A Peace Prize for a Zealot?

 

R. Yaakov Bieler

Parshat Pinchos, 5765

 

Pinchos is deemed the prototypical “Kanai” (zealot) in Biblical literature based upon the extraordinarily violent deed for the sake of HaShem that he impulsively[1] undertakes at the end of Parshat Balak (BaMidbar 25:1 ff.). After a portion of the Jewish people had been seduced by Moavite and Midianite women to engage in first sexual immorality and then idolatry (25:1-3),[2] the head of the tribe of Shimon, Zimri ben Salu, openly brings into the Jewish encampment[3] a Midianite princess, Kozbi bat Tzur, in effect daring the authorities to try to stop their illicit liaison (25:6). Before either Moshe or the Jewish judges can respond to Zimri’s public challenge to their, and God’s, authority, Pinchos takes action.

 

BaMidbar 25:7-8

And Pinchos ben Elazar HaKohen saw[4] and he rose up from the midst of the congregation and he took a spear into his hands.

And he came after the Jewish man into the chamber and he skewered the Jewish man and the Midianite woman at the point of their transgression[5]…

 

Even if it were contended that both Zimri and Kozbi [6] were deserving of the death penalty, the rules of Jewish judicial proceedings,[7] are obviously ignored by Pinchos when he carries out such a judgment. However, in Rabbinic literature, Pinchos’ ostensibly precipitous reaction to Zimri’s and Kozbi’s scandalous behavior is understood to fall under an already established Halachic paradigm: (Mishna Sanhedrin 9:6) “…A Jewish individual who is intimate with an Aramian woman (representative of any member of an idolatrous culture) will be attacked by zealots…”[8] Sanhedrin 82a even presents a verse in “Nevi’im” (Prophets) that serves as the basis for Pinchos’ action:[9]

 

Malachi 2:11-12

Yehuda (a term representing the entire Jewish people) has dealt treacherously, and a disgusting thing has been done in Israel and in Yerushalayim. For Yehuda has profaned the Holiness of the Lord which he loved, and has been intimate with the daughter of a strange god.

The Lord will Cut off from the man that does this all living offspring from the tents of Yaakov, or any presenting an offering to the Lord of Hosts.[10]

 

Even if legal precedent was on his side, at the time that Pinchos first responds to the public sin, he could not know, and perhaps didn’t particularly care, how the general Jewish community would view his execution of Zimri, the head of the tribe of Shimon, along with his ingénue. However, the fact that HaShem Appears in a public Revelation supporting Pinchos and his actions immediately after the killings, suggests that such a Divine Communication was necessary in order to quell the people’s unrest and displeasure with Pinchos.

 

BaMidbar 25:10-11

And HaShem Spoke to Moshe, Saying:

Pinchas, the son of Elazar, the son of Aharon the Priest has turned My Wrath away from the Children of Israel, in that he was zealous for My Sake among them, and I did not Consume the Children of Israel in jealousy.

 

HaShem Attempts to make clear that the plague mentioned in BaMidbar 25:8-9,   resulting in 24,000 deaths, was brought about by the actions of the likes of Zimri, and that only Pinchos’ quick thinking and readiness to punish the transgressors kept the number of casualties from increasing.[11]

 

But what is curious, and somewhat counter-intuitive, is the very next verse.

 

BaMidbar 25:12

Therefore I Say I Give to him “Briti Shalom” (My Covenant of Peace).

 

Even if we acknowledge that certain circumstances require vigorous and violent action, to associate those who carry out such initiatives with a Divine Covenant of Peace is striking.[12]

 

Furthermore, since the priestly line emanates from Aharon (VaYikra 8:2), he is generally viewed as the prototypical Kohen. And Aharon is described in numerous sources as a man who highly values peace.

 

Avot 1:12

…Hillel said: Be among the students of Aharon—Love peace, pursue peace, love people and bring them closer to Tora.[13]

 

Avot D’Rabbi Natan, Chapt. 12

…When Aharon would be traveling along a road, and he would meet an evildoer, he would greet him. The next day when that individual would contemplate transgressing a Commandment, he would say, “Woe is me! How will I be able to lift up my eyes afterwards and see Aharon? I will be so embarrassed before him since he greeted me so kindly.” The result was that that person would decline to transgress…

 

Sanhedrin 6b

...Moshe would say, “Let the law split the mountain” (colloquially, “Let the chips fall where they may”, regardless of the outcome.

But Aharon loved peace, would pursue peace  and would cause peace to exist between one person and the next, as it is said, (Malachi 2:6) “The true law was in his mouth, and iniquity would not be found on his lips; in peace and righteousness he has walked with Me, and many he caused to repent.”

