Spiritual Slavery as a Virtue

“Shirat HaYam” (the Song at the Sea) (Shemot 15) contains several memorable statements about a) HaShem (15:1, 3, 6- 8, 10-13, 17-8), b) the Egyptians (15:4-5, 9), and c) other non-Jewish nations (15:14-16). Yet, regarding the Jewish people, those who were singing the song, relatively little is stated, aside from the end of verse 16 and the beginning of verse 17:

…Until “Amcha” (Your People) pass over, Oh Lord, until they pass over, this people “Kanita” (whom You Acquired).

Whereas there is ample prior textual evidence to the Jewish people being HaShem’s People,[1] the idea that HaShem has acted towards them as a “Koneh” (acquirer) is a novel concept.

The most literal interpretation of the phrase in question is provided by Ibn Ezra.

The connotation of “Kanita”—that they (the Jewish people) were slaves in Egypt. And now You have Acquired them to be for You slaves.[2]

Yahel Ohr, a commentary on Ibn Ezra, points to a later verse in the Tora that further clarifies the concept being presented.

The term reflects the same idea as in (VaYikra 25:42) “They are My Slaves because I Took them out from the land of Egypt, from the house of bondage.”

Ibn Ezra’s interpretation lends additional meaning to the first of the Ten Commandments:

I am the Lord your God Who has Brought you out from the land of Egypt, from the house of bondage.

In contrast to RaMBaN, who looks upon this verse as completely theological in nature, i.e., demonstrating aspects of God’s Essential Qualities:

He Said: “Who has Brought you out from the land of Egypt”—because His Taking them out from there was the evidence establishing the Existence and Will of God, because it was with His Knowledge and Providence that we came out of there. The Exodus is also evidence for the Creation of the world, for presuming the eternity of the universe, which precludes a Master of the Universe Who is in control of it, it would follow that nothing could be changed from its nature. And it is also evidence for God’s infinite Power, and His infinite Power is an indication of His Unity, as He Said, (Shemot 9:14) “That you (Pharoah) may know that there is none like Me in all the earth.” This is the intent of the expression “Who Brought you out…” since they are the ones who know and are witnesses to all these things.

Ibn Ezra sees 20:2 as the justification for why God has the right to Command the Jewish people to observe all of His Commandments, i.e., because they “belong” to Him as a result of His having Redeemed them from their slavery, a state that He Predicted that they would experience (Beraishit 15) and which He Orchestrated (the Canaanite famine forcing the family to relocate to Egypt at the end of Beraishit).

But just how much do the Jewish people technically “owe” HaShem as a result of the Exodus? An interesting analogy can be drawn from “Halachot” (Jewish law) that apply to kidnapped and then redeemed non-Jewish slaves working for Jewish masters.[3] The assumption that when slaves are redeemed from bondage, instead of becoming autonomous and answerable only to themselves, they now must devote their lives to serving their Liberator as slaves resonates with a dispute in the Mishna.

If a non-Jewish slave of a Jew be carried off by robbers and ransomed by a third party, if he is ransomed as a slave (i.e., with the intention that he will continue his life in servitude), he goes back to slavery. But if he is ransomed as a free man (i.e., that from this point on he no longer will be a slave), he does not go back to slavery.

The redemption from slavery takes place after the original owner has given up hope of recovering his slave. Consequently, according to the first view, i.e., that the servant who is redeemed in order that he continue to be a slave, the kidnap victim will be enslaved to the one who has redeemed him, since his original master essentially gave up his rights to reclaiming his slave. If he was redeemed with the intention that he be free, then he is no longer a slave to anyone.

R. Shimon ben Gamliel says regardless of the intent of the one who redeems him, the slave is returned to his original owner, because the Rabbis feared that if this were not the case, slaves would deliberately allow themselves to be kidnapped in order to thereby eventually win their freedom.

An alternate interpretation for R. Shimon ben Gamliel: If the slave was redeemed to be a slave, he will have to work for the individual who redeemed him. However if he was redeemed to be free, the slave must return to his original owner in order to discourage slaves from deliberately getting themselves kidnapped and eventually freed.

