Rescinding Loans, Respect and Self-Respect

Not only are stories that first appeared in previous books of the Tora augmented and given different perspective in Devarim,[1] but Mitzvot are also often presented with either new detail or altered emphasis. In Parshat Re’eh, the Commandment of “Shmitta” (the Sabbatical year) that was first mentioned in Shemot and then extensively discussed towards the end of VaYikra, is revisited and we are presented with an aspect of the law that seems never even implied earlier on.

Whereas Parshiot Mishpatim and BeHar concern themselves with the agricultural dimension of “Shmitta”,

And the seventh “Tishmetena” (you will remove your hand) and let it (the field) lie fallow, so that the poor of your people may eat, and what they leave over, the beasts of the field may eat. In a similar manner you will deal with your vineyards and your olive orchards.

Speak to the Children of Israel and say to them: When you come to the land that I Give you, then shall the land keep a Shabbat for HaShem.

Six years you shall sow your field and six years you shall prune your vineyards, and gather in its fruit.

But in the seventh year shall be Shabbat of solemn rest for the land, a Shabbat for HaShem. You shall neither sow your field nor prune your vineyard.

That which grows by itself of your harvest, you will not gather, nor gather the grapes of the unpruned vine, because it will be a year of rest for the land.

And the Shabbat produce of the land shall be food for you and for your servant and for your maidservant and for your hired servant and for the stranger who sojourns with you.

And for your cattle and for the beast in your land shall all its produce be food.

And this is the matter of “Shmitta”: Every creditor that lends anything “BeRei’eihu” (his friend) “Shamot” (shall release it). He shall not demand it of his “Rei’eihu” or “Achiv” (his brother) because he has proclaimed “Shmitta” (a release) to Hashem.

From a non-Jew he may demand it (a loan),[3] but that which belongs to you that is with “Achicha” (your brother) (i.e., you lent your property to your brother) “Tashmeit” (you shall release) your hand…

If there be among you a poor man, one of “Achecha” (your brothers) within any of your gates in your land that HaShem your God Gives you, you shall not harden your heart, nor shut your hand “MeiAchicha HaEvion” (from your poor brother).

But you shall open your hand wide to him, and shall surely lend him sufficient for his need in that which he lacks.

Beware that there not be an unworthy thought in your heart, saying: The seventh year, the year of “Shmitta”, is approaching, and your eye be evil against “Achicha HaEvion” and you give him nothing, and he cry to HaShem against you, for it shall be considered with respect to you as a sin.

You shall surely give him and your heart shall not be grieved when you give him, because for this thing HaShem, your God will Bless you in all your works and in all that to which you put your hand.

It could be maintained that since not everyone is a landowner, let alone a farmer, in order for “Shmitta” to impact on a maximum number of individuals, the remission of loans serves to expand the universe of people affected by this Mitzva. Nevertheless, it is not obviously apparent what refraining from agricultural activities has directly to do with the remission of monetary debts incurred when one person has borrowed money from another.[4]

Sefer HaChinuch links the two aspects of “Shmitta” with regard to four distinct objectives:

…And therefore the Blessed One Commanded to declare ownerless all that the land brings forth during this year (the 7^th) aside from the resting during it (refraining from agricultural activities) in order for a person to remember that the (1) land that brings forth to him annually its fruits does not do so by means of its own strength or special qualities, but rather that there is a Master over it and over its owners, and when He Wishes, He Commands concerning it that it is to be declared ownerless.

And there is another benefit in the matter to acquire by means of this the quality of “giving way”, (2) because the ultimate generous individual is one who has no expectation of any sort of return.[5]

And there is another benefit in the matter whereby (3) the individual increases his trust in HaShem, because a person who can wholeheartedly to give away and declare ownerless to the world all of the produce of his fields and the inheritance of his fathers that grow annually for an entire year, and he and his entire family become educated in doing so, he will not be excessively greedy and will not be lacking in trust in the Divine…[6]

…And renouncing loans follows the same reasoning (that pertains to allowing the land to lie fallow), i.e., to teach our souls beneficial attributes: (2) The attribute of generosity,[7] as well as (3) establishing within our hearts great trust in HaShem, Blessed be He.[8] Then our souls will be prepared to receive Good from the Master of All in the form of Blessing and Kindness. And there also comes from this a strong fence and iron curtain (4) to distance oneself exceedingly from thievery and from desiring the possessions of our fellow, because we will make the following logical deduction: Even if I have loaned him my money and the “Shmitta” year arrives, the Tora states, “The lender must withdraw his hand not to steal and not to violently reacquire that which is his”, all the more so I must distance myself from desiring let alone taking that which never was mine.”

