“It Might not Matter
What I Call a Rose,[1]
But How I Refer to
Another Human Being
is Something Else
Entirely!”
R. Yaakov Bieler
Parashat BeHar, 5768
Two popular volumes that deal in
dimensions of Jewish law as it pertains to our speech are R. Joseph Telushkin’s
Words that Hurt; Words that Heal: How to Choose Words Wisely and Well
(Quill, William Morrow, New York, 1996), and The Power of Words—Koach
HaDibur by R. Zelig Pliskin (Benai Yaakov Publications, New York,
1988). Whereas the former is a review of the laws of Lashon HaRa (evil speech), first treated comprehensively by the Chafetz
Chayim (R. Yisrael Meir Kagan) in his classical Halachic work, Shmirat
HaLashon, the latter focuses upon a less well-known area of Jewish law,
which has its biblical basis in this week’s Parasha.
In Parashat BeHar, the verb “YaNeH”
(BDB:[2]
suppress, oppress, maltreat) appears twice, the first time with respect to a
relatively clear-cut issue, the second as part of an extremely ambiguous
context:
VaYikra 25:14
And if you sell something to your neighbor, or buy
something from your neighbor’s hand, Al Tonu one person vis-à-vis the
other.
Ibid. 17
VeLo Tonu
one man vis-à-vis the other, and you will fear your God, for I am the Lord,
your God.
The original
instance of “oppression” (25:14) is a function of business dealings between two
parties, where one is enjoined from taking advantage of the other. While we
could imagine all sorts of inappropriate activities that could fall under the
rubric of such an injunction, the Oral Tradition singles out exploitation
having to do with pricing to be the intent of the Tora’s prohibition:
Bava Metzia 4:3
Ona’ah is constituted by an overcharge of
four silver Ma’a’s in twenty four, which is a Sela. Therefore 1/6th
of the purchase…[3]
And
since so much of Parashat BeHar is devoted to matters of property, sales
and the treatment of the poor,[4]
we would have expected that 25:17 would have been interpreted exclusively in a
vein similar to the earlier understanding of the use of “YaNeH” in verse
14. But this is not the case:
Bava Metzia 4:10
Just as there is Ona’ah in
buying and selling, so too there is Ona’ah in conversation. One should
not say to him (another person), “How much is this object?” even though he has
no intention to purchase it.
(Whereas
this first clause of the Mishna appears to be on point, i.e.,
acting inappropriately within a business context, the examples
that follow do not seem to be directly connected to the issues at
hand.)
If he is a penitent, do not say to him, “Remember
your earlier deeds!”
If he is the child of converts, do not say to him,
“Remember the deeds of your parents!” as it is said, (Shemot
A
Baraita[5]
in Bava Metzia 58b provides additional examples of verbal Ona’ah:
…If he is a convert and comes to study Tora,
one must not say to him, “Shall the mouth that ate unclean and forbidden food,
abominable and creeping things come to study the Tora that was uttered by the
Mouth of the Omnipotence?”
If he is visited by suffering, afflicted by disease…one
must not speak to him as his companions spoke to Iyov, (Iyov 4:6
ff.) “Is not your fear of God your confidence? And your hope the integrity of
your ways? Remember, I pray you, who ever perished being innocent?”
(The Baraita then concludes with one
more commercial example of Ona’ah, as well as a further clarification of the
initial case cited in the Mishna:)
If donkey drivers sought grain from a person, he
must not say to them, “Go to so-and-so who sells grain,” while knowing that he
has never sold any.
R. Yehuda said: One may not feign interest in a
purchase when he has no money, since this is known in the heart only, and
of everything known only in the heart, it is written, (VaYikra
25:17) “…and you will fear your God.”[6]
R.
Yehuda’s connection of the Mishna’s initial example with the ending of
verse 25:17 is consistent with how this phrase is interpreted throughout the Tora.
Consider RaShI’s comment on VaYikra 19:14:
You shall not curse someone who is deaf, and before a
blind person do not place a stumbling block and you will fear your God, I Am HaShem.