 

Pinchos clearly is cut from different cloth when compared to Aharon in this regard. We could well imagine that had he been in Aharon’s position when the people came with a demand to build a Golden Calf (Shemot 32:1-5) Jewish history might have  gone in a different direction!

 

According to NeTzIV on BaMidbar 25:12, it is precisely because of Pinchos’ more violent temperament, that a “Brit Shalom” is specifically needed to assure that the spilling of blood and general destruction not be the exclusive type of actions of which he would be capable going forward.

 

…As a reward for having put to rest the Anger and Fury against the Jewish people of the Holy One Blessed Be He, He Blessed him with the Covenant of Peace, so that he would not himself (consistently) be unforgiving and full of anger, and because the essence of the action undertaken by Pinchos whereby he killed human being directly with his own hand, is very likely to cause there to remain in the perpetrator’s heart a powerful feeling of zealousness and hatred long into the future, yet since Pinchos’ intentions were exclusively for the sake of Heaven (he had no personal agenda with either Zimri or Kozbi), for this reason there comes to him the blessing that he should be generally calm and peaceful (in his other dealings) so he does not become handicapped in his heart.

 

Yeshayahu Leibowitz[14] further develops NeTzIV’s theme:

 

…That is to say, that as a result of one person killing another due to religious zealotry, such an individual can become desensitized to the horror of murder. For this reason, Pinchos requires a special Blessing from HaShem, in order that the act of zealotry that he carried out for the sake of Heaven doesn’t transform him into an evildoer. The demarcation point between an act of murder for the sake of Heaven and murders arising from the personal passions of a particular individual may become blurred…

 

However, NeTzIV’s approach suggests that the “Brit Shalom” was unique to Pinchos and people like him. It wouldn’t necessarily apply only to Kohanim or for that matter individuals who are religious functionaries, but to anyone who may find him/herself in circumstances necessitating the resort to violence, e.g., a law enforcement officer or a soldier. In light of the fact that immediately after HaShem’s Declaration of establishing His Covenant of Peace with Pinchos, He Goes on to Say that the Priesthood would be extended to Pinchos as well, suggests that what is taking place is not only about a person who acts violently even with legitimate cause, but is applicable to the Priesthood in general:

 

BaMidbar 25:13

And he (Pinchos) shall have, as well as his offspring after him, the Covenant of the eternal Priesthood because he was zealous for his God, and made atonement for the Children of Israel.

 

RaShi on 25:13 explains that without this Divine Affirmation, Pinchos and his offspring would have been bypassed for the Priesthood due to a technicality. Although Pinchos was Aharon’s grandson, nevertheless he was born to Eliezer before Aharon and his sons were anointed in VaYikra 8:10. Consequently, since only children born to Aharon’s sons after the anointing would be included in the Priesthood, Pinchos and his descendents would have been excluded had an exception not been made by HaShem at this point. It seems that the sins of Ba’al Pe’or therefore constituted a test for Pinchos and a final opportunity to demonstrate whether or not he, and by extension his offspring after him, had “what it takes” to be a Kohen, and by HaShem’s Reaction, he clearly passes that test. But from the perspective of what Aharon and Pinchos respectively stand for, it would appear that HaShem, by entering into a “Brit Kehuna” (a Covenant of Priesthood) specifically with Pinchos and his personality type, is introducing a certain dialectic within the Priesthood. On the one hand, as exemplified by sources such as those cited above,  there is the Divine Desire to continue the traditions of the peacemaker, as exemplified by Aharon, whose recent death is described in BaMidbar 20:22-29; but HaShem apparently Wishes to add another, counter-element into the culture of the Priesthood via Pinchos. Even with his tendency towards harsh measures that are to be somewhat mitigated by a “Covenant of Peace”, Pinchos nevertheless seems to represent the antithesis of Aharon. How might this new complementarity between peace and aggression, compromise and clear resolution for one side or the other, that HaShem has Engineered into the Priesthood at this juncture, be understood? R. S.R. Hirsch reflects upon the empirical reality of the oft times inverse relationship between violence and long-term peace.