Although Sefer HaChinuch at the outset of his rationale for Devarim 15:2 makes the claim that “Shmittat Kesafim” (the rescinding of debts incurred via loans) stems from the same reasoning that applies to “Shmittat Karka’ot” (allowing the land to lie fallow) (“…And renouncing loans follows the same reasoning…”), the first reason that he lists in his commentary on Shemot 23:10-11, ( (1) “…there is a Master over it and over its owners…”) appears to be omitted among the reasons that he offers in his commentary on Devarim.[9] HaKetav VeHakabbala explicitly includes reason (1) in his discussion of the cancellation of loans during “Shmitta”, and supplies a proof text from Mishlei:

…The reason why the word “Yad” (hand) is added[10] is because it symbolllizes power, the upper “hand”, rulership and hegemony…because the lender is like the master of the borrower and his control is over him. (Mishlei 22:7;[11] Gittin 14a) “A borrower is the slave of the lender”. And the lender makes the borrower subservient to him in terms of his body (there is the potential that he has to sell himself as a servant in order to repay his debt) as well as his property (liens can be placed upon his real estate so that the debt is repaid). And the text is Commanding that in the Sabbatical year, the lender will relinquish all of the controls that he has over the borrower, not only that the debt does not have to be repaid, but also the potential collection from his body and from his property completely depart. For this reason the text states, “Teshamet Yadecha” (you will withdraw your hand), i.e., remove and withdraw the rulership of your hand from him, and once his subjugations are withdrawn, the lender can never again collect this debt at any future time…

HaKetav VeHaKaballa contends that the issue of instilling a limitation upon a sense of human mastery is in fact relevant not only to in the case of agricultural matters, but also with respect to specific monetary issues. An individual can incur a debt to another in a number of ways:

a) the two parties can be involved in buying, selling or renting objects, property or commodities;

b) one individual provides a service to another for which he is entitled to compensation;

c) someone may have injured another, destroyed or stolen his property and therefore becomes obligated in restitution and even atonement;

or d) a person makes capital or an object available to another who is in need,[12] with the understanding that the loaned object will be returned at some future point or that something of equal value will eventually be given to replace the original money or object.

In instances a)—c), either the two parties are on relatively equal footing[13] (there is a transaction with an agreed-upon price, with one side offering an object or service and the other providing monetary compensation) or the individual to whom the money is owed had been previously unwillingly victimized by the debtor and incurred some type of loss, resulting in his legally being defined as having the upper hand over the perpetrator, who must now make good on his malfeasance. To release such debtors from their obligations would be patently unfair to their opposite numbers who had either already provided them with an acquisition or service ( a) and b) ), or, even worse, it would demonstrate that one is not accountable for his reprehensible behavior towards others ( c) ). Naturally, if the creditor wishes to be “Mochel” (to forego the obligation which another owes him), that is his choice. But for the Halacha to insist upon such a “Shmitta” (removal of the hand) against the will of the creditor would undermine the basic social contract that underlies all commercial and social interactions and relationships.

It is specifically in case d) where a master-subordinate relationship has been created at the time of the loan by the person to whom the compensation is now owed. It is reasonable to assume that it was already personally humiliating for the poor individual to have had to seek out assistance in order to meet some past pressing need; by virtue of the creditor regularly reminding him of his continuing outstanding obligation, the debtor’s inferiority and incompetence in the face of the wealthier individual who had helped him is reiterated over and over.[14] Such a situation literally turns into a master-subordinate relationship if the burden of debt is so considerable that the debtor who cannot repay his loans must sell himself as a slave to either another Jew, or, under the direst of circumstances, to a non-Jew.[15] Consequently, by Commanding that loans be rescinded, God “Short-circuits” such a degrading relationship.