RaShI[7]
Since this matter is not something that human beings can
determine whether the intent of the perpetrator was for good or evil, and he
can obfuscate and claim that “I meant well,” therefore it is said concerning
this “…and you will fear your God”, Who Knows your thoughts. And similarly all
matters that are given over to the heart of a person that does them, and other
people are incapable of knowing what he meant, it is stated, “…and you will
fear your God.”
Nevertheless, even if we can appreciate
how R. Yehuda came to understand VaYikra 25:17 by virtue
of first interpreting its concluding phrase in light of its other usages in the
Tora, and then doubling back to apply the idea to a situation involving
buying and selling, it is more difficult to justify the Mishna’s and extension
of Ona’at Devarim to penitents, children of converts, converts and
those suffering tragedies in their personal lives. One commentator on the Mishna
supplies a rationale for the associative thinking that is taking place:
RaMBaM, Peirush LaMishnayot, Bava
Metzia 4:10
Know that concerning Ona’at Devarim a separate
verse was devoted, and it states, “VeLo Tonu one man vis-à-vis the other
and you will fear your God...” And the Tora is more stringent regarding
this than Ona’ah in monetary matters (25:14) for you see how the Tora
warns about this and attempts to instill fear (by referring to God).
Furthermore, a person can transgress this by means of subterfuge (if Ona’at
Kesafim is defined as overreaching in terms of charging excessively, that
can be objectively determined; the same cannot be said when it is a matter of
someone’s words and how they are to be interpreted with regard to whether
malice was intended or not.) E.g., a person assumes the stance of a buyer, and
he in the end does not buy, yet he claims (fallaciously) that his intention was
to buy; Or he brings up to someone uneducated some intellectual idea and he
asks him to explain this matter, intending thereby to embarrass him-yet he
protests when confronted with what he has done that he had thought that the
individual was in fact educated; Or he tells someone a story and includes
within it the shortcomings of some individual and his “defects” (probably a
reference to his genealogy or irreligious past), and then asserts, “I did not
intend what you are attributing to me.” For this reason, it is stated, “…and
you will fear your God”. And in accordance with this matter you will find that
in every instance where it is stated, “…and you will fear your God” it is a
matter that human judges are unable to judge the alleged perpetrator.
It
would appear that RaMBaM recognizes the ostensible disconnect between
the diverse cases cited in the Mishna. The means by which he suggests we
connect them is by placing these instances all within the context of where a
person who is engaged in conversation, brings something up directly or
indirectly regarding either the individual to whom he is speaking, or someone
else, be he a buyer or seller, an individual who aspires to be knowledgeable, a
penitent or a convert, appears to have said something disingenuous, insensitive
or even cruel and then proceeds to proclaim his innocence. The common denominator
of the various cases is not so much the subject matter of the discourse, as the
lack of compassion and empathy on the part of the speaker. Just as God
Identifies Himself as Caring deeply for all of His Creatures, particularly
those who are in difficulty—(Tehillim 91:15) “He will call upon Me and I
will Answer him; I Am with him in his trouble; I will Extract him and I
will Honor him,” so too if we are enjoined to walk in the Ways of the Divine,[8]
we are expected to strive to achieve a
comparable level of compassion for our fellows.
During the course of the discussion
of Ona’at Devarim,[9]
the Talmud presents an intriguing example of this transgression, one which many
people seem to assume is perfectly acceptable behavior.
Bava Metzia 58b
R. Chanina said: …All who descend into Geihinnom
reascend except for three who descend but do not reascend: 1) One who
commits adultery, 2) who publicly shames his neighbor, or 3) who fastens
an evil nickname[10]
upon his neighbor.