 

R. S. R. Hirsch on BaMidbar 25:12

…the concept of “Shalom”, the state of the most complete harmony of all of the conditions of the world with each other and with God, is declared to be a “Brit”, i.e., an absolute decision sustained by God’s Promise, the ultimate realization of which is guaranteed to have the absolute attention of God’s Rule, and is therefore absolutely guaranteed ultimately for the world. God Places the responsibility for the realization of this highest harmony of Peace just on that way of thinking, that disposition and way of acting that a world hiding its thoughtless inactive forgetfulness of its duty under the cloak of “love of peace” likes to designate and condemn as “disturber of peace”. “Peace” is something highly precious, for which everything, all one’s rights and possessions, may be sacrificed, but never the rights of others and never what God has Declared to be Right and Good. True peace of men with each other rests on the peace of all of them with God. He who dares to wage war with people who are against Divine Goodness and Truth is, in the midst of his fight, and by it, fighting for the “Brit Shalom” on earth. He, who for the sake of so-called peace, quietly leaves the field to people who are really at variance with God, his love of peace is at one with the enemies of the “Brit Shalom” on earth. It was not the inactive standing apart of the masses, not even the tears of those who stood inactive at the entrance of the Sanctuary weeping at the treason; it was the honest brave act of Pinchos which saved the nation and restored its peace with God and His Law, and thereby brought back the basis for the real true peace on earth…

 

Consequently, according to R. Hirsch, the “Brit Shalom” is not to balance Pinchos’ zealotry, but rather an acknowledgement that such actions are sometimes called for in order to achieve their very antithesis, i.e., social peace and justice. Since Kohanim are not only to serve as ritual functionaries in the Tabernacle/Temple, but also as judges—see e.g., Devarim 17:9—suggests that the manner by which they approach their fellow man might sometimes require the peacemaking of an Aharon, while at other times, the “take no prisoners” approach of Pinchos might be called for.

 

But even R. Hirsch understands the dangers in overly glorifying the Pinchos-like mentality, when he provides an explanation for a particularly oblique homiletic interpretation of BaMidbar 25:12.

 

Kiddushin 66b

How do we know that the service (in the Tabernacle/Temple) of a man (Kohen) with a physical blemish is retrospectively invalid?

Said R. Yehuda in the name of Shmuel: Because the Tora states, “Therefore I Say I Give to him ‘Briti Shalom’”—when he is perfect. (The Amoraim are punning on the root “Shin”-“Lamed”-“Mem”=“Shalem”, which means in addition to “peace” also “whole/perfect”.)

But “Shalom” (as opposed to “Shalem”) is written?

Said R. Nachman: The “Vav” of “Shalom” is broken off in the middle[15] (suggesting that it is legitimate to read “Shalem” as if the “Vav” does not appear at all.)

 

R. Hirsch on BaMidbar 25:12 con’t.

…But the “Vav” in “Shalom” is …a “broken” (written imperfectly) “Vav”. For the Pinchos Covenant is a “rejoined peace”. Pinchos’ zeal is required where the real Peace is broken. And the Pinchos fight is just for the re-establishment of the real Peace; he wants to make “Shalom” “Shalem” again. To this the Talmud attaches the sentence, “The service of a man with a physical blemish is invalid”…he who wishes to restore the peace broken with God—and that is what every Divine Service is symbolic of—must himself be “Shalem”.

 

I understand R. Hirsch as suggesting that the Gemora implies that not only must every Kohen be “Shalem”, but even Pinchos himself, by virtue of his zealotry, was not ideally “Shalem” however necessary and important his action is to be considered. Consequently he too has to work upon his “anger management” so that the “Brit Shalom” is at the same time a true “Brit Shalem”.

 

Shabbat Shalom, and during these difficult times around the world, let us hope that “Shalom” and “Shleimut” will prevail. Each of us should do what we can to promote these qualities and values in our personal, familial, professional, and communal lives, as well as pray that those in leadership positions throughout the world will do the same.


[1] RaShI quotes Sanhedrin 82a to the effect that a consultation with Moshe preceded Pinchos carrying out the execution of Zimri and Kozbi:

a)   RaShI on BaMidbar 25:6 “Before the eyes of Moshe”—Moshe was asked what the law is concerning the actions of Zimri and Kozbi. The Rabbis suggest that Moshe was unable to answer due to his own marriage to a Midianite woman, Tziporra. Although his marriage could be deemed legitimate precisely because there was an official marriage and an assumption of conversion on the part of Tziporra, Moshe nevertheless felt that his moral authority was compromised due to a generally perceived similarity between the two cases.

b)   Ibid. “And they were ‘crying’ (lit., a euphemism for their inappropriate intimacy)”—Moshe was unable to recall the rule that in such a situation, the sinner(s) are liable to being punished by zealots, without trial. Consequently the rest of the congregation cried when they saw Moshe’s impotency in dealing with this situation, after he had been so resolute in handling the crisis of the Golden Calf. In fact, Moshe’s “not knowing what to do” was caused by HaShem so that Pinchos would have the opportunity to step forward and seize the moment.

c)   RaShI on 25:7 “And Pinchos saw”—Pinchos, in contrast to Moshe, did remember the applicable law to this situation. He quotes the law to Moshe, supposing that Moshe would enforce it. Instead Moshe tells Pinchos that since he remembered what was to be done, he should be the one to carry out the sentence.

