What Might They have been Thinking?

 

R. Yaakov Bieler

Parashat VaYeishev, 5766

 

Although the main focus of Parshat VaYeishev is the sale of Yosef by his brothers to the Yishmaelite caravan, and how as a slave in Egypt, after a successful beginning in Potiphar’s house, Yosef winds up in prison, Beraishit 38 recounts the apparently independent mysterious and evocative story of Yehuda and Tamar.

 

Chronologically we are told that the events of Chapter 38 unfold immediately after Yosef is sold—(38:1) “VaYehi Ba’Eit HaHih” (and it was at that time…), i.e., following on the heels of the events of Chapter 37. We learn that Yehuda marries a Canaanite woman,[1] Shua, and fathers three sons, Eir, Onan and Sheila. Yehuda arranges for Eir to marry Tamar, but Eir unfortunately dies before a child can be born to him and his wife. Although Beraishit 38 takes place well before the Tora is given at Sinai in Shemot 19, nevertheless the practice of “Yibum” (levirate marriage—see Devarim 25:5-10) appears to be in effect,[2] and Yehuda instructs Onan that it is his responsibility to marry Tamar in order that the late Eir, who was Yehuda’s firstborn and therefore entitled to additional property rights, will have someone to carry on his name and inherit his property. Onan, however, refuses to fulfill his father’s command, also suddenly dies, and the responsibility for marrying Tamar falls in turn to Sheila, who is at this point too young to marry anyone. Although Yehuda promises Tamar that once Sheila comes of age, he will be ordered to marry her as Onan had been, it becomes apparent to the twice over widow that Yehuda in fact does not intend to fulfill his promise. Although the text uncharacteristically[3] reveals to the reader Yehuda’s rationale for ignoring his guarantee to his daughter-in-law, i.e., he was afraid that marriage to Tamar would prove to be as lethal to Sheila as it had been to his two older brothers,[4] Yehuda never discloses this. Tamar decides to take matters into her own hands, and following the death of his wife, Shua, seduces Yehuda by pretending to be a prostitute, conceives, and upon being threatened with execution due to her illegitimate[5] pregnancy, confronts her father-in-law with evidence that he is the father of the unborn twins that she is carrying. Yehuda admits to his patrimony as well as how he has wronged her by not carrying out his commitment to allow her to marry Sheila. The story ends with Tamar’s giving birth to the twins, one of whom, Peretz, becomes the progenitor of the line from whom King David descends.

 

The most obvious incongruities in this story are:

1)  how, if at all, can Tamar’s seduction of Yehuda be justified,

    and 2)  what are we to conclude regarding Yehuda’s engaging a prostitute, regardless of his marital status and her specific identity?

 

RaShI’s strangely elusive comment attempting to account for Tamar’s intent in seducing Yehuda seems to raise more questions than it answers:

 

RaShI on 38:14 “Because she saw that Sheila had grown… (and was not being given to her by Yehuda for a husband as he had promised)”

Therefore “Hifkira Atzma”[6] (she made herself as if she was free/unfettered/unmarried, i.e., she ignored that she had been instructed to await Sheila’s coming of age, and instead acted as if she had no marital restrictions upon herself) because she desired to have children with him (Yehuda).”

 

While Tamar’s single-minded determination to contribute to the formation of the Jewish people by having children with a key member of Yaakov’s family, if not his grandsons, then with his son Yehuda himself, could be deemed admirable, one must ask whether “the ends justify the means”. One of the seven Noachide Commandments[7] which are considered by Jewish tradition to be binding upon all human beings from the earliest moments of civilization is the prohibition against “Gilui Arayot” (sexual immorality). Even if Rabbinic authorities debate whether the letter of the law that applied to Noachides included only actions of adultery, incest and any other intimate relationship between people who could never legally marry, the spirit of the law would appear to be unambiguous—extra-marital relationships are improper and not conducive to the establishment of a basic modicum of morality for human civilization. Furthermore, Rabbinic tradition maintains that following the Flood, people became particularly leery about sexual immorality in light of Beraishit 6:12, “And God Saw the earth, and behold it had become corrupted, because all living things had corrupted their ways on the earth.” Recalling the horrors of the Flood created a mindset whereby despite the Divine Assurances to Noach that another Flood would never come to destroy the earth (9:11), it was not worth taking chances,[8] and society had to police itself in order to prevent things from getting out of hand once more. A manifestation of such hypersensitivity appears in the following Midrash:

 

Mishnat R. Eliezer, Chapt. 7:[9] (Beraishit 19:11) “And Yaakov kissed Rachel and he lifted up his voice and he cried.”

