What Might They
have been Thinking?
R. Yaakov
Bieler
Parashat
VaYeishev, 5766
Although the main focus of Parshat
VaYeishev is the sale of Yosef by his brothers to the Yishmaelite caravan, and
how as a slave in Egypt, after a successful beginning in Potiphar’s house, Yosef
winds up in prison, Beraishit 38 recounts the apparently
independent mysterious and evocative
story of Yehuda and Tamar.
Chronologically we are told that
the events of Chapter 38 unfold immediately after Yosef is sold—(38:1) “VaYehi
Ba’Eit HaHih” (and it was at that time…), i.e., following on the heels of
the events of Chapter 37. We learn that Yehuda marries a Canaanite woman,[1]
Shua, and fathers three sons, Eir, Onan and Sheila. Yehuda arranges for Eir to
marry Tamar, but Eir unfortunately dies before a child can be born to him and
his wife. Although Beraishit 38 takes place well before the Tora is given at
Sinai in Shemot 19, nevertheless the practice of “Yibum” (levirate marriage—see
Devarim 25:5-10) appears to be in effect,[2]
and Yehuda instructs Onan that it is his responsibility to marry Tamar in order
that the late Eir, who was Yehuda’s firstborn and therefore entitled to
additional property rights, will have someone to carry on his name and inherit
his property. Onan, however, refuses to fulfill his father’s command, also
suddenly dies, and the responsibility for marrying Tamar falls in turn to
Sheila, who is at this point too young to marry anyone. Although Yehuda promises
Tamar that once Sheila comes of age, he will be ordered to marry her as Onan had
been, it becomes apparent to the twice over widow that Yehuda in fact does not
intend to fulfill his promise. Although the text uncharacteristically[3]
reveals to the reader Yehuda’s rationale for ignoring his guarantee to his
daughter-in-law, i.e., he was afraid that marriage to Tamar would prove to be as
lethal to Sheila as it had been to his two older brothers,[4]
Yehuda never discloses this. Tamar decides to take matters into her own hands,
and following the death of his wife, Shua, seduces Yehuda by pretending to be a
prostitute, conceives, and upon being threatened with execution due to her
illegitimate[5]
pregnancy, confronts her father-in-law with evidence that he is the father of
the unborn twins that she is carrying. Yehuda admits to his patrimony as well as
how he has wronged her by not carrying out his commitment to allow her to marry
Sheila. The story ends with Tamar’s giving birth to the twins, one of whom,
Peretz, becomes the progenitor of the line from whom King David
descends.
The most obvious incongruities in
this story are:
1) how, if at all, can Tamar’s seduction of
Yehuda be justified,
and 2) what are we to conclude regarding
Yehuda’s engaging a prostitute, regardless of his marital status and her
specific identity?
RaShI’s strangely elusive comment
attempting to account for Tamar’s intent in seducing Yehuda seems to raise more
questions than it answers:
RaShI on 38:14 “Because she saw that Sheila had
grown… (and was not being given to her by Yehuda for a husband as he had
promised)”
Therefore “Hifkira Atzma”[6]
(she made herself as if she was free/unfettered/unmarried, i.e., she ignored
that she had been instructed to await Sheila’s coming of age, and instead acted
as if she had no marital restrictions upon herself) because she desired to
have children with him (Yehuda).”
While Tamar’s single-minded
determination to contribute to the formation of the Jewish people by having
children with a key member of Yaakov’s family, if not his grandsons, then with
his son Yehuda himself, could be deemed admirable, one must ask whether “the
ends justify the means”. One of the seven Noachide Commandments[7]
which are considered by Jewish tradition to be binding upon all human beings
from the earliest moments of civilization is the prohibition against “Gilui
Arayot” (sexual immorality). Even if Rabbinic authorities debate whether the
letter of the law that applied to Noachides included only actions of
adultery, incest and any other intimate relationship between people who could
never legally marry, the spirit of the law would appear to be
unambiguous—extra-marital relationships are improper and not conducive to
the establishment of a basic modicum of morality for human civilization.
Furthermore, Rabbinic tradition maintains that following the Flood, people
became particularly leery about sexual immorality in light of Beraishit
6:12, “And God Saw the earth, and
behold it had become corrupted, because all living things had corrupted their
ways on the earth.” Recalling the horrors of the Flood created a mindset
whereby despite the Divine Assurances to Noach that another Flood would never
come to destroy the earth (9:11), it was not worth taking chances,[8]
and society had to police itself in order to prevent things from getting out of
hand once more. A manifestation of such hypersensitivity appears in the
following Midrash:
Mishnat R. Eliezer, Chapt.