One would have thought that someone interested in redeeming a slave from his captors is acting in an altruistic manner, thinking only of the slave’s welfare and how he would be better off was he to be his own master. However, the Mishna’s assertion that just because the slave is no longer under the control of those who illegally captured him does not necessarily mean that he is free to live his life as he pleases, appears to diminish the purity of the act of redemption. The redeemer, rather than being interested in the objective freedom of the slave, is merely reassigning him to either his original master, or to a new and different slave driver, who is possibly acquiring a new slave conveniently and affordably. One could contend that if those who captured the slave are corrupt and cruel, even if the slave is required to continue to be enslaved following his redemption, at least he will now hopefully answer to someone who is more sensitive to his needs and his humanity. Furthermore, not only is a person who is fully Jewish obligated to live in accordance with the “Mitzvot”,[4] an “Eved Kena’ani” (lit. a Canaanite servant; someone who is not born Jewish and has been forcibly made into a servant for Jews) also has to fulfill all Commandments with the exception of time-bound “Mitzvot”;[5] therefore by placing him within the household of someone who will allow him and even encourage him to practice the Judaism to which he is obligated, this is in fact “helping” the slave to live a better and more fulfilled life, than were he to go off on his own and possibly cease being Jewishly observant.

Another dimension of whether a person who has become a slave is better off being “free” or remaining a slave, is reflected in the choice that is presented to a Jewish male slave[6] at the end of his first six years of servitude.

And if the servant shall plainly say: I love my master, my wife, my children.[7] I will not go out free.

Then his master shall bring him to the judges. His master shall bring him to the door or to the door post, and his master shall bore his ear through with an awl, and he shall serve him forever.

Although the requirement to make a hole in the slave’s earlobe is typically interpreted (Kiddushin 22b; RaShI on Shemot 21:6) as indicating that the individual did not hear clearly the pronouncement at Sinai recorded in VaYikra 25:55, “For unto Me the Jewish people are slaves (to the preclusion of any other master, if it can be possibly avoided)”—this verse very much emphasizes the same assumption in the verse cited by Yahel Ohr above—if it was such an evil for a Jew to be a slave to another human being, let alone to HaShem, why would this option even be offered by the Tora?[8] Whereas the original term of six years can be understood to constitute a means by which an indigent individual who either became overwhelmed by debt, or in desperation was brought to stealing and once apprehended, unable to repay what he had taken, can work off his debt and rehabilitate himself in order to once again rejoin society as a free and responsible individual, that such a person is allowed to choose to remain as a slave beyond his original six years until the Jubilee year[9] would seem not to have a similar personally beneficial quality. However, if we would assume, quite counter-intuitively, that at least for some people, the state of slavery may be preferable to the state of having the responsibility to fend for oneself, then it is easier to understand why the Tora would allow the Jewish slave to freely make such a choice.

Another manifestation of the ambivalence on the part of Jewish tradition with regard to the state of slavery, this time in terms of a non-Jew who is enslaved to a Jew, is reflected in the following Tannaitic debate:

If a man says (to a representative): Give …this declaration of emancipation (the document that demonstrates that an “Eved Cana’ani” [a non-Jewish slave] has been freed by his master), it is the man’s right to countermand… (this instruction). This is the ruling of R. Meir.

(R. Meir’s assumption is that receiving his freedom is detrimental to the non-Jewish slave. Consequently, the rule “Zachin LeAdam SheLo BeFanav” [one can perform a benefit for another even not in the presence of that other person; without that person’s knowledge] would not apply here, and therefore the surrogate who was given the declaration of emancipation cannot be viewed as also the representative of the recipient, the non-Jewish servant. Therefore as long as the servant does not actually receive this document, it has as yet not been officially transferred to him, and it is still considered in the possession of the master, who in turn can cancel it as long as it has not been received.)