Whereas the ostensible benefit is to the borrower/debtor who as a result of “Shmittat Kesafim” is no longer plagued by the heavy burden of futilely trying to meet his financial obligations, Sefer HaChinuch implies and HaKetav VeHaKaballa states explicitly that there is a benefit to the lender as well, i.e., that the rescinding of the loans owed to him prevents him from developing the spiritually caustic sensibility of his superiority over other human beings.[16] Just as “Shmittat Karka’ot” sends a message that HaShem is Master of the land, “Shmittat Kesafim” specifically with respect to loans complements that message and asserts that He is also the One True Master over all people.[17]^,[18]

The objective to prevent a master-subservient relationship from developing as the result of some people being beholden to others as a result of unpaid loans, has a subtle correlative of which the Halacha is sensitively aware. Even if a poor person is released from his obligation to repay a long-standing debt that does not mean he will not feel guilty, beholden and inferior to the individual who had been kind to him in the past when he needed the money.[19] On a certain level, the “Eved Ivri” (the Jewish servant) is better off than someone who had never been sold into servitude, since the servant at least to some extent repaid the loan(s) that he incurred![20] Every time a borrower who never repaid any part of his loan sees or even merely thinks of the lender, the fact that the Tora legally excused the debt does not necessarily take away his shame and sense of inadequacy. Consequently the Halacha distinguishes between the borrower’s legal obligation which has been removed, and his moral obligation that remains very much in place:

…But this remission, literally, this “allowing to escape out of the hand” (fig., the rescinding of the loan; the creditor must “remove his hand”, resulting in the debtor “escaping out of his hand”) is entirely only one-sided. The creditor, the “Ba’al” (literally “master”) who by virtue of his legal claim on his neighbor had become a person in power, holding him in his hand, renounces forever his right to assert that power. But the debtor remains forever morally in his debt and duty-bound to repay him, and if the debtor offers voluntarily to discharge the debt, the creditor certainly has to declare “Meshamet Ani” (I am removing my hand) and places the “Shmitta” privilege at his (the borrower’s) disposal.[21] But if nevertheless the debtor persists in his repayment, the creditor may accept it (see Shevi’it 10:8). Yes, it is by no means the tendency of the Tora to release people who can pay from their moral duty of discharging their moral obligations, and from such people the creditor can expect that they will make no use of the “Shmitta” favor. The “Shmitta” declaration to be made by the creditor is what the Tora demands, but the relation of the debtor to the debt remains unaltered by it…The debtor who voluntarily pays a debt which was remitted by “Shmitta” is only acting in the true sense of the Tora (Shevi’it 10:9)…

…With the passing of the “Shmitta” period all debts which have been contracted are reduced to moral obligations only,[22] the settlement of which is left to the time and convenience which the debtor himself settles. Instead of the depression with which his debt loads him, he feels himself elevated by the confidence which the Tora places in him and he will make the repayment of what was a legal obligation and is not left entirely to his own free will, a matter of honor. The title “Re’ah” (friend) (Devarim 15:2) tells both the creditor and the debtor what is expected of them, and it is God the Father of them all, Who Wishes to See them in the exercise of such sentiments, as His Children, as brothers in His Household.

Shabbat Shalom and may thinking about Mitzvot such as “Shmittat Kesafim” challenge us to engage our fellow man with compassion, kindness and understanding.

[1] See e.g., recent essays on Parshiot Devarim (http://www.kmsynagogue.org/Devarim2.html), VaEtchanan (http://www.kmsynagogue.org/vaetchanan3.html), and Eikev (http://www.kmsynagogue.org/Eikev3.html) .

[2] It is notable that in VaYikra, where the Tora goes into great detail concerning the “Shmitta” of the land (the level of detail is so atypical that it draws Rabbinic comment—see RaShI on VaYikra 25:1), the term “Shmitta” never appears, with the text referring to the “Shabbat of the land”. Nevertheless since in Shemot “Shmitta” is used with respect to “Shmittat Karkaot”, it could be explained that whereas Shemot is concerned with what the owners of the land do during the Sabbatical year (i.e., remove their hands and allow the land to lie fallow), VaYikra describes the effect of the removal of the hands, i.e., that the land rests comparable to Sabbath observers resting during the weekly Shabbat.

[3] The distinction between Jews and non-Jews with respect to “Shmittat Kesafim” parallels a similar difference with respect to receiving interest from one who borrows money—see Devarim 23:21. See fn. 16.

[4] R. S.R. Hirsch on Devarim 15:2 writes:

…At the end of the year he (the creditor) has to testify to the fact that the real Lord and Owner of all possessions is God, Who has Declared the remission of all demands for debts which have become due until then…

It seems to me that R. Hirsch’s hypothesis is imprecise. If the point of “Shmittat Kesafim” was that all possessions belong to HaShem, why restrict the rescinding of obligations exclusively to loans? A renunciation of all possessions would mean that not only that which grows in the fields is ownerless and should be accessible to all comers, but any and all things that belong to people, moveable as well as immoveable objects, should be subject to the same rules. While one could counter that anarchy would reign as the result of declaring any and all property ownerless, nevertheless a grandiose statement to the effect that “the fact that the real Lord and Owner of all possessions is God” does not appear to be born out if “Shmittat Kesafim” only applies to debts incurred by loans. See below for what I consider a more refined and precise approach.