7:[9]
(Beraishit 19:11)
“And Yaakov kissed Rachel and he
lifted up his voice and he cried.”
Said R. Shimon: In the Tora, in
the Prophets and in the Writings we find that a person has to take into
consideration the impression that he makes upon others, in the same manner that
he is concerned about making an impression upon God...
And so it says, “And Yaakov kissed
Rachel and he lifted up his voice and he cried.” And why did he cry? He noticed
people whispering to one another, saying: Did this one come here to renew
matters of promiscuity among us? Immediately he cried, to demonstrate that
this was not a lascivious kiss, but rather one indicating love of a family
relation.
So how can we understand and
possibly even confer legitimacy to Tamar’s ostensibly adulterous and incestuous
behavior and Yehuda’s giving in to the lures of someone he took to be a
prostitute?
At first glance, paradigms in
the Bible which might supply at least Tamar’s actions with some legitimacy
are Yael and Esther. According to Nazir 23b, Yael seduced the
Philistine general Cisera prior to killing him with a tent peg. And in Megilla
15a, Esther is understood to have declared to Mordechai that whereas previously
she was able to claim that the King’s marital demands of her were made against
her will, now that she is to willingly invite him along with Haman to her
chambers, in order to be able to reveal that she too is endangered by the evil
courtier’s plottings, she no longer can make the claim of “Ones” duress to
rationalize her intimate relationship with the Persian King. However, upon
further reflection, Tamar’s situation would appear to be distinct from these two
Biblical heroines whom the Rabbis claim[10]
offered themselves to men under questionable circumstances. Yael’s and Esther’s
actions are taken within the greater context of eliminating a lethal threat
to the existence of the Jewish
people as a whole and the summary defeat of its avowed enemies in the
persons of Cisera and Haman. What comparable extenuating circumstance can Tamar
claim that would justify her actions? Was she so self-possessed that she thought
that were she not to conceive and raise up members of Avraham’s family, the sort
of descendents that lead to David and the Messiah would never come about, and
therefore she had to become involved, no matter what it
took?
Perhaps the story of Yehuda’s
mother Leah’s determination to marry Yaakov can serve as an earlier
paradigm for Tamar’s subsequent behavior with respect to Yehuda himself.[11]
The biblical text clearly states that Yaakov’s intent was to marry only Rachel,
and not her older sister (29:18). Lavan obviously had other plans, and at the
last moment, substituted Leah for Rachel under the marriage canopy (29:23).
Although Lavan is identified as the instigator of the switch, and in an act of
self-justification, he eventually derides Yaakov’s expectation to be allowed to
marry the younger of the two sisters before the older is married (29:26), Leah
did go along with the plan. If Yaakov does not discover until the following
morning that it was Leah rather than Rachel that he had married, Leah obviously
willingly supported and contributed to Lavan’s deception in order to become
Yaakov’s wife, regardless of the cloud that such deception cast upon their
relationship in subsequent years.[12]
In a comment that at least partially parallels what he writes concerning Tamar’s
actions with respect to Yehuda, RaShI suggests that Leah was motivated to do
whatever was required in order to marry the type of person that she wanted, and
avoid marrying someone whom she did not want.
RaShI on 29:17 “And the eyes of Leah were
soft/watery…”—(According to the tradition in Bava Batra 123a) she (Leah) thought
that her lot would be to become the wife of Eisav (Yaakov’s brother, and the
ostensibly older[13]
of the twins born to Yitzchak and Rivka). This resulted in her constantly
crying, because it was being said, “Rivka has two sons and Lavan has two
daughters. The older (Eisav) to the older (Leah) and the younger (Yaakov) to the
younger (Rachel).”
It is logical to assume that
wishing to marry Yaakov and not Eisav also implied wanting to have children
fathered by Yaakov rather than by Eisav, a course of action that is later
replicated by Tamar with respect to finding a way to have children with Yehuda.
Consequently, in the cases of Leah
and Tamar, it would appear that their pure, idealistic intentions become more
significant than the actions that engender raised eyebrows. The Talmud and its
commentators highlight Tamar’s thoughts and actions in the following manner:
Nazir 23b Said Ulah: Tamar acted
promiscuously and Zimri acted promiscuously (BaMidbar 25:1-9). Tamar acted
promiscuously and there emerged from her kings and prophets (RaShI: a reference
to David and Yeshayahu); Zimri acted promiscuously and as a result tens of
thousands of Jews were killed (in the resulting executions and
plagues).