The “Chachamim” (wise men) say: …He may not countermand the declaration of emancipation, on the principle that a benefit may be conferred upon a man in his absence (and as soon as the representative controls the document of emancipation, it is as if the slave has already received it)…for if he does not want to provide support for his non-Jewish slave (i.e., as long as the slave is still in the master’s possession, the master is entitled to say to his slave that he must try to support himself via begging or any other means), he is not bound to do so. (Consequently, since the slave is not necessarily better off vis-à-vis receiving support whether he is still in the state of slavery or not, there is no disability involved in receiving his freedom, and therefore once the order has been given to the surrogate to deliver the declaration of emancipation, it can no longer be rescinded.)

Said R. Meir to them: (By freeing him) does he not disqualify the slave from eating “Teruma” (the 1/40-1/60 of agricultural crops grown in Israel that must be given to the Kohen of one’s choice and that then is eaten by him, his family and his possessions, including his non-Jewish slaves) (and therefore this is a disability, preventing the surrogate from immediately acquiring the document of emancipation on behalf of the slave)?

They (the “Chachamim”) said to him: It (his right to eat “Teruma”) is only because he is the Kohen’s property (i.e., being able to eat “Teruma: is not a benefit per se for the slave. Since the Kohen has the right to feed “Teruma” to any and all of his possessions, including his animals as well as his non-Jewish slave, this is not such a great benefit. Furthermore, it is possible for the Kohen to sell his non-Jewish slave to a non-Kohen, thereby depriving the slave of “Teruma” without granting him his freedom. And as far as losing the ability to have an intimate relationship with a non-Jewish female slave, this would constitute a disability if he were unable to subsequently marry anyone. But since once he is free, he could marry a free woman, once again this is not deemed a disability.)

At first glance it is difficult to understand R. Meir’s position. By definition, isn’t it natural for any person, not only a Jew, but also non-Jews, to prefer to be in a state of freedom than to be enslaved? Even if technically there may be certain benefits that may no longer apply, isn’t the general existential state of being one’s own master an objective benefit that is not subject to someone else’s determination? A perspective on this issue is offered by Sefer HaChinuch, commenting on a verse in Parshat Behar.

(And you shall take them [the non-Jewish slaves] as an inheritance for your children after you to inherit them for a possession; they shall be your slaves forever...)

…And among the bases for this Commandment is because the Jewish people are among the choicest of the human race, and were created in order to acknowledge their Creator, and to serve before Him, and it is appropriate that they have servants who serve them. And if they do not have servants from among the nations, then at least they will have servants from among their own people which will result in these individuals being prevented from devoting as much effort as possible to serving the Holy One, Blessed Be He. Therefore we have been commanded to hold on to these (the non-Jewish servants) to serve us, after they have been made ready and idolatry has been uprooted from their mouths, and they will not be a stumbling block in our homes. And this is why it is stated afterwards, (the continuation of VaYikra 25:46) “…And your brothers, the Children of Israel, one man should not cause his brother to work hard”, i.e., therefore (if you retain your non-Jewish servants) you will not have to use your fellow Jews for servants, and all will be ready to engage in Divine Service…

And since the basis of this Commandment is to increase the number of individuals engaged in the Service of their Creator, may He Be Blessed, the Rabbis allowed this Commandment to be negated in all instances where such a negation would lead to the fulfillment of other Commandments, even for a Commandment that is only Rabbinic, as long as it is a Commandment that will benefit a group of people (as opposed to a single individual), e.g., if a “Minyan” is lacking in the synagogue, and it is necessary to free a non-Jewish slave in order to complete the “Minyan”. And you must not ask, “How can a positive Tora Commandment (not to free the non-Jewish slave) be abrogated in order to fulfill a Rabbinic Commandment (to pray in a “Minyan”)?” Since the basis of the Commandment is to increase the service of HaShem, Blessed Be He, upon the freeing of this individual this service can be performed in a superior manner, and now the individual will be obligated to fulfill many Commandments that while a non-Jewish slave he was exempt from (positive, time-bound Commandments), and this is why it is permitted to free him, for in this manner the matter has been handed down.