Said R. Shimon: In the Tora, in the Prophets and in the Writings we find that a person has to take into consideration the impression that he makes upon others, in the same manner that he is concerned about making an impression upon God...

And so it says, “And Yaakov kissed Rachel and he lifted up his voice and he cried.” And why did he cry? He noticed people whispering to one another, saying: Did this one come here to renew matters of promiscuity among us? Immediately he cried, to demonstrate that this was not a lascivious kiss, but rather one indicating love of a family relation.

 

So how can we understand and possibly even confer legitimacy to Tamar’s ostensibly adulterous and incestuous behavior and Yehuda’s giving in to the lures of someone he took to be a prostitute?

 

At first glance, paradigms in the Bible which might supply at least Tamar’s actions with some legitimacy are Yael and Esther. According to Nazir 23b, Yael seduced the Philistine general Cisera prior to killing him with a tent peg. And in Megilla 15a, Esther is understood to have declared to Mordechai that whereas previously she was able to claim that the King’s marital demands of her were made against her will, now that she is to willingly invite him along with Haman to her chambers, in order to be able to reveal that she too is endangered by the evil courtier’s plottings, she no longer can make the claim of “Ones” duress to rationalize her intimate relationship with the Persian King. However, upon further reflection, Tamar’s situation would appear to be distinct from these two Biblical heroines whom the Rabbis claim[10] offered themselves to men under questionable circumstances. Yael’s and Esther’s actions are taken within the greater context of eliminating a lethal threat  to the existence of the Jewish people as a whole and the summary defeat of its avowed enemies in the persons of Cisera and Haman. What comparable extenuating circumstance can Tamar claim that would justify her actions? Was she so self-possessed that she thought that were she not to conceive and raise up members of Avraham’s family, the sort of descendents that lead to David and the Messiah would never come about, and therefore she had to become involved, no matter what it took?

 

Perhaps the story of Yehuda’s mother Leah’s determination to marry Yaakov can serve as an earlier paradigm for Tamar’s subsequent behavior with respect to Yehuda himself.[11] The biblical text clearly states that Yaakov’s intent was to marry only Rachel, and not her older sister (29:18). Lavan obviously had other plans, and at the last moment, substituted Leah for Rachel under the marriage canopy (29:23). Although Lavan is identified as the instigator of the switch, and in an act of self-justification, he eventually derides Yaakov’s expectation to be allowed to marry the younger of the two sisters before the older is married (29:26), Leah did go along with the plan. If Yaakov does not discover until the following morning that it was Leah rather than Rachel that he had married, Leah obviously willingly supported and contributed to Lavan’s deception in order to become Yaakov’s wife, regardless of the cloud that such deception cast upon their relationship in subsequent years.[12] In a comment that at least partially parallels what he writes concerning Tamar’s actions with respect to Yehuda, RaShI suggests that Leah was motivated to do whatever was required in order to marry the type of person that she wanted, and avoid marrying someone whom she did not want.

 

RaShI on 29:17 “And the eyes of Leah were soft/watery…”—(According to the tradition in Bava Batra 123a) she (Leah) thought that her lot would be to become the wife of Eisav (Yaakov’s brother, and the ostensibly older[13] of the twins born to Yitzchak and Rivka). This resulted in her constantly crying, because it was being said, “Rivka has two sons and Lavan has two daughters. The older (Eisav) to the older (Leah) and the younger (Yaakov) to the younger (Rachel).”  

 

It is logical to assume that wishing to marry Yaakov and not Eisav also implied wanting to have children fathered by Yaakov rather than by Eisav, a course of action that is later replicated by Tamar with respect to finding a way to have children with Yehuda.

 

Consequently, in the cases of Leah and Tamar, it would appear that their pure, idealistic intentions become more significant than the actions that engender raised eyebrows. The Talmud and its commentators highlight Tamar’s thoughts and actions in the following manner:

 

Nazir 23b Said Ulah: Tamar acted promiscuously and Zimri acted promiscuously (BaMidbar 25:1-9). Tamar acted promiscuously and there emerged from her kings and prophets (RaShI: a reference to David and Yeshayahu); Zimri acted promiscuously and as a result tens of thousands of Jews were killed (in the resulting executions and plagues).

