Jewish Unity during Difficult Times

In a recent interview appearing in the July 24^th edition of HaAretz[1], R. Yaakov Meidan, a member of the Yeshivat Har Etzion faculty, stated that as a result of the Gaza situation, in the future, Israeli religious Zionists should forge alliances with the Chareidi community rather than with the “secular elites”. Not only does this mark a stark change for R. Meidan himself, who, as the article extensively points out, has made great efforts in attempting to find workable compromises with the secular leadership of Israel, but his comments are particularly disconcerting when one considers that R. Meidan is one of the Roshei Yeshiva-elect of Yeshivat Har Etzion, one of the most influential Yeshivot Hesder (Tora-study institutions where Israeli students alternately study and fulfill their army service over the course of five years within the context of the Yeshiva) associated with religious Zionism. It is entirely reasonable to expect R. Meidan to not only powerfully influence the Yeshiva with regard to Tora learning, but also vis-à-vis general life in Israel.

One of the men R. Meidan is succeeding as Rosh Yeshiva is R. Aharon Lichtenstein, long appreciated as a most articulate and important voice in the religious Zionist camp. R. Lichtenstein is not only recognized as a great Tora scholar, but his overall Hashkafa (worldview) has long reflected a sober and courageous sense of responsibility and concern for broad religious and social issues. In a review of several volumes of R. Lichtenstein’s collected essays and addresses recently published, Dr. Alan Brill writes “His moral vision is one of his distinctive exemplary traits striking anyone who has ever had the privilege of having dealings with him. His moral sincerity, consistency, and strength are, without exaggeration, one of the defining qualities of his vision, and, unfortunately and painfully, a rare commodity in our leaders.”[2] R. Lichtenstein’s views about the implications of the “disengagement” also appeared in HaAretz some days after the interview with R. Meidan, entitled, “Reflections on Decisive Times and Decisive Orders”.[3] With respect to the specific question of further participation by the religious Zionist movement in the affairs of Israeli society, R. Lichtenstein articulates a view that is clearly contrary to R. Meidan’s sentiments.

…There is also an internal price, which the national religious public is paying (when they feel alienated and desirous of separating themselves from the rest of Israeli society). National unity is not only a need of the army or the state; it is a social and spiritual need of the Tora- and Mitzva-observant public itself. The values of unity of the Jewish people and the obligation of mutual responsibility were not brought to the Beit Midrash (house of Tora study) from foreign fields.[4] They were spawned under the canopy of the Tora…[5]

R. Lichtenstein proceeds to cite two Talmudic sources[6] to demonstrate that even though unity is a value for the Jewish people wherever they may happen to reside, this is particularly so in terms of the land of Israel. Both sources, from the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds, focus upon explicating an evocative and theologically important verse in Devarim.

The hidden things are the province of HaShem, our God, and the public things are our responsibility as well as our children’s forever to act in accordance with all of the words of this Tora.

A reader of this verse cannot help but wonder regarding what are the “things” that are referenced? What distinguishes “hidden” things from those that are “public”? What are our responsibilities with respect to these “public” things? Two approaches for clarifying these questions are recorded in the Bavli version of Sanhedrin.

A dispute among Tannaim (Rabbinical commentators whose views are cited in Midrash and Mishna)…

Why are there dots[7] (in the Sefer Tora) over the words “Lanu” and “U’LeVaneinu” as well as the “Ayin” contained in the word “Ad”?

This is to teach that (the Jewish people) were not punished for the “hidden things” (i.e., sins that were perpetrated in private, without anyone else being aware that this was being done) until they crossed the Jordan River (into Israel). These are the words of R. Yehuda.

R. Nechemya said to him: Are (the Jewish people) ever punished for private transgressions (of individuals)? The Tora has clearly stated “forever”.[8] But rather, just as they never were held accountable for the private transgressions, so too they weren’t even held accountable for the public sins until Israel’s crossing the Jordan (into the land of Israel.)