The separate listing of categories 2) and 3) suggests that
even if the individual has become accustomed to this name and therefore does
not appear to be personally embarrassed by its usage, this nevertheless does
not remove the onus from the person who invokes such a name. People sometimes
feel that they have to be “good sports” and tolerate the teasing and/or
disrespect of others. An extreme example of such self-deprecation and lack of
ego-strength or even masochism appears in the Talmud with respect to personal
physical injury or damage:
Bava Kama 8:7
…If the victim said, “Put out my eye,
cut off my arm and break my leg,” the offender would nevertheless be liable. (Just
because the victim has no regard for his body, does not mean that someone else
can exploit this problem.) And so also even if he told him to do it on the
understanding that he would be exempt, he would still be liable. If the victim
said, “Tear my garment and break my pitcher,” the defendant would still be
liable. But if he said to him, “Do this with the understanding that you will be
exempt,” he would be exempt. (An individual can state that he is not
interested in maintaining his property. However, even if damages would not be
assessed, there would still seem to be a violation of the prohibition of
[Devarim
The
lack of piety, if not outright sinfulness, manifest in calling someone by a derogatory
nickname is suggested in two other Talmudic passages:
Ta’anit 20b
The students of R. Adda bar Ahava asked
him: To what do you attribute your longevity? He replied: I have never
displayed my impatience in my house, and I have never walked in front of a man
greater than myself, nor have I ever meditated over the words of Tora in
dirty alleys, nor have I ever walked 4 Amot without musing over the Tora
or without wearing Tefillin, nor have I ever fallen asleep in the Beit
Midrash for any length of time or even momentarily, not have I rejoiced
over the disgrace of my friends, nor have I ever called my neighbor by a
nickname given to him by myself, of some say by a nickname given to him by
others.
Megilla 28a
R. Zera was asked by his students: To
what do you attribute your longevity? He replied: I have never displayed my
impatience in my house…(there follows virtually verbatim what is stated in Ta’anit)
nor have I called my fellow by his nickname or as some say, family nickname.
Particularly
in light of the latter source, one could imagine that a certain nickname has
been associated with not only this individual, but an entire family.
Nevertheless, I have to be concerned how this person feels when called by such
a name, independent of any tradition or family history. Such a conclusion is
born out by the formulation of RaMBaM with respect to this ruling:
Mishneh Tora, Hilchot Dei’ot 6:8
…So said the Sages: One who embarrasses
his fellow publicly does not have a portion in the World to Come. Consequently
an individual must be careful not to embarrass his fellow in public whether he
is young or old. And one should not call him a name which causes him
embarrassment…
While
other sources cited to this point refer to a “bad name” implying that the name
itself is intrinsically insulting and demeaning, e.g., “stinky”, “baby”,
“stupid”,[11]
RaMBaM allows for the possibility that while the name inherently is not
negative, since the individual at this point in his life is embarrassed by
being referred to in this manner, we must defer to his subjective sensibility
rather than an objective evaluation of the name in question. One can imagine
that if the individual is humble, then referring to him as the “Genius”, the
“Ilui” could make him uncomfortable. Even if when younger, a person’s name had
a diminutive added to it, e.g., “Bobbie” in place of Robert or Roberta, “Yanki”
instead of Yaakov, should I assume that I have a right to continue to refer to
him/her in this manner even if s/he has become much more mature and
accomplished at this point? Is there a difference between a parent or sibling
for whom a child or brother/sister are relatively frozen in time and therefore
names of the past have far more staying power and someone who has become
acquainted with the person not all that long ago? Even if the individual says
that it’s alright to call him by this “familiar” name, how can we possibly know
that this is truly how the individual feels? While Daniel Z. Feldman, in “A
Rose by any Other Name: Derogatory Nicknames”[12]
is probably commenting on objectively negative names, his reflections could be
applied to virtually any nickname, once we posit the possibility of some sort
of embarrassment on the part of the person being referred to:
Beyond embarrassment, a further level
of emotional violation is present. A person’s name is his connection to his
sense of identity, to his awareness of his existence as an independent
individual…
To be deprived of this name is to
become disenfranchised from the reality of being a unique creation; it is to
stand bereft of any evidence of individuality. The resulting alienation is
profound; it clearly impacts differently than humiliation in other forms, yet
apparently in as devastating a manner. The fact that the initial sense of
embarrassment has abated is thus inconsequential, and degradation all its own
remains…
The British essayist, William
Hazlitt (1778-1830) wrote, “A nickname is the heaviest stone that the devil can
throw at a man.”[13]
Is this an overstatement, or did the author truly understand the degree of Ona’at
Devarim that is implicit in a nickname?