 

RaShI (and Tosafot)

Tamar who acted promiscuously”—and had the intention of doing so for the sake of a Mitzva, in order to provide offspring. (RaShI fills out this comment in Horiyot 10b, where he adds, “from righteous fathers”)…

Zimri who acted promiscuously”—and had the intention to commit a transgression.

 

 In addition to Leah’s rather unorthodox and unethical efforts to become part of Yaakov’s family, the Rabbis draw attention to the story of Timna, alluded to in Parshat VaYeishev, as another example of the extent to which outsiders wish to associate with this special family and its distinguished lineage, in whatever capacity possible, even if it is extremely indirectly. Furthermore, implicit in this Aggada is the assumption that when someone’s pure motives to be joined to Avraham’s special family, i.e., here too the intentions were “LeShem Shamayim”, are rebuffed, not only the woman in question, but the entire family as a whole ends up suffering!

Sanhedrin 99b (Beraishit 36:22) “The sister of Lotan was Timna”—Who was Timna? She was the daughter of royalty, as it is written (36:29, 40) “The chieftain of Lotan…”, “The chieftain of Timna”. And every chieftain is a king without a crown (i.e., even though officially a chieftain is not a king, for all intents and purposes he has royal status, thereby conferring upon Timna royal status as well). She was desirous to convert and went to Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov. But they refused to accept her. She went and became the concubine for Elifaz, son of Eisav. She said: It is better that I be a handmaiden in this house, than a noblewoman anywhere else. There descended from her Amalek who exceedingly troubled the Jewish people. Why did this occur? Because they (Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov; fig. the Jewish people) should not have driven her away.

A third example of a woman who appears to be single-mindedly pursuing the opportunity to become one of the progenitors of the Jewish people and that also happens to be recorded in Parshat VaYeishev, is Mrs. Potifera. The simple meaning of the text (39:6-7) suggests that this individual is simply an immoral person attempting to commit adultery with a powerless slave to whom she is physically attracted. Yet the Rabbis attribute her immodest overtures towards Yosef as stemming from a Prophetic sense that she too is personally destined to contribute offspring to Yosef’s family line.  RaShI understands the juxtaposition of the story of Tamar’s seduction of Yehuda in Beraishit 38, followed in the next chapter by the account of Mrs. Potifera’s attempts to seduce Yosef (Chapt. 39), as of a piece.

RaShI on 39:1“And Yosef was brought down to Egypt” (this is the beginning of the chapter that immediately follows the story of Yehuda and Tamar)—the text is returning to the original story (interrupted at the end of Chapt. 37)…and in order to associate the action of Tamar with the action of Mrs. Potifera, in order to say that just as that was for the sake of Heaven, so too this was for the sake of Heaven, for she had seen in her horoscope that in the future she would have offspring through him (Yosef). But she did not know whether they would be descended through her or through her daughter.[14]

In a similar vein, in order to remove the suggestion of immorality from Tamar’s actions, some commentators approach Tamar’s decision as something that she was Divinely Inspired to do, similar to Mrs. Potifera, and therefore what took place should be considered beyond moral reproach.

Midrash Shochar Tov (cited in Tora Shleima, #59, p. 1458) (38:13) “’VaYugad’ (And it was told)[15] to Tamar, saying: Behold, your father-in-law (Yehuda) has gone up to Timna to sheer the sheep.” It was told to Tamar by means of “Ruach HaKodesh” (the Holy Spirit), “Behold, your father-in-law goes up to Timna.”

 

Yet one can wonder about both Tamar and Mrs. Potifera’s conclusions regarding the implications of the Divine Messages that they may have received, in the same manner that questions can be raised regarding Rivka’s actions once she is informed that she is carrying within her the progenitors of two nations and that the younger will dominate the older. Once someone is given this type of information regarding future offspring, to what degree must measures, including those that are morally questionable, be undertaken to assure that the prophecies be fulfilled? Is that the very message of the prophecy, i.e., do whatever you have to in order to assure that you will have children with certain fathers and that those children will turn out to assume certain roles, or are the recipients of such messages supposed to only resort to “legal” and “legitimate” means to help along the unfolding of the situations to which they have been made privy?  While the prophecies ultimately come true, it is unclear that the particular ministrations of the women involved were necessary in order to make these things happen. Yaakov may have received Yitzchak’s blessings without Rivka’s plottings; if Tamar would have directly spoken to Yehuda, perhaps he would have relented concerning Sheila rather than forcing her to resort to such desperate measures; and Mrs. Potifera, even according to RaShI’s suggestion that she was Divinely Inspired, did not precisely understand what she was being told. As recipients of these prophecies—the Biblical text only mentions explicitly such a revelation to Rivka in 25:22—one wonders if these women passed or failed the tests that being given such information presented to each of them.