RaShI (and
Tosafot)
“Tamar who acted
promiscuously”—and had the intention of doing so for the sake of a Mitzva,
in order to provide offspring. (RaShI fills out this comment in Horiyot 10b,
where he adds, “from righteous fathers”)…
“Zimri who acted
promiscuously”—and had the intention to commit a
transgression.
In addition to Leah’s rather
unorthodox and unethical efforts to become part of Yaakov’s family, the Rabbis
draw attention to the story of Timna, alluded to in Parshat VaYeishev, as
another example of the extent to which outsiders wish to associate with this
special family and its distinguished lineage, in whatever capacity possible,
even if it is extremely indirectly. Furthermore, implicit in this Aggada is the
assumption that when someone’s pure motives to be joined to Avraham’s special
family, i.e., here too the intentions were “LeShem Shamayim”, are rebuffed, not
only the woman in question, but the entire family as a whole ends up
suffering!
Sanhedrin 99b (Beraishit 36:22) “The sister of
Lotan was Timna”—Who was Timna? She was the daughter of royalty, as it is
written (36:29, 40) “The chieftain of Lotan…”, “The chieftain of Timna”. And
every chieftain is a king without a crown (i.e., even though officially a
chieftain is not a king, for all intents and purposes he has royal status,
thereby conferring upon Timna royal status as well). She was desirous to convert
and went to Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov. But they refused to accept her. She
went and became the concubine for Elifaz, son of Eisav. She
said: It is better that I be a handmaiden in this house, than a
noblewoman anywhere else. There descended from her Amalek who exceedingly
troubled the Jewish people. Why did this occur? Because they (Avraham, Yitzchak
and Yaakov; fig. the Jewish people) should not have driven her
away.
A third example of a woman who
appears to be single-mindedly pursuing the opportunity to become one of the
progenitors of the Jewish people and that also happens to be recorded in Parshat
VaYeishev, is Mrs. Potifera. The simple meaning of the text (39:6-7)
suggests that this individual is simply an immoral person attempting to commit
adultery with a powerless slave to whom she is physically attracted. Yet the
Rabbis attribute her immodest overtures towards Yosef as stemming from a
Prophetic sense that she too is personally destined to contribute offspring to
Yosef’s family line. RaShI
understands the juxtaposition of the story of Tamar’s seduction of Yehuda in
Beraishit 38, followed in the next chapter by the account of Mrs. Potifera’s
attempts to seduce Yosef (Chapt. 39), as of a piece.
RaShI on 39:1“And Yosef was brought down to
Egypt” (this is the beginning of the chapter that immediately follows the story
of Yehuda and Tamar)—the text is returning to the original story (interrupted at
the end of Chapt. 37)…and in order to associate the action of Tamar with the
action of Mrs. Potifera, in order to say that just as that was for the sake
of Heaven, so too this was for the sake of Heaven, for she had seen in her
horoscope that in the future she would have offspring through him (Yosef). But
she did not know whether they would be descended through her or through her
daughter.[14]
In a similar vein, in order to
remove the suggestion of immorality from Tamar’s actions, some commentators
approach Tamar’s decision as something that she was Divinely Inspired to do,
similar to Mrs. Potifera, and therefore what took place should be considered
beyond moral reproach.
Midrash Shochar Tov (cited in Tora
Shleima, #59, p. 1458) (38:13) “’VaYugad’ (And it was
told)[15]
to Tamar, saying: Behold, your father-in-law (Yehuda) has gone up to Timna to
sheer the sheep.” It was told to Tamar by means of “Ruach HaKodesh” (the
Holy Spirit), “Behold, your father-in-law goes up to
Timna.”
Yet one can wonder about both
Tamar and Mrs. Potifera’s conclusions regarding the implications of the Divine
Messages that they may have received, in the same manner that questions can be
raised regarding Rivka’s actions once she is informed that she is carrying
within her the progenitors of two nations and that the younger will dominate the
older. Once someone is given this type of information regarding future
offspring, to what degree must measures, including those that are morally
questionable, be undertaken to assure that the prophecies be fulfilled? Is that
the very message of the prophecy, i.e., do whatever you have to in order to
assure that you will have children with certain fathers and that those children
will turn out to assume certain roles, or are the recipients of such messages
supposed to only resort to “legal” and “legitimate” means to help along the
unfolding of the situations to which they have been made privy? While the prophecies ultimately come
true, it is unclear that the particular ministrations of the women involved were
necessary in order to make these things happen. Yaakov may have received
Yitzchak’s blessings without Rivka’s plottings; if Tamar would have directly
spoken to Yehuda, perhaps he would have relented concerning Sheila rather than
forcing her to resort to such desperate measures; and Mrs. Potifera, even
according to RaShI’s suggestion that she was Divinely Inspired, did not
precisely understand what she was being told. As recipients of these
prophecies—the Biblical text only mentions explicitly such a revelation to Rivka
in 25:22—one wonders if these women passed or failed the tests that being given
such information presented to each of them.