[5] The declaration of produce of the land to be ownerless in order to allow anyone to come and partake from it is an act of “Tzedaka”. Since the owner of the field will not necessarily know the identity of those who helped themselves, he cannot have any expectation of even “Tovat HaNa’ah” (the feeling on the part of the recipient of an act of kindness of indebtedness to pay back the kindness at some future point).

[6] Trust in the Divine in this regard allows the owner of the field whose produce has been declared ownerless not to worry that his needs and those of his family will not be met since he is giving away all of this food.

[7] The rescinding of loans to the poor is another form of “Tzedaka”, without expectation on the part of the lender of repayment. Even though there may be a moral responsibility on the part of the borrower to try to repay these loans (see R. S.R. Hirsch below), the lender is never supposed to count on the debt ever being repaid.

[8] See fn. 6.

[9] Sefer HaChinuch could be given the benefit of the doubt and one might claim that since he already listed reason (1) in Shemot, he does not have to repeat it in Devarim once he states that the same reasons apply. But then again, he does repeat reasons (2) and (3) and even adds (4). It seems to me to be much more logical to assume that when the author states that the same reasons apply, he was referring to those reasons that he explicitly lists, rather than to something that he does not list.

[10] “And this is the matter of ‘Shmitta’: Every “Mashe Yado” (lit. one who grips with his hand; i.e., creditor) that lends anything to his friend shall release it. He shall not demand it of his friend or his brother because he has proclaimed a release to Hashem.”

Note the additional usages of “hand” in the verses of Devarim 15.

[11] The verse in its entirety reads: “The rich rule over the poor, and the borrower is servant to the lender.” MaLBIM offers an interpretation that has direct bearing upon the discussion in this essay:

MaLBIM on Mishlei 22:7

It is known from the histories of the nations that in ancient times, the rich would lend monies to the poor with interest, and the law was if the borrower could not repay, the lender could take him, his wife and children as slaves and to oppress them physically in any manner that he wished. The rich would initially lend with interest to those who were “Dalim” (i.e., in difficult financial circumstances), and the borrowers would quickly become “Rashim” (individuals completely without means). The “Rash” is worse off than the “Dal”, since the “Dal” is in danger of losing his property, as compared to the “Rash” who no longer owns anything, and therefore becomes a slave. But because of this arrangement, from time to time there is a rebellion among the borrowers, and they would kill the lenders in order to extract extensive revenge from their oppressors, to the point where the rulers are forced either to declare an amnesty regarding the debts, or to repay them from the national treasury in order to quell the rebellion. And during these times, the wealthy individuals who did not lend with interest, but rather had compassion upon the poor and offered them charity, were saved and were regarded with respect and favorableness among the people…

[12] A wealthy individual can also at times be in need if his capital is not liquid and he wishes to avail himself of an opportunity to acquire new holdings. But the Tora’s discussions of loans in every instance involve someone who is literally poor and therefore becomes that much more subservient to his creditor by desperately needing a loan. See Shemot 22:24 ff.; VaYikra 25:35 ff.; Devarim 15:7 ff.; 24:6, 10 ff.

[13] One could argue against the above statement in light of the following Talmudic and codified sources:

Bava Batra 48a-48b

Raba said: The law is that if a man sells a thing under pressure or physical violence, the sale is valid (assuming that the seller is properly compensated for his property)…

One Taba (an individual’s name) tied a certain Papi (another individual’s name) to a tree and kept him there until he sold a field to him...

RaMBaM, Mishna Tora, Hilchot Mechira 10:1

One who was put under duress until he sold, and he accepted the price of the sale, even if he was suspended in the air until he sold, the sale is valid, whether with regard to moveable objects or real estate, because as a result of the duress, the seller decided fully to sell...

While there are various exceptions and means by which one can extract himself from such a sale, e.g., a declaration before the acceptance of the money in front of witnesses that the seller does not wish to sell, nevertheless if buyer and seller were conceptually considered equals in the transaction, it would be hard to imagine why duress would be permitted. However, it could be countered that since proper value has been given and the seller in the end, for whatever reason, agreed to part with his property, a fair transaction has taken place. While clearly against the spirit of friendship and collegiality, perhaps such a position was developed in order to obviate the possibility of people constantly claiming duress after the fact due to their seeing that they could have gotten a better deal for their possessions somewhere else. While some unscrupulous buyers might take advantage of such a proviso in the law, at the same time it might protect unsuspecting buyers from major losses when sellers improperly try to invalidate prior transactions.