 

But what about Yehuda’s actions with respect to engaging a prostitute? Some commentators, such as Ta’am VaDa’at, suggest that Yehuda too was acting as a result of Prophecy and therefore engaged in an activity that ordinarily he would never dream of pursuing. However, it would appear according to the Midrash as well as the Halachic Codes, that a metaphysical explanation does not have to be invoked, and  that a profound difference existed with respect to such practices between the state of affairs pre- and post-Sinai.

 

Midrash HaGadol (cited in Tora Shleima, #78, p. 1462)

(38:16) “…And she said to him, ‘What will you give me so that you can come in to me?”

The Biblical text is declaring that prior to the giving of the Tora, if a man would encounter a woman in a public setting, and if they were both desirous of an intimate relationship, he would pay her a price that she would set, they would be intimate in a place along the road (as opposed to his bringing her to his home for marriage purposes—see RaMBaM, Hilchot Ishut 1:1) and he would go on his way, because the prohibition of “Kedeisha” had not as yet been imposed upon them. And the money that he would give to her corresponded to the payment made by a husband to a wife during future generations.

 

RaMBaM, Mishna Tora, Hilchot Ishut, 1:4

(After practically quoting the above verbatim, RaMBaM continues:

Once the Tora was given, the “Kedeisha” arrangement became prohibited, as it is stated, (Devarim 23:18) “There will not be a ‘Kedeisha’[16] from among the daughters of Israel…” Therefore anyone who has intimate relations with another for the sake of promiscuity, not within the context of “Kiddushin” (the Rabbinic process of Sanctification for the sake of marriage) will receive corporeal punishment as ordained by the Tora because he was involved with a “Kedeisha”.[17]

 

The Talmud further attempts to create a context for Yehuda’s pre-Sinai actions, that removes from him the reproach that a modern reader might sense when reading about his actions.

 

Sota 10a R. Shmuel bar Nachmani said: It (the place where Tamar sat in order to entrap Yehuda, 38:14) is called “Petach Einayim” (lit. the gate/door of eyes[18]) because she gave “eyes” to her words (i.e., she gave plausible answers to each of Yehuda’s questions when he was determining whether she was permissible to him).

When Yehuda inquired about her (Tamar), he asked her, “Are you perhaps a non-Jew?”

She replied, “I am a convert.”

“Are you perhaps married?”

“I am unmarried.”[19]

“Perhaps your father has accepted on your behalf betrothals (to other men)?”

She replied, “I am an orphan.”

“Perhaps you are ritually impure?”

“I am ritually pure.”

 

If an illicit relationship was intended, then according to this Talmudic passage, it would seem that Tamar’s answers would specifically not be what Yehuda wishes to hear. Apparently, some form of temporary “Kiddushin” (legitimate marriage) was acceptable at this point in Biblical history, and Tamar had to first satisfy Yehuda’s requirements before he would be intimate with her.

 

As this chapter is studied more and more, it appears that when one question is finally answered, a dozen more questions appear upon the horizon. Yet the process of inquiry directed at these difficult-to-understand Biblical passages is necessary if we are to throw light upon this portion of our history, and more importantly, if we are to try to understand that prior to the Tora’s officially being given, greater emphasis was placed upon what a person intended and thought, than upon what s/he necessarily did. Apparently, since human thoughts and sensibilities are impossible to legislate, as the Jewish people grew in numbers and diversity, a standardization of action became necessary, leading to the codification of Tora and Mitzvot. Hopefully a happy medium can be attained whereby we not only act in accordance with holiness and righteousness, but we think such thoughts as well.

 

Shabbat Shalom.