But then what is the reason that (due to) Achan(‘s sin)[9] they (the Jewish people) were punished?[10] Because his wife and children were aware of what he was doing.[11]

The disagreement between R. Yehuda and R. Nechemya with regard to the collective responsibility of the Children of Israel for one another’s secret “Aveirot” (transgressions) appears to center around the question whether or not complicity for another’s actions can be assigned only if one was in a position to do something about either preventing the sin from happening in the first place, or at least influencing the lawbreaker to repent and make restitution before s/he is officially accused of the crime. R. Nechemya feels that you can’t blame someone if the matter was completely out of his/her hands—in this case, an action known only to the perpetrator. R. Yehuda, on the other hand, believes that the mutual responsibility for all actions, private and public, that was implied when the Jews stood together in unity at Sinai and collectively pronounced the plural “Na’aseh VeNishma” (We will do and we will hear) first takes effect when the Jewish people finally enters its homeland and thereby becomes a true nation.

The Talmud Yerushalmi’s parallel passage on the verse in Devarim presents a single view that is more extreme than even R. Yehuda’s.

Said R. Shimon ben Lakish: At the Jordan River, they (the Jewish people) “accepted” (in light of the next sentence, not willingly) upon themselves the “hidden things”.

Yehoshua (who was leading them into Israel) said to them: If you do not accept upon yourselves responsibility for the “hidden things”, the waters will come and inundate you.

Said R. Shimon bar Zavda: And it (Reish Lakish’s interpretation) is proper. You should know this is so, because Achan sinned and the majority of the Sanhedrin fell at Ai (the great Sanhedrin is comprised of 71 judges; since at the battle of Ai, Yehoshua 7:5 states that 36 Jews died, hence “half of a Sanhedrin”).[12]

Said R. Levi: At Yavneh (when the Sanhedrin had to relocate from Jerusalem to Yavneh as a result of the Roman persecutions that eventually led to the destruction of the Second Temple), “Hutra HaRetzua” (the strap became undone, i.e., there were an inordinate number of secretive crimes.) A “Bat Kol” (a prophetic voice from Heaven) issued forth and said, “You no longer have responsibility of the ‘hidden things.’”

It is notable how Reish Lakish’s understanding of what transpired at the Jordan River closely parallels the Midrashic description of the receiving of the Tora at Sinai according to Tractate Shabbat.

(Shemot 19:17) “And Moshe brought out the people to meet HaShem from the encampment and they stood themselves at the foot of the mountain.”

Said R. Avdimi bar Chama bar Chasa: This is to teach that the Holy One Blessed Be He Suspended the mountain above them like a ceiling, and Said to them, “If you accept the Tora, that will be good; and if not, right there will be your burial site (i.e., I will Drop the mountain upon you.)”

Consequently, in the same manner that according to R. Avdimi, HaShem Imposes upon the Jewish people the acceptance of the entire Tora, and rather than considering Mitzva observance as an option that the Jews willingly take upon themselves, the holy lifestyle is a Divine Expectation and therefore an obligation, similarly with respect to taking on the responsibility for another Jew’s private shortcomings, Reish Lakish suggests that this was something upon which the very lives of the Jews depended. The logic underlying the interrelationship between these two theological concepts is readily apparent: Since Judaism is a communal rather than an individual faith, not only is it important that a common spiritual lifestyle inform the members of the Jewish people, but also that everyone does his/her best to assist one another to assure that everyone will be able to achieve their respective maximum spiritual levels. And when one person fails, the entire communal body has failed to some degree. Furthermore, this should not only be a consideration “after the fact” and sins have already been committed, but awareness of mutual interdependence and responsibility that could possibly lead to collective punishment, should motivate everyone to try to both anticipate and prevent one another’s transgressions, and it goes without saying encourage one another’s Mitzva fulfillment.

