the FUTURE!

Siftei Chachamim #50 offers two approaches that strive to reconcile the conflicting implications of Beraishit and Devarim in this matter. First, the commentator notes that while it could be said, at least according to some, that Yishmael had actually not as yet done anything wrong, the recalcitrant son’s life of crime had already begun. Apparently once one begins to slip morally, ethically, and religiously, it becomes so much harder to turn back, compared to when one takes care to resist taking such a first step at the outset.

Secondly, Siftei Chachamim surmises that while Beit Din Shel Ma’ala may decide not to look towards the future, Beit Din Shel Mata, the this-worldly court, cannot but do otherwise. This latter idea parallels the concept that   12/13 may be the age of responsibility in terms of one’s contemporaries and society, Divine Judgement does not begin before the age of 20. Since God cannot be adversely affected by the actions of a human being, He can “afford” to wait longer and not look into the future. But the human judicial authorities who struggle to make a community safe and devoid of conflict and strife, have to move more quickly, anticipating the worst, rather than waiting until the last minute before finally acting by meting out rebuke and punishment. 

Let us all have a great year together, and let us all come through the Yomim Noraim unscathed and unbowed.

 

 

* Rosh HaShana 16a calls for the Mussaf Silent Prayer to be divided into three sections: Malchiyot (matters of Divine Monarchy), Zichronot (Divine Remembrances), and Shofrot (references to the sounding of the Shofar.) Each section contains 10 verses that express the particular topic from various perspectives, as well as additional sentiments and appeals associated with the theme.

** See Tractate Beitza 4b-5a. If the witnesses for Rosh Chodesh Tishrei would come early enough, then at least within the environs of Jerusalem, there would only be a single day for Rosh HaShana. On the other hand, there were occasions when even in Jerusalem there would have to be two days of the holiday should the witnesses either not come at all on the 30th of Elul, or they come to late to do anything with their testimony until the next day.

*** If Arugot HaBosem is prepared to listen to the Shofar as the cries of Sara hearing that her beloved Yitzchak’s life was in jeopardy, is it appropriate to also hear in these wails and sobs the weeping of Hagar, described in Beraishit 21:16? While the historical conflict between the descendants of Yitzchak and Yishmael has caused  some to be disdainful of feeling compassion for those who have opposed, let alone hated the Jewish people, should we also be unmoved by the impending tragedy that Hagar and her son confronted? Does the choosing of this section of the Tora for the first day of Rosh HaShana have implications for an answer, if not “the” answer, to this question?

**** It would appear that this Midrash, as well as the RaShI that quotes it, is at odds with another Midrashic tradition,  paraphrased in RaShI’s commentary on Beraishit 21:9.  There Sara sees Yishmael “Mitzachek”, which is interpreted as either alluding to idolatry, sexual immorality or murder. While it could be maintained that these were cases where the transgression was attempted and not necessarily carried out, it would still appear that to call such a person a Tzaddik begs credulity. Could it be that Sara herself interpreted actions negatively when they were in fact harmless and unworthy of significant response? R. Eliyahu Mizrachi, quoted in Siftei Chachamim #80, attributes the difference in approach to a Tannaitic argument between R. Shimon on the one hand, and R. Akiva and everyone else on the other.