[1] Yaakov’s sons marrying Canaanite women is assumed in several commentaries. Why were they permitted to do this, when both Avraham and Yitzchak insisted that this not take place is an interesting issue. See www.kmsynagogue.org/VaYeshev.html for an essay on this theme.

[2] On the one hand, the existence of “Yibum” at this point could support the claim of ChaZaL that the Forefathers and Foremothers fulfilled the Commandments of the Tora before it was officially given by God to the Jewish people—see e.g., Mishna Kiddushin 4:14 and RaShI on Beraishit 26:5. But it could also be contended that whereas specific Jewish ritual law may not have been practiced at this point in the history of the Jewish people, there is an internal logic in the law of levirate marriage that would make it a sensible part of any people’s social contract. In order to assure an orderly inheritance from one generation to another, children are necessary, and in the event that a father dies before he fathers any, they can be fathered by intimate family members of the deceased, as long as the mother is the same. The practice of “Yibum” could then be understood as a corollary to the instances of surrogate motherhood that we encounter with respect to Sara and Hagar, as well as Bilha and Rachel, and Zilpa and Leah. In these latter cases, the father is the same, and the mothers have substitutes in order that additional children be born into the family, both for inheritance and demographic purposes.

A post-Sinai instance of at least a type of biblical “Yibum” appears in Ruth 3:12-3; 4:1-13. The fact that the option to marry the deceased’s widow in Beraishit and Ruth is not confined to his brothers but seems to include, in the case of Tamar, her father-in-law, and with respect to Ruth, first “Ploni”, and then Boaz, apparently relatively distant relatives, suggests either a surprisingly loose interpretation of the Biblical verses (“brother” and “sister” could mean “relative” rather than specifically “sibling”, as in Beraishit 29:12), or despite a resemblance to “Yibum”, Yehuda’s involvement with Tamar and the case in point in Ruth are fundamentally distinct from “Yibum”, particularly in light of her not being Jewish while married to one of Naomi’s sons.

[3] The Bible tends to only reveal a character’s external actions rather than their trains of thought and motivations. See Erich Auerbach’s essay “Mimesis” in his collection of writings entitled Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask, Princeton U. Press, 1953.

[4] Tamar’s situation whereby a woman’s first two husbands die while still married to her, becomes codified in Jewish law as the basis for preventing such a widow from marrying a third time:

Tur, Even HaEzer #9

A woman who has been married to two men who have died, she should not marry a third because she is considered to have the “Chazaka” (the status achieved after a series of repetitions of events) of one whose husbands die. (In Rabbinic commentaries on the Talmud, e.g., RaShI on Yevamot 26a, such an individual is termed a “Katlanit” [one who causes the death of others].) And if she nevertheless marries a third time, my father (the father of the author of the Tur, R. Yaakov Ba’al HaTurim, was the Ro”Sh, Rabbeinu Asher) wrote that we force the third husband to divorce this woman, because the danger to which he is exposed is more significant than the prohibition against forcing a husband to divorce against his will, and just as the “Beit Din” (the Jewish court) is obligated to stop an individual engaged in transgressing a prohibition, so too is the “Beit Din” obligated to prevent a person from doing harm to himself.

While it could be contended that in the Biblical period, such Rabbinic legislation as recorded in the Tur had not as yet been enacted or undertaken, nevertheless the prudence of Yehuda’s actions would seem to be supported by the subsequent Halachic ruling. Therefore, if Yehuda is to be faulted for not giving Sheila to Tamar, it was more a matter of not disclosing to her his intentions, rather than his deciding to withhold his third and only surviving son from her.

[5] A “Yevama” (the levirate wife) is Halachically bound to await the “Yavam”’s (the candidate to marry her and carry on the deceased brother’s line) decision to either marry her or perform the “Chalitza” ceremony. Only if the “Yavam” chooses the latter does the “Yevama” become free to marry someone outside the family. See Devarim 25:5-10.

[6] The terminology that RaShI chooses connotes a reckless abandon that appears to be inappropriate for a moral individual. Making oneself “Hefker” suggests that one allows others to do with one as they wish. Not only does this appear inappropriate for someone coming from the tradition of the family of Avraham; it would seem improper for anyone to view themselves to be in such a licentious state.

[7] The other six are: Prohibitions against 1) Murder, 2) Idolatry, 3) Blasphemy, 4) Thievery, 5) Taking a limb from an animal that is still alive and the Positive Commandment to establish law courts to prosecute violators of the other basic laws. These laws are listed, derived from Biblical verses and discussed in Sanhedrin 56a.