But what about Yehuda’s actions
with respect to engaging a prostitute? Some commentators, such as Ta’am VaDa’at,
suggest that Yehuda too was acting as a result of Prophecy and therefore engaged
in an activity that ordinarily he would never dream of pursuing. However, it
would appear according to the Midrash as well as the Halachic Codes, that a
metaphysical explanation does not have to be invoked, and that a profound difference existed with
respect to such practices between the state of affairs pre- and post-Sinai.
Midrash HaGadol (cited in Tora
Shleima, #78, p. 1462)
(38:16) “…And she said to him,
‘What will you give me so that you can come in to
me?”
The Biblical text is declaring
that prior to the giving of the Tora, if a man would encounter a woman in a
public setting, and if they were both desirous of an intimate relationship, he
would pay her a price that she would set, they would be intimate in a place
along the road (as opposed to his bringing her to his home for marriage
purposes—see RaMBaM, Hilchot Ishut 1:1) and he would go on his way, because the
prohibition of “Kedeisha” had not as yet been imposed upon them. And the money
that he would give to her corresponded to the payment made by a husband to a
wife during future generations.
RaMBaM,
Mishna Tora, Hilchot Ishut, 1:4
(After
practically quoting the above verbatim, RaMBaM continues:
Once
the Tora was given, the “Kedeisha” arrangement became prohibited, as it is
stated, (Devarim 23:18)
“There will not be a ‘Kedeisha’[16]
from among the daughters of
Israel…”
Therefore anyone who has intimate relations with another for the sake of
promiscuity, not within the context of “Kiddushin” (the Rabbinic process of
Sanctification for the sake of marriage) will receive corporeal punishment as
ordained by the Tora because he was involved with a “Kedeisha”.[17]
The Talmud further attempts to
create a context for Yehuda’s pre-Sinai actions, that removes from him the
reproach that a modern reader might sense when reading about his actions.
Sota 10a R. Shmuel bar Nachmani said: It
(the place where Tamar sat in order to entrap Yehuda, 38:14) is called “Petach
Einayim” (lit. the gate/door of eyes[18])
because she gave “eyes” to her words (i.e., she gave plausible answers to each
of Yehuda’s questions when he was determining whether she was permissible to
him).
When Yehuda inquired about her
(Tamar), he asked her, “Are you perhaps a non-Jew?”
She replied, “I am a convert.”
“Are you perhaps
married?”
“I am unmarried.”[19]
“Perhaps your father has accepted
on your behalf betrothals (to other men)?”
She replied, “I am an
orphan.”
“Perhaps you are ritually
impure?”
“I am ritually
pure.”
If an illicit relationship was
intended, then according to this Talmudic passage, it would seem that Tamar’s
answers would specifically not be what Yehuda wishes to hear. Apparently, some
form of temporary “Kiddushin” (legitimate marriage) was acceptable at this point
in Biblical history, and Tamar had to first satisfy Yehuda’s requirements before
he would be intimate with her.
As this chapter is studied more
and more, it appears that when one question is finally answered, a dozen more
questions appear upon the horizon. Yet the process of inquiry directed at these
difficult-to-understand Biblical passages is necessary if we are to throw light
upon this portion of our history, and more importantly, if we are to try to
understand that prior to the Tora’s officially being given, greater emphasis was
placed upon what a person intended and thought, than upon what s/he necessarily
did. Apparently, since human thoughts and sensibilities are impossible to
legislate, as the Jewish people grew in numbers and diversity, a standardization
of action became necessary, leading to the codification of Tora and Mitzvot.
Hopefully a happy medium can be attained whereby we not only act in accordance
with holiness and righteousness, but we think such thoughts as well.
Shabbat
Shalom.
[1] Yaakov’s sons marrying Canaanite
women is assumed in several commentaries. Why were they permitted to do this,
when both Avraham and Yitzchak insisted that this not take place is an
interesting issue. See www.kmsynagogue.org/VaYeshev.html
for an essay on this theme.