R. Lichtenstein, basing himself upon the MaHaRaL, sees these two sources as indicating that the importance of Jewish unity is evident “…for the entirety of the Jewish people in its Exile, but…it carries even more weight in the Land of Israel, where the organic existential connection is conspicuous. And as hinted at in the Jerusalem Talmud in Sota 7:5, it is of especial consequence when a Jewish government is sovereign in Israel[13].”[14]

R. Yuval Cherlow, Rosh Yeshiva of the Yeshivat Hesder in Petach Tikva, addressing this same issue from a perspective parallel to R. Lichtenstein’s in his column in Ma’ariv this past week,[15] likens the relationship between the different cohorts in a given society to a marriage.

A partnership requires a certain type of compromise and agreement. Just as during the married life of a couple, neither person will be able form the family unit absolutely in accordance with his/her own vision and approach, the same is true with regard to the life of a nation. Despite the fact that we entertain a different outlook than the State of Israel with respect to most fundamental issues—from the form of government to national identity, from the nature of military service to cultural life—we decided to take part “LeChatchila”[16] (a priori) in everything. We are not shutting our eyes from the fact that in order to participate, we must serve in military units that do not conduct themselves in accordance with out fundamental principles, we study academic subjects in institutions that are far removed from the values of holiness, modesty and faith, we are partners with a government that conducts its affairs according to policies that are distant from fairness, righteousness and many other values…

(But if we choose to withdraw from all of these activities) there will be a heavy price to pay. The inward, personal loss would be the fruitful and active dynamism that flows specifically from interactions with other groups. But even more importantly the outward loss, there will no longer be any opportunity for influencing and elevating the general society once we choose to remove ourselves from it…

While the multi-faceted pain of the “disengagement” is readily apparent and deeply felt by any sensitive, empathetic individual, Jewish unity is a much greater fundamental issue that hopefully will not be irrevocably rendered asunder as a result of what is transpiring in Israel during the coming weeks.

[1] “Nobody is Listening”, by Ari Shavit and Yair Sheleg, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=603188

[2] “An Ideal Rosh Yeshiva: By His Light: Character and Values in the Service of God and Leaves of Faith by Rav Aharon Lichtentstein” in Edah Journal, 5:1, Tammuz 5765, p. 6.

[3] http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=602659

[4] It is disappointing to note that R. Lichtenstein himself alludes in one more place in his essay to the manner in which some try to dismiss his learning and perspectives on the world:

p. 6. “I will only note that I will admit without embarrassment that I come from a Beit Midrash that some of my adversaries consider to be tainted by a Diaspora mentality, that is very sensitive to human life in particular and to the human aspect in general.”

Rather than resorting to personal attacks, it would be much preferred if those who disagree would focus upon the respective merits of the arguments themselves in order to try to prove their points. Furthermore, who is to say that lessons learned in the Diaspora and influenced by that experience have no merit? Could this not have been one of the reasons why HaShem Decreed in the first place that the Jewish people must spend some time in exile?

An interesting essay that speculates regarding the differences between traditional observance as it develops in Israel and the Gola is “Does Place Make a Difference?: Jewish Orthodoxy in Israel and the Diaspora” by Eliezer Don-Yihiya, in Israel as a Religious Reality, ed. Chaim I. Waxman, Jason Aronson Inc., Northvale, NJ, 1994, pp. 43-74. Among Professor Don-Yihiya intriguing points is that due to Israeli Orthodoxy’s greater affinity for particularism and attraction to Messianic ideas, it is significantly more intolerant and inflexible than Diaspora Orthodoxy. One can see both “pluses” and “minuses” for each of these manifestations of Orthodox observance.

[5] “Reflections on Decisive Times and Decisive Orders”, p. 3.

[6] In a weekly publication entitled Israel Report, edited by Etan Bluman, Ari Clark, Chaim Cohen and Ari Gartenberg (students at the Tora Academy of Bergen County), Issue 470, July 29, 2005, R. Lichtenstein’s essay is excerpted, and then followed by excerpts from a response by Moshe Feiglin, leader of the Manhigut Yehudit faction of Likud. Mr. Feiglin introduced his comments with the following statement: “…even R. Lichtenstein would not claim that this was a Tora-scholarly article…” A close reading of R. Lichtenstein’s complete article, in which Talmudic sources as developed below as well as Halachic principles are clearly discussed (while someone may disagree with their interpretation and application, it is difficult to insist that R. Lichtenstein has not employed “Tora-scholarship” to reach his conclusions) gives at least this reader a distinctly opposite impression.