[8] Most obviously, even if God Does not Bring another Flood, there are other natural catastrophes that could be employed to convey God’s Displeasure over the moral shortcomings of human society. Then there is the subtlety implied in RaShI’s comment on Shemot 1:10:

“Let us outsmart him”—i.e., the Jewish people….And the Rabbis interpreted, “Let us outsmart the< Savior (HaShem) of Israel and judge them by water (i.e., let us throw the male children into the River and thereby utilize water as our killing platform). For He has already Sworn that He will not Bring a Flood ever again (and they [the Egyptians] did not understand that upon the entire earth He will not Bring such a Flood, but He could Do so against a single nation!)

[9] Quoted in R. Menachem Kasher’s Tora Shleima, Vol. 5, p. 1162.

[10] The verses in Shoftim and Esther do not explicit state that Yael and Esther were intimate with Cisera and Achashveirosh. Yet the Rabbis infer that this was the case from the superfluous language in Shoftim 5:27 as well as the direct invitation extended in Esther 5:8 for the King to visit the Queen in her chambers.

[11] In an essay on Parshat Lech Lecha (http://www.kmsynagogue.org/LechLecha2.html) it was noted that Rabbinic tradition contends that Hagar was given by her father Pharoah to Avraham so that she could be part of his holy household. However, whether there was an additional intent either on her part or that of her birth family that she conceives children on Avraham’s behalf is far from clear. If anything, RaShI’s comment on 16:3 suggests that Hagar was reluctant to serve in such a capacity.

Beraishit 16:3

“And Sarai, the wife of Avraham, took Hagar the Egyptian, her handmaiden, after 10 years of dwelling in Canaan with Avraham, and she gave her to Avram her husband as a wife”

RaShI

“And Sarai took”—she took her with words. She said to her, “You should be happy that you have merited to cling to such a holy body as his!”

In general, whenever the verb “to take” is used in connection with a human being, RaShI interprets the context as one of “taking the person” by convincing him/her rather than employing physical coercion.

[12]             Beraishit 29:31

“And HaShem Saw that Leah was hated…”

RaMBaN

“That Leah was hated”—Behold Leah deceived both her sister (Rachel) as well as Yaakov. Even if one argues that she was honoring her father (Lavan) who forcibly took hold of her and brought her to him, and she did not wish to resist him, it was still her responsibility to either say or hint that she was Leah; but instead she distanced herself all night, and for this reason he (Yaakov) did not recognize her until the morning. And for this reason Yaakov hated her. And HaShem Knew that she had done this in order to be married to a “Tzaddik” (righteous individual), and for this reason He had Compassion upon her (and caused her to conceive a number of times)…

[13] In the course of trying to justify Yaakov’s purchase of the birthright from Eisav, commentators strive mightily to demonstrate how in fact Yaakov may have been the older of the two brothers, despite Eisav’s emerging first, e.g., Yaakov was conceived first, even if he emerged into the world second; the struggling in the womb reversed the positions of the feti and caused them to be born “out of order”, etc.  Nevertheless, the obvious “fact on the ground” was that Eisav was the older, and it therefore was a reasonable expectation that he should marry the older of Lavan’s daughters, Leah.

[14] In the end, Yosef marries the daughter of Potifera in 41:45.

[15] The passive form of the verb and the absence of an identifiable subject in the sentence allows for the supposition that the information did not reach Tamar by ordinary human means, but rather via a Divine Oracle.

[16] The similarity between the terms “Kedeisha” and “Kiddushin” are difficult to overlook. In both cases, a form of “dedication” is indicated; in the former, dedication to a life of immorality and promiscuity with multiple partners, in the latter dedication to a single individual over the course of a lifetime.

[17] Maggid Mishna, a commentator on RaMBaM, claims that the basis for his making this pronouncement about what took place before the Tora was given is the very case of Yehuda and Tamar, which he apparently viewed as normative of the times, rather than as an aberration.

[18] But the words also mean “the opening of the eyes”. Ironically at this point, Yehuda does not see; but three months later he comes to see only too well.

[19] Commentators obviously have difficulty with this response. Some claim that the marriages with Yehuda’s sons were never consummated and therefore, she was neither legally bound to Sheila nor prohibited from Yehuda.