[2] On the one hand, the existence of
“Yibum” at this point could support the claim of ChaZaL that the Forefathers and
Foremothers fulfilled the Commandments of the Tora before it was officially
given by God to the Jewish people—see e.g., Mishna Kiddushin 4:14 and RaShI on
Beraishit 26:5. But it could also be contended that whereas specific Jewish
ritual law may not have been practiced at this point in the history of the
Jewish people, there is an internal logic in the law of levirate marriage that
would make it a sensible part of any people’s social contract. In order to
assure an orderly inheritance from one generation to another, children are
necessary, and in the event that a father dies before he fathers any, they can
be fathered by intimate family members of the deceased, as long as the mother is
the same. The practice of “Yibum” could then be understood as a corollary to the
instances of surrogate motherhood that we encounter with respect to Sara and
Hagar, as well as Bilha and Rachel, and Zilpa and Leah. In these latter cases,
the father is the same, and the mothers have substitutes in order that
additional children be born into the family, both for inheritance and
demographic purposes.
A post-Sinai instance of at least a
type of biblical “Yibum” appears in Ruth 3:12-3; 4:1-13. The fact that the
option to marry the deceased’s widow in Beraishit and Ruth is not confined to
his brothers but seems to include, in the case of Tamar, her father-in-law, and
with respect to Ruth, first “Ploni”, and then Boaz, apparently relatively
distant relatives, suggests either a surprisingly loose interpretation of the
Biblical verses (“brother” and “sister” could mean “relative” rather than
specifically “sibling”, as in Beraishit 29:12), or despite a resemblance to
“Yibum”, Yehuda’s involvement with Tamar and the case in point in Ruth are
fundamentally distinct from “Yibum”, particularly in light of her not being
Jewish while married to one of Naomi’s sons.
[3] The Bible tends to only reveal a
character’s external actions rather than their trains of thought and
motivations. See Erich Auerbach’s essay “Mimesis” in his collection of writings
entitled Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans.
Willard R. Trask, Princeton U. Press, 1953.
[4] Tamar’s situation whereby a woman’s
first two husbands die while still married to her, becomes codified in Jewish
law as the basis for preventing such a widow from marrying a third
time:
Tur, Even HaEzer
#9
A woman who has been married to two
men who have died, she should not marry a third because she is considered to
have the “Chazaka” (the status achieved after a series of repetitions of events)
of one whose husbands die. (In Rabbinic commentaries on the Talmud, e.g., RaShI
on Yevamot 26a, such an individual is termed a “Katlanit” [one who causes the
death of others].) And if she nevertheless marries a third time, my father (the
father of the author of the Tur, R. Yaakov Ba’al HaTurim, was the Ro”Sh,
Rabbeinu Asher) wrote that we force the third husband to divorce this woman,
because the danger to which he is exposed is more significant than the
prohibition against forcing a husband to divorce against his will, and just as
the “Beit Din” (the Jewish court) is obligated to stop an individual engaged in
transgressing a prohibition, so too is the “Beit Din” obligated to prevent a
person from doing harm to himself.
While it could be contended that in
the Biblical period, such Rabbinic legislation as recorded in the Tur had not as
yet been enacted or undertaken, nevertheless the prudence of Yehuda’s actions
would seem to be supported by the subsequent Halachic ruling. Therefore, if
Yehuda is to be faulted for not giving Sheila to Tamar, it was more a matter of
not disclosing to her his intentions, rather than his deciding to withhold his
third and only surviving son from her.
[5] A “Yevama” (the levirate wife) is
Halachically bound to await the “Yavam”’s (the candidate to marry her and carry
on the deceased brother’s line) decision to either marry her or perform the
“Chalitza” ceremony. Only if the “Yavam” chooses the latter does the “Yevama”
become free to marry someone outside the family. See Devarim
25:5-10.
[6] The terminology that RaShI chooses
connotes a reckless abandon that appears to be inappropriate for a moral
individual. Making oneself “Hefker” suggests that one allows others to do with
one as they wish. Not only does this appear inappropriate for someone coming
from the tradition of the family of Avraham; it would seem improper for anyone
to view themselves to be in such a licentious state.
[7] The other six are: Prohibitions
against 1) Murder, 2) Idolatry, 3) Blasphemy, 4) Thievery, 5) Taking a limb from
an animal that is still alive and the Positive Commandment to establish law
courts to prosecute violators of the other basic laws. These laws are listed,
derived from Biblical verses and discussed in Sanhedrin
56a.