[1] William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, II:2
“What’s in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo called,
Retain that dear perfection that he owes
Without that title…”
[2] Brown,
Driver, Briggs, A Hebrew English Lexicon of the Old Testament, Clarendon
Press,
[3] Soncino, p. 295, fn. 10
If the vendor overcharged by 1/6th, he is considered to have defrauded the vendee, and the overcharge is recoverable; or the sale may be revoked.
[4] VaYikra 25:1-7 The Sabbatical year where one’s crops are considered ownerless and therefore cannot be bought and sold.
Ibid. 8-13 The Jubilee year, which in addition to having the same restrictions as the Sabbatical year, also provides for Jewish slaves to go free, and land that had been sold during the previous 50 years to be restored to their original tribal owners.
Ibid. 14 Ona’ah re price gauging.
Ibid. 15-16 The price of land must be pro-rated in light of its eventual return during the Jubilee year.
Ibid.
17 The second instance of the prohibition of Ona’ah.
Ibid. 18-22 A Divine Promise that if the Jews observe the Tora, there will be enough food produced during the 6th year of the Sabbatical year cycle to allow them to manage during the 6th, 7th and 8th years without buying and selling their crops until they can plant and harvest a new crop.
Ibid.
23-24 Land in
Ibid. 25-28 An individual who due to economic reverses had to sell his real estate can always buy it back or a relative can buy it back on his behalf during the years leading up to the Jubilee year.
Ibid. 29-30 An individual who sells his house within a walled city can only buy it back up to one year from the sale.
Ibid. 31 An individual who sells his house outside a walled city can always buy it back or have it returned to him with the advent of the Jubilee year.
Ibid. 32-34 Rules governing the sale of property belonging to Levites.
Ibid. 35-43 Rules governing the purchase and maintenance of a Jewish slave owned by a Jew.
Ibid. 44-46 Rules governing the purchase and maintenance of a non-Jewish slave owned by a Jew.
Ibid.
47-55 Rules governing the purchase and redemption of a Jewish slave owned by
a non-Jew.
Ibid. 26:1 Prohibitions against idolatry
Ibid.
2 The need to respect Shabbat
and God’s Holy Places.
[5] Halachic material dating from the period of the Mishna that was not included in the work edited by R. Yehuda HaNasi.
[6] The assumption that belief in God will preclude an individual from engaging in egregious behavior is articulated artfully in the following Mishna:
Avot 3:20
He (R. Akiva) used to say:
Everything is given with collateral, and traps are spread throughout all of
life. The store is open, the Owner gives credit, the notebook is open, the Hand
is Writing, whomever wishes to borrow
should come and borrow, the collectors make their rounds daily, and they
collect from man either knowingly or unknowingly, and they have something to
base (their collections) upon. The judgment is a true judgment and everything
is prepared for the festive meal.
[7] It would
appear that RaShI’s comment on the concluding phrase of the verse is
connected to the interpretation that he gives, based upon the Midrash
Halacha, for the previous phrase, “…and
before a blind person do not place a stumbling block”—“To one who is blind
regarding a matter, do not give advice that is inappropriate for him, e.g., do
not say, ‘Sell your field’ in order that you will be able to purchase it; ‘Purchase a donkey’ so that you can
confiscate it from him for an outstanding debt.”
[8] E.g., Devarim 8:6; 19:9; 26:17; 28:9; 30:16.
[9] The
citation of using a negative nickname for another individual under the rubric
of the Shulchan Aruch’s discussion of
Ona’at Devarim in Choshen Mishpat 228:5
demonstrates that in the view of the Halachic decisors, this is in fact another
example of verbal oppression.
[10] William
and Mary Morris, Morris Dictionary of Word and Phrase Origins, Harper
Collins,
[11] R. Pliskin, in The Power of Words, p. 190, even suggests that there might be an element of self-fulfilling prophecy should non-complimentary names be employed for someone:
At times this can be very
destructive if the name implies strong limitations or faults, since people tend
to live up (or down?) to the names that they are called.
[12] The
Right and the Good: Halacha and Human Relations, Yashar Books,
[13] Sketches
and Essays, “Nicknames” quoted in The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations,
ed. Elizabeth Knowles, Oxford U. Press,