Although such a rationale would never justify the mistreatment of a non-Jewish slave, and RaMBaM has already codified how objectionable such behavior on the part of a slave owner is considered:

It is permissible to demand from a non-Jewish servant hard work. And even though this is the letter of the law, the attributes of piety and the way of wisdom require that an individual be compassionate and pursue justice, and not make heavy the burden of his servant, and not trouble him, and feed him and give him drink from all foods and drinks. The early sages used to share with their servants all of the foods and drinks that they would drink, and they would provide food for their animals and servants before they would take food for themselves, as it is said, (Tehillim 123:2) “As the eyes of the servants look to the hands of their masters, and as the eyes of the maid to the hand of her mistress, so our eyes wait upon the Lord our God, until He shall Be Gracious unto us.” Similarly one should not disparage his servant neither by gestures or words, for he has been given over to servitude, not to humiliation. And one must not frequently raise one’s voice or become angry, but rather speak with him calmly and listen to his complaints. And so is stated explicitly concerning the admirable conduct of Iyov regarding which he was praised: (31:13-14) “If I despised the cause of my male and female servants, what shall I do when God Rises up (against me)? And when He Remembers, what shall I answer Him? Did not He Who made me in the belly make him (the servant)? Did not One Fashion us in the womb?” Cruelty is to be found among the idolaters, but the descendents of our Father, Avraham, the Jewish people, upon whom the Holy One, Blessed Be He, Showered the goodness of the Tora, and Commanded them via statutes and laws to be righteous and compassionate to all, and similarly by means of the Attributes of the Holy One, Blessed Be He, Who Commanded us to emulate them, as it is said, (Tehillim 145:9) “God is Good to all, and His Compassion applies to all of His Works.” Everyone who engages in mercy, he will be the recipient of mercy, as it is said, (Devarim 13:18) “…That the Lord may Turn from the Fierceness of His Anger, and Show you Mercy, and have Compassion upon you, and Multiply you…”

the perspective of Sefer HaChinuch apparently assumes that if the purpose of all mankind is to serve HaShem, different roles are assigned to different individuals along the lines of a grand division of labor in order to achieve such an end. Consequently the non-Jewish servant is at the very least enabling a purer form of Worship and Service by freeing his master from certain responsibilities in order to devote his time, energy and attention to spiritual matters. Furthermore, between the Jewish people and their servants, there never is a pure master/servant relationship, since even the Jewish masters who appear to be in control of the lives of others, are in actuality slaves themselves to a Higher Master, One Who has Acquired ownership rights over all.

Whereas the assumption that the Exodus provides the basis for specifically Jews being considered the slaves of HaShem, a more universalistic perspective that would imply that all human beings are God’s “Property” and therefore subject to His Decrees, arises from an alternate interpretation of “Kanita” in Shemot 15:16.

…There is additionally implied in the term “Kanita”: “Yatzarta” (You have Formed/Created). You have Made it (the Jews) into a people. Parallels to this usage appear in Devarim 32:6 “…Is He not your Father “Kanecha”, He “Asecha” (Made you) and “VaYechonenecha” (Established you)”, Yeshayahu 43:21 “This people have I Formed for Myself, they shall relate My Praise.”

“Formation”, as opposed to “acquisition” applies to all human beings. While the Jewish people may have been formed by the experience of the servitude in and Exodus from Egypt, other nations have undergone their own formation processes under HaShem’s Influence. If HaShem is the Creator and Molder of all, He “Owns” all and is entitled to Impose His Will upon all. Every creature, animate and inanimate, therefore ought to see him/itself as absolutely beholden to God and solely committed to carrying out His Will, God’s Spiritual Slaves.

Shabbat Shalom, and may we strive to live up to the responsibilities that are engendered by being God’s Servants.

[1] See Shemot 3:7, 10; 4:22; 5:1; 7:4, 16, 26; 8:16-9; 9:1, 13; 10:3-4; 12:31.

[2] Although the phrase “Eved HaShem” is usually translated as “servant of HaShem”, if a parallelism is to be established between this terminology and the former status of the Jews in Egypt from which they were redeemed, then “slave of HaShem” would be more apropos.