[14] Most Rabbinic commentators assert that the debts are rescinded only at the end of the Sabbatical Year, in accordance with the manner in which the term “Miketz” (at the end of) in Devarim 15:1 is interpreted by the Midrash Halacha. ROSh (Gittin, Chapt. “HaSholeach”, #20) however, argues that while the debt is legally in play up until the end of the 7^th year, the Tora’s Instruction to “remove one’s hand” already applies from the beginning of the year in the sense that the lender is enjoined against even reminding the borrower of his outstanding obligations.

[15] See Shemot 21:2-6; VaYikra 25:39-55. RaShI on Shemot 21:2 interprets the verses in VaYikra to specifically relate to the case where a person becomes impoverished and cannot pay his debts as opposed to a situation where the court sells him in order to repay the losses arises from his thievery, which the commentator associates with the verses in Shemot.

[16] In fn. 3, it was noted that there is a distinction between Jews and non-Jews both with respect to “Shmittat Kesafim” as well as the charging of interest for loans. If one would offer the rationale that since loans are not intrinsically illegal—just as one can rent his property, he should similarly be able to rent his money—but nevertheless the Jewish people constitute an extended family to the effect that they are to treat one another with excessive kindness, then the application of these laws demonstrating the deep personal connection that exists among Jews is more readily understandable. However, once the rationales that we have seen in Sefer HaChinuch and HaKetav VeHaKaballa are suggested, i.e., the need to not feel mastery over the poor, the engendering of a spirit of generosity, a test with regard to the degree to which one trusts in HaShem, and to train ourselves not to be desirous of the possessions of others, it is difficult to account for why such exercises should not pertain to our relationships with all human beings, rather than just with Jews. Although there are some views that interest must be taken from non-Jews when they borrow money from Jews, and that their debts must not be rescinded during a Sabbatical year, there are sufficient contrary views that would argue that while it is not necessary to forgo these loans and interest, that does not mean that one must insist on collecting these monies. These latter perspectives would draw a distinction between the type of non-Jews that are the subjects of Biblical verses and Talmudic passages, who were pagan and idolatrous, and the gentiles with whom we interact today. Particularly in light of RaMBaM’s comment in Mishna Tora, Hilchot Melachim 10:12 :

…And so it appears to me that we must conduct ourselves vis-à-vis “Geirei Toshav” (sojourners among us who observe the 7 Noachide Commandments) with politeness and kindness as we would deal with Jews. Because we are Commanded to help them stay alive, as it is said, (Devarim 14:21) “You shall not eat animals that were not properly ritually slaughtered, to the sojourner in your gates you will give it and he will eat it…”

…Even concerning idolaters, the scholars said to visit their sick, to bury their dead along with the dead of Israel, and to support their poor along with the poor of Israel, because of the ways of peace. Behold it is stated, (Tehillim 145:9) “HaShem is Good to all, and His Compassion are upon all of His Works”, and (Mishlei 3:17) “Its (the Tora’s) ways are ways of pleasantness and all of its paths are peace”

keeping in mind the context of loans discussed in the Tora as relating specifically to a means by which kindness is offered to the poor, why shouldn’t kindness and respect be extended to these individuals in addition to fellow Jews?

[17] Such an approach would appear to beg the question with regard to Hillel’s institution of Pruzbul, whereby the legal loophole of transferring IOU’s to the court prevents the debts from being rescinded by the Sabbatical Year (see Gittin 4:3). Despite the Tora’s explicit warning against such behavior in Devarim 15:9,

“Beware that there not be an unworthy thought in your heart, saying: The seventh year, the year of ‘Shmitta’, is at hand, and your eye be evil against your poor brother and you give him nothing, and he cry to HaShem against you, for it shall be considered with respect to you as a sin”

it seems that the rich became so reticent about offering loans to the poor as the Sabbatical Year approached, that an economic crisis was created, and the only way in which the poor would have a chance to survive, was by circumventing the law. Consequently, it would appear that the very people in need of the lessons of not lording it over the poor, being generous, trusting in HaShem that He would Replace what they gave as charity and not desiring the property of others, were allowed not to learn these lessons. If the legislation would have applied only to Hillel’s generation (see e.g., Bava Kama 94b that describes legislation that was created specifically for R. Yehuda HaNasi’s generation), that would be one thing. But the institutionalization of Pruzbul down through the ages would appear to reflect poorly upon the Jewish people, who need to refine their personal character and religiosity as much as any other nation. When RaMBaM writes in Mishna Tora, Hilchot Temura 4:13,