[7] BaMidbar Rabba 3:13 lists the following instances where dots appear over at least some of the letters of these verses in the Sefer Tora:

Beraishit 16:5; 18:9; 19:33; 37:12; BaMidbar 3:39; 9:10; 21:30; 28:21; Devarim 29:28.

A rule that appears several times in Midrashim on the Tora concerning letters that are dotted is cited in the name of R. Shimon ben Elazar:

Berashit Rabba 48:15

Said R. Shimon ben Elazar: In every place where you find the letters (in a word) that are undotted are more numerous than the ones that are dotted, you give greater credence to the undotted letters. Where there are more letters dotted than undotted, greater importance is attributed to the dotted letters.

Beraishit Rabba 78:9 cites a case where all the letters of a particular word are dotted, and then cites a dispute as to whether the dots indicate that the entire word should be given greater emphasis than usual, or whether the word should be interpreted as if its opposite had been written.

Consequently, since even without a portion of Devarim 29:28 being dotted, it would have evoked particular interest because of its evocative subject matter, now that dots do appear above a significant number of the verse’s letters, even more attention is commanded by it.

[8] R. Yehuda therefore reads the verse in question:

Devarim 29:28

The hidden things are the province of HaShem, our God only until the Jews cross the Jordan, when they become our responsibility as well, in contrast to the public things are our responsibility as well as our children’s forever to act in accordance with all of the words of this Tora.

R. Nechemya counters:

The hidden things are the province of HaShem, our God forever, while the public things are our responsibility as well as our children’s from the time the Jews cross the Jordan, forever from that time onwards to act in accordance with all of the words of this Tora.

[9] Achan secretly stole spoils from Yericho and hid them under his tent.

[10] The Jewish army subsequently lost the battle at Ai.

[11] The Talmud’s answer to the question of why according to R. Nechemya, Achan’s sin was in fact public rather than private, and therefore the Jews were collectively held accountable by losing the battle of Ai, is relevant to many of the discussions about and policies designed to thwart homicide bombing in the Moslem community. The State of Israel’s policy whereby the house of a homicide bomber is destroyed basically suggests that one’s family is responsible for one’s criminal behavior, not in some metaphysical or “Hammurabian” sense, but rather because someone must have known about what was being planned, and yet no steps were taken to prevent the bomber from carrying out his/her evil designs. In this case, the principle of “Shetika KeHoda’a Damei” (silence is tantamount to approval) seems to be operative.

[12] The case of Achan, where collective responsibility is assigned, causes the Bavli Sanhedrin to redefine the situation to be an incidence of public rather than private transgression, while the Yerushalmi Sota draws the conclusion that all Jews are responsible for even hidden sins, at least those residing in the land of Israel.

[13] The comment at the end of the passage implies that as long as the Sanhedrin, the symbol of a sovereign Jewish government was continuing to function normally in its proper seat, the “Lishkat HaGazit” (the Office of Hewn Stone) within the Temple, then mutual responsibility for “hidden things” continues. But once it was exiled, and therefore its power severely limited, there no longer was a Divine Expectation that the society as a whole would be able to deal with serious crime, both public and private.

[14] “Reflections on Decisive Times and Decisive Orders”, p. 3.

[15] "Shutafim Mela’im, Lamrot HaKoshi’im” (Full Partners, despite the Difficulties) in Ma’ariv, 7/29/05 http://nrg.co.il/cgi-bin/nrgprint.pl?channel=channel_judaism

[16] This is Halachic terminology for the ideal and preferred manner of doing something, as opposed to “BeDiAvad” (a posteriori) reflecting a minimum standard whereby it is considered that the law has been complied with, but it has not been carried out in the most ideal fashion.