While such an interaction suggests that basic legal procedures, i.e., one is not to take the law into his own hands, one is not to act in the presence of a greater authority until the latter’s opinion is made known, legal precedent must be determined before any action is undertaken, etc., were in fact followed, I believe that it is fair to say that such an approach is hardly a “Peshat” (literal) rendering of the text at hand. 

Sanhedrin 82a would ironically appear to support the “Peshat” of the text, as opposed to the Rabbinic Midrash cited by RaShI:

            R. Chisda said: If the zealot comes to take counsel (whether to punish the transgressors enumerated in the Mishna including the case of being intimate with an idolatress), we do not instruct him to do so (in direct opposition to RaShI on 25:7, cited in c) above).

It has been stated likewise: Rabba bar Chana said in R. Yochanan’s name: If he comes to take counsel we do not instruct him to do so.

What is more, had Zimri forsaken his mistress and Pinchos slain him, Pinchos would have been executed on his account. And had Zimri turned on Pinchos and slain him, he would not have been executed, since Pinchos was a pursuer (“Rodef”).

[2] Although it appears that the Moavites were the ones who initiated the attempts to first curse (BaMidbar 22:2 ff.) and then corrupt the Jewish people sexually and idolatrously (25:1 ff.), the Tora records that the Midianites were willing co-conspirators, as implied by 22:4 and 25:6. Consequently a question arises regarding the avenging war that HaShem later Commands the Jews to carry out (BaMidbar 31:2)—why was it directed specifically at the Midianites and did not include the Moavites? RaShI on 31:2 offers two rationales: a) the Moavites tried to defeat the Jews because they were genuinely frightened of them, as opposed to the Midianites who involved themselves in a conflict in which they had no vested interest; b) because Ruth the Moavite and Na’ama the Amonite were going to play important roles in Jewish history, the Moavites had to be spared at this point in time.

[3] BaMidbar 25:6 suggests that the original sinning of Ba’al Pe’or was taking place at some remove from the general encampment, out of plain sight of Moshe and the rest of the Jewish people.

[4] The verb “Seeing” in TaNaCh is commonly interpreted as connoting “understanding”, as in the case of Shemot 2:11 where Moshe both sees visually but more importantly understands and empathizes with the situation of the Jewish slaves.

[5] Zimri’s and Kozbi’s sin was taking place in “private”, i.e., while everyone was aware of what was going on, it nevertheless was transpiring within Zimri’s tent. Therefore Pinchos executes the two individuals by driving home his weapon in the parts of the body that will make clear to all who see the bodies afterwards that Zimri and Kozbi had been sinning and Pinchos  had legitimate cause to kill them.

[6] One of the 7 Noachide Commandments prohibits improper sexual behavior (“Gilui Arayot”). Although what Kozbi was doing would not be considered adultery unless she was already married, something that the biblical text does not indicate one way or the other, nevertheless, her actions are clearly promiscuous. However, RaMBaM, Hilchot Melachim 5:5-8 does not include promiscuity as part of the definition of the prohibition against sexual immorality for Noachides. Perhaps the rationale justifying Kozbi’s killing is the fact that, in light of BaMidbar 25:1-2, she was serving as a “Meisit” (a seducer who influences another to engage in idolatry)—see Devarim 13:7-12. The severity of the sin of the “Meisit” is indicated by the statement in Sanhedrin 29a, that whereas in all cases when an individual is on trial for his/her life, the judges advise the accused as to what to say in his/her defense, this is not done with regard to a “Meisit” who is left to fend for him/herself.