[3] Although in this essay I resort to Halachic principles associated with slavery in the Jewish tradition, I would like to make clear that the entire issue as it pertains to non-Jews, even idolaters, being “owned” by Jews is deeply morally troubling. If the Tora is meant to be a document for all times and all societies, the religious justification for the institution of slavery is virtually impossible to comprehend. Since there is no Mitzva to own slaves, it is possible to render the entire practice moot by not engaging in it, and this is the absolutely appropriate stance to assume in this day and age. Nevertheless, our dismay aside, if it is part of the Jewish tradition, then at least we can attempt to derive spiritual principles from the theoretical rather than the practical reality of slavery. A similar approach is taken with respect to the (Devarim 21:18-21) “Stubborn and Rebellious Son” as well as the (Devarim 13:13-19) “Overturned City” about which the Talmud (Sanhedrin 71a) states they never came to pass, but nevertheless, “Derosh VeKabel Sechar” (interpret and receive reward.)

[4] It is for this reason that it becomes so important to redeem a Jew from slavery whose master is not Jewish, as emphasized in VaYikra 25:47 ff. Particularly according to the Rabbinic tradition reflected by RaShI on 25:47,that assumes that the master is not only an idolater, but an idolatrous Temple for which the Jew must help prepare sacrifices and maintain the facility, it is important to make it possible for the Jew to leave such a situation and the myriad transgressions that his service there inevitably forces him to violate.

[5] See e.g., Berachot 3:3 (20a).

[6] Non-Jewish slaves are virtually never to be freed according to the Tora—see VaYikra 25:46; Berachot 47b.

[7] According to the Rabbinic interpretation in Kiddushin 14b, quoted by RaShI on Shemot 21:4, a Jewish male servant is allowed to be given during his tenure as a slave, a non-Jewish female slave with whom to be intimate and have children. However, while the Jewish male slave could regain his freedom either after six years of slavery or by repaying the money that his master paid on the slave’s behalf to settle outstanding debts or thievery, the woman that he was given and any children which they had together are required to remain slaves. Consequently wanting to remain with the family that he has established as a slave might provide the incentive for him to wish to continue in this state rather than exercise the option to go free.

[8] Of course, one could always resort to the principle of “Dibra Tora KeNeged Yetzer HaRa” (lit. the Tora is speaking in order to sublimate/appease the Evil Inclination; i.e., that although a particular practice is permitted, it is not due to an attempt to challenge an individual to rise above his foibles and temptations, but rather to provide a less than ideal outlet for them, in light of what the alternative might prove to be if such an outlet were not legitimately offered), as in the cases of:

a) VaYikra 19:25. A promise is made that if the laws of “Arla” (the prohibition against partaking in the fruit of a newly planted fruit tree during the first three years of its bearing fruit) and “Revai” (the requirement that the fourth year’s produce be consumed in Jerusalem) will be observed, the produce of the fifth year will be exceedingly abundant. It appears that this type of enticement should not be necessary if a person were altruistically committed to performing the Commandments.

b) Devarim 21:11. The permission to marry a female war captive is given only due to a fear that were this not permitted, the soldier might rape the woman and then abandon her. Ideally however, a spouse should be chosen under other circumstances.

c) Kiddushin 40a. Said R. Abahu in the name of R. Chanina: It is better for a person to transgress in secret and not profane God’s Name in public. And R. Ilai HaZaken said: If a person sees that His Evil Inclination is getting the best of him, he should go to a place where no one knows him, and he should put on black clothing and he should wrap himself in black, and he should do what his heart desires, as long as he does not publicly profane God’s Name.

Concerning this Talmudic passage, Rabbeinu Chananel comments: Heaven forbid that a transgression is being permitted, but rather that Rabbis were speaking against the Evil Inclination, and recognized the deep desires of this individual, and they think that by going to a distant place and putting on black, his heart will break and he will in the end refrain from doing what he intended.

But if there is a perspective by which such a decision by the Jewish slave could be viewed as a sign of spiritual vitality rather than an indication of weakness and indecision or even transgression, why should we adopt the latter rather than the former?

[9] See VaYikra 25:10.