[8] Most obviously, even if God Does
not Bring another Flood, there are other natural catastrophes that could be
employed to convey God’s Displeasure over the moral shortcomings of human
society. Then there is the subtlety implied in RaShI’s comment on
Shemot 1:10:
“Let us outsmart him”—i.e., the
Jewish people….And the Rabbis interpreted, “Let us outsmart the<
Savior (HaShem) of Israel and judge them by water (i.e., let
us throw the male children into the River and thereby utilize water as our
killing platform). For He has already Sworn that He will not Bring a Flood ever
again (and they [the Egyptians] did not understand that upon the entire earth He
will not Bring such a Flood, but He could Do so against a single
nation!)
[9] Quoted in R. Menachem Kasher’s Tora
Shleima, Vol. 5, p. 1162.
[10] The verses in Shoftim and Esther do
not explicit state that Yael and Esther were intimate with Cisera and
Achashveirosh. Yet the Rabbis infer that this was the case from the superfluous
language in Shoftim 5:27 as well as the direct invitation extended in Esther 5:8
for the King to visit the Queen in her chambers.
[11] In an essay on Parshat Lech Lecha
(http://www.kmsynagogue.org/LechLecha2.html)
it was noted that Rabbinic tradition contends that Hagar was given by her father
Pharoah to Avraham so that she could be part of his holy household. However,
whether there was an additional intent either on her part or that of her birth
family that she conceives children on Avraham’s behalf is far from clear. If
anything, RaShI’s comment on 16:3 suggests that Hagar was reluctant to serve in
such a capacity.
Beraishit
16:3
“And Sarai, the wife of Avraham,
took Hagar the Egyptian, her handmaiden, after 10 years of dwelling in
Canaan with Avraham, and she gave her to
Avram her husband as a wife”
RaShI
“And Sarai took”—she took her with
words. She said to her, “You should be happy that you have merited to cling to
such a holy body as his!”
In general, whenever the verb “to
take” is used in connection with a human being, RaShI interprets the context as
one of “taking the person” by convincing him/her rather than employing physical
coercion.
[12]
Beraishit
29:31
“And HaShem Saw that Leah was
hated…”
RaMBaN
“That Leah was hated”—Behold Leah
deceived both her sister (Rachel) as well as Yaakov. Even if one argues that she
was honoring her father (Lavan) who forcibly took hold of her and brought her to
him, and she did not wish to resist him, it was still her responsibility to
either say or hint that she was Leah; but instead she distanced herself all
night, and for this reason he (Yaakov) did not recognize her until the morning.
And for this reason Yaakov hated her. And HaShem Knew that she had done this
in order to be married to a “Tzaddik” (righteous individual), and for this
reason He had Compassion upon her (and caused her to conceive a number of
times)…
[13] In the course of trying to justify
Yaakov’s purchase of the birthright from Eisav, commentators strive mightily to
demonstrate how in fact Yaakov may have been the older of the two brothers,
despite Eisav’s emerging first, e.g., Yaakov was conceived first, even if he
emerged into the world second; the struggling in the womb reversed the positions
of the feti and caused them to be born “out of order”, etc. Nevertheless, the obvious “fact on the
ground” was that Eisav was the older, and it therefore was a reasonable
expectation that he should marry the older of Lavan’s daughters,
Leah.
[14] In the end, Yosef marries the
daughter of Potifera in 41:45.
[15] The passive form of the verb and
the absence of an identifiable subject in the sentence allows for the
supposition that the information did not reach Tamar by ordinary human means,
but rather via a Divine Oracle.
[16] The similarity between the terms
“Kedeisha” and “Kiddushin” are difficult to overlook. In both cases, a form of
“dedication” is indicated; in the former, dedication to a life of immorality and
promiscuity with multiple partners, in the latter dedication to a single
individual over the course of a lifetime.
[17] Maggid Mishna, a commentator on RaMBaM, claims that the basis for his making this pronouncement about what took place before the Tora was given is the very case of Yehuda and Tamar, which he apparently viewed as normative of the times, rather than as an aberration.
[18] But the words also mean “the
opening of the eyes”. Ironically at this point, Yehuda does not see; but three
months later he comes to see only too well.
[19] Commentators obviously have
difficulty with this response. Some claim that the marriages with Yehuda’s sons
were never consummated and therefore, she was neither legally bound to Sheila
nor prohibited from
Yehuda.