[7] e.g., a)   BaMidbar 35:24-25 The two-fold repetition of the term “Eida” within the context of a capital trial gives rise to the interpretation in Sanhedrin 2a that the number of judges required for such a trial is 23 (each “Eida” one that finds for guilt and one that finds for innocence, is equivalent to 10, a derivation in Megilla 23b from BaMidbar 14:27. This is the basis for the original 20 judges in such a trial; a majority of 2 has to be possible to allow for a split decision for conviction according to the implications of Shemot 23:2, which generates the need for an additional two judges; no Beit Din should have an even number of judges in order to allow for a split decision for innocence, so 1 more is added, resulting in a total of 23). Furthermore, Sanhedrin 17a states the principle that if in a capital case all judges vote for conviction, the accused is acquitted, because in such a situation they are supposed to delay their final judgment until the next day in the hope that someone who has voted for guilt will change his mind an agree with someone arguing for innocence. But if there is no one arguing for innocence, this scenario cannot take place. This Talmudic principle obviously assumes that there will be some give-and-take during the deliberations leading up to the court’s decision, something that is impossible when there is only a court of one. 

           b)  In Rosh HaShana 26a, R. Akiva interprets BaMidbar 35:24-25 to derive the principle that a witness cannot also serve as a judge, which Pinchos appears to do in this situation.

           c)  BaMidbar 35:30; Devarim 17:6; 19:15 explicitly state that no one can be convicted, let alone executed, on the basis of the testimony of a single witness. (It could be argued that the means by which Pinchos carried out the execution allows anyone who witnesses the bodies of Kozbi and Zimri to be witnesses “after the fact”. However, a defense could be mounted that this is at best circumstantial, with this type of evidence not being admissible in a Jewish court.)       

[8] This particular rule is the point at issue according to the Rabbinic view that a discussion between Moshe and Pinchos took place prior to Pinchos’ killing Zimri and Kozbi. Moshe “forgets” the principle, but Pinchos recalls it. See fn. 1 above. 

[9] Any time that a Tora law, let alone one that is invoked to justify the killing of another individual, is based upon verses from “NaCh” (the acronym for “Nevi’im” and “Ketuvim”), it is to be assumed that there is an Oral Tradition regarding such a law that originates from Sinai, and it is only later, during the lifetime of this particular Prophet that it is first written down. Consequently, such a law can have a “D’Oraita” (originating from the Tora) status, even when the proof text stems from a much later epoch.

[10] It could be argued that, aside from the rule implied in Malachi, Pinchos was exemplifying the principle of (Tehillim 119:126) “A time to do for HaShem ‘Heifeiru Toratecha’”. According to Berachot 54a, there are two possible interpretations of this verse:  a) they (in this case, the sinners embodied by Zimri and Kozbi) have pushed aside Your Tora, i.e., because of the state of wide-spread sinfulness, someone (Pinchos) has to act on HaShem’s Behalf, or b) because of the sinfulness (of Zimri and Kozbi), someone (Pinchos) has to push aside the Tora him/herself in order to defend it—see also Yerushalmi Berachot where R. Shimon bar Yochai’s interpretation of this verse appears. However it could be countered that the principle derived from Tehillim 119:126 might not go so far as to legitimize killing people, since the contexts in which it is traditionally invoked is the construction of “Bamot” (illegal altars at at time when there is a central site for the Tabernacle/Temple), as in the cases of Gidon (Shoftim 6:24) and Eliyahu (I Melachim 18)—see RaShI on Tehillim 119:126.  

[11] The incident at Ba’al Pe’or becomes another instance of HaShem Punishing the Jewish people without affording Moshe the opportunity to intervene. A previous example where Aharon, instead of Moshe, is given the opportunity to take the credit for ending a plague and thereby gain credibility in the eyes of the people appears in BaMidbar 17:11-15. See http://www.kmsynagogue.org/Korach1.html

[12] Several commentators, including Ibn Ezra, Rabbeinu Bachaya, Chizkuni and Da’at Zekeinim MiBa’alei Tosafot, suggest, among other broader possibilities, an extremely narrow understanding of the “Brit Shalom” to the effect that HaShem was Guaranteeing Pinchos’ safety in the face of possible reprisals from the families of the individuals that he had just killed. While this could be understood as a real concern for Pinchos after causing the deaths of a Prince of Shimon and a Midianite princess, I find the implication of the term “Briti Shalom” as suggestive of a much more comprehensive Divine Intent.

[13] Avot D’Rabbi Natan, Chapt. 12 adds to the list as a separate example and implied general category, “Who makes peace between husband and wife.”

[14] Sheva Shanim Shel Sichot Al Parshat HaShavua, Keter, Jerusalem, 2000, p. 730.

[15] Certain letters in a Sefer Tora are written atypically, i.e., sometimes they are larger than usual or smaller than usual. In this case the letter “Vav” is clearly not a “Yud”, but also is not written in the manner that a “Vav” is typically written. The interpretive approach categorized as “Remez” (hints) attempts to account for these types of irregularities, as exemplified by this passage in Kiddushin.