…And most laws of the Tora are nothing but great directives to improve attitudes and to straighten behavior…

such positive personal development can only occur when the Commandments apply and are not allowed to be circumvented. Hillel may have been “Metaken Olam” (fixed the world) vis-à-vis the desperate straits of the poor, but he may have simultaneously permitted the rich to continue to “miss the point.”

[18] It is interesting to note that many Bible critics did not believe that the rescinding of the loans was permanent, but rather only something that would apply during the Sabbatical year itself. R. David Tzvi Hoffmann in his commentary to Devarim 15:1-3 attributes such a position to critics such as Michaels, Rosenmiller, Baumgarten, Reggio, Shultz, Zolshitz, Baer, Knobel, Keil and Dillman, among others. The reasons given by these commentators for disagreeing with the Rabbinic understanding that the debts were rescinded permanently include:

a) the cancellation of loans would stop people from lending to the poor altogether,

b) such a policy would aid and abet dishonest people who would take advantage of the system,

c) if the term “Shmot” is used with respect to the land (Shemot 23:11) and with respect to the fields having been allowed to lie fallow during the 7^th year, following the Sabbatical year the land is used as it was previously, why not say the same with regard to debts, i.e., following the 7^th year, they once again are to be collected?

HaKetav VeHaKabbala goes into great detail with regard to the similar claims of a commentary called “Iggeret Yashar”, one of whose claims is that the language of the Mishna Shevi’it 10:1 :

“Shevi’it” rescinds loans whether they were undertaken with an IOU or not…”,

suggesting that it is specifically the Sabbatical Year that cancels loans, and once it is no longer the 7^th year, the loans revert to their previous status of being in effect. HaKetav VeHaKaballa counters that the author did not see “Yashar” (lit., straight; a play on the commentary’s title), and rather than comparing the loan to the land during the 7^th year, let it be compared to the produce of the 7^th year, which retains its status, even once the Sabbatical Year is concluded.

Aside from the textual proofs that these commentators attempt to bring to bear in order to demonstrate that the loans would only be temporarily cancelled, there is a conceptual understanding of the institution of “Shmittat Kesafim” that they clearly do not comprehend. It appears that the loan that is being made to the poor individual is in fact a grant, out-and-out “Tzedaka” (charity). The only reason why it is defined as a loan is in order to preserve the dignity of the borrower who would prefer to be treated as one who has the potential to pay back his obligations rather than being given outright presents. Consider the following Talmudic passage:

Ketubot 67b

Our Rabbis taught: If a man has no means and does not wish to be maintained out of the poor funds, he should be granted the sum he requires as a loan and then it can be presented to him as a gift.

If we are discussing charity rather than a business arrangement, then it’s not a matter of the rich expecting to receive their money back because that is not the spirit in which this money ought to be given. But this “high road” was unfortunately not taken in Hillel’s time and continues to be a problem through the present day.

[19] The idea that the recipient of a loan will consider the lender having done him a favor serves as an important psychological foundation for the following Halachic position of Rava:

Bava Kama 107a

Rava stated: On what ground did the Tora lay down the rule that he who admits (in court) to a part of a claim (concerning a loan, e.g., the lender states that he lent $100 to the borrower, but the latter is prepared to admit to owing only $50) has to take an oath (the taking of an oath in court is an indication that there is suspicion that the individual is not telling the truth and therefore by forcing him to take an oath whereby he invokes God’s Name, holds a Sefer Tora, etc., he will possibly be intimidated into telling the truth in the event that he has been lying)? Because of the assumption that no man is so brazen (it would be considered completely inappropriate for the borrower to repudiate any and all responsibility to someone who has been helpful to him in the past; however once he admits to part of the claim, we suspect that he may be stalling for time to pay back the remainder) as to deny outright in the presence of his creditor the claim put forward against him.

[20] See fn. 15.

[21] There is concern that there not be mere going through the motions but that a sincere remission take place.

[22] Ironically, this view can be said to be a midpoint between the critics who wished to claim that following the Sabbatical Year the debt returns to its prior status of being in force even legally, and the positions of the Rabbis who insisted that at least on a legal level this was not the case. See fn. 12.