The Olah Sacrifice: The Exception or the Rule?
R. Yaakov Bieler
Parshat Tzav, Shabbat HaGadol, 5764
The beginning of Parshat Tzav (VaYikra 6:2 ff.) appears to revisit territory that has already been explored at the outset of the book of VaYikra (1:3 ff.) In both places we are told about aspects of the Olah (“the one going up” or “totally burnt”), begging the question why all of the information concerning this particular sacrifice could not have been concentrated in a single section of the Tora.
Both R. S.R. Hirsch and Da’at Mikra point out that whereas the instructions in Parshat VaYikra dealt with the perspective of the person bringing the sacrifice, (1:2) “A person who offers up from among you a sacrifice”, Parshat Tzav focuses upon the issues specifically relevant to the priests who will be actually carrying out the offering, (6:2) “Command Aharon and his children saying, ‘This is the law of the Olah…’” Accepting the dichotomy between the “owners” of the sacrifice as opposed to the individuals offering it up, appears to underscore a Talmudic discussion regarding the precise definition of the role played by the priests in the
The revisiting of the Olah sacrifice in VaYikra 6 allows for another dimension of this sacrifice to be explored by Rabbinic commentators. Those closely scrutinizing the Tora text, note a slight variation with regard to the Olah from the pattern that is established in VaYikra 6-7. While the phrase “Zot Torat” (this is the body of law concerning…) appears not only with regard to the Olah (6:2), but also in terms of the Mincha (meal offering) (6:7), the Asham (guilt offering) (7:1), and the Shlamim (peace offering) (7:11), there is no parallel to the additional language of emphasis, “He HaOlah” (IT is the Olah) in 6:2. Merely by occupying the first position in the listing of the sacrifices, which is not only the case in Chapter 6, but also in Chapter 1 (verse 3), already confers upon the Olah a special, primary status. The addition of the words “Hi HaOlah” draws even more attention to this sacrifice and generates evocative insights.
Midrash Yelamdeinu (5) places the Olah in the following context:
The sacrifice should never be removed from the altar (i.e., as opposed to other sacrifices, more of the Olah is burned upon the altar rather than being distributed for consumption among various people) because it is more beloved than any of the other sacrifices. To what might this be compared? To a king who is celebrating and gifts are being brought to him by his sharecroppers, members of his family, and his beloved friends. As he would receive these presents, he would ask each of them, “Who are you?” And the presenter would respond, “A sharecropper of the king.” And so the second and so the third, etc. Then someone else came bearing a gift. He said, “I simply come to honor the king,” whereupon the king said, “The gift that this one brings will not leave my table.” They said to him, “Our master, why do you love this gift more than all of the other gifts?” He said, “All of these others who have brought gifts, have done so because they are either obligated to me financially or feel bound to honor me. But this one, who is neither my sharecropper nor a member of my household, simply comes to honor me. For this reason, I love his gift best of all.” So too, in the matter of sacrifices, if someone has sinned, he is obligated to bring a sin offering, and for other sins, he must bring a guilt offering. But the Olah is a pure gift. For this reason it is especially dear to Me.
In the essay on Parshat VaYikra, 5764, “Competing Visions of the Purpose of Korbanot”, it was noted that RaMBaN saw as the primary purpose for sacrifices, a means of atoning for sins. The Midrash cited above suggests that not only are there sacrifices that do not serve such a purpose, but that these sacrifices are more desirable from God’s Point of View than those that allow us to atone. While it is a wonderful act of Chesed (Divine Compassion) for HaShem to create for us by way of the Chatat (sin offering), Asham (guilt offering) and Tamid (constant, daily offering) rituals by which we achieve atonement for our sins, (6) it is not to our credit that we continually require and rely upon these numerous means of atonement. Better not to sin in the first place, than have to try to get back into God’s Good Graces following a lapse in judgment and proper behavior. When a person reaches out to God, not because he is in need either religiously or materially, but rather as a pure statement of love and respect, only then is it an act that is LiShma (for its own sake), pure and spiritually profound. Instead of drawing attention to man’s imperfections, the Olah reflects the inherent positive spiritual potential that each of us possesses, our essential Tzelem Elokim (image of God), a quality which in the end truly justifies God’s Creating the universe, and endowing man with free choice. (7)
However, an alternate source in Midrashic literature substantiates RaMBaN’s understanding of how all sacrifices essentially achieve a form of atonement, even the Olah. Midrash Tanchuma #13 (8) relates:
“These are the laws of the Olah”—So have the Rabbis taught: The Olah is entirely holy because it was not brought as a response to sins. The guilt offering was required because of acts of thievery; (9) But the Olah was not brought as a result of sin or thievery, but rather it comes due to Hirhur HaLev (mere thoughts of the heart related to sins). And so a person, who would fantasize in his heart about something, would bring an Olah for these matters that rose up in his heart.
A curious aspect of the Olah ritual can be explained from the perspective of the need to atone for reprehensible thoughts as well. In order to account for the emphasis in 6:2 upon the parts of the Olah burning upon the altar throughout the night, Mincha Belula and Toldot Yitzchak write:
The reason for the Tora stating that the Olah will be burning throughout the night, is because an individual fantasizes at night and then carries out his fantasies during the day, as the prophet says, (Micha 2:1) “Surely those who think about sin and evil deeds while in their beds, by the light of the morning carry out their plans…” …and since the Olah is brought as a result of improper fantasizing, for this reason is the command given that the sacrifice should burn throughout the night, so that the atonement should take place at the time of the sin.
However, the approach that the Olah comes to atone just like other sacrifices, if not for overt sins, then at least for the precursors of sin, i.e., evil thoughts, appears to run counter to the clearly articulated position in Jewish thought, i.e., that HaShem holds an individual accountable only for the negative actions that s/he actually performs, rather than the thoughts that may pass through his/her head. As the Shabbat Zemer boldly proclaims, “Hirhurim Mutarim!” (fantasies are permitted). Kiddushin 39b and Chullin 142a, when recounting the classical story of theodicy whereby a boy who is following his father’s instructions to retrieve eggs from a bird’s nest by first driving away the mother bird, two commandments that the Tora promises will each be rewarded by longevity, (10) falls off the tree and dies, speculate that perhaps the boy was thinking evil thoughts and for this reason was punished. The Talmud concludes that only for thoughts denying essential beliefs about God and affirming false deities might an individual be held accountable. And in Kiddushin 40a, it is maintained that the proof text for HaShem not holding less than pure thoughts against an individual is based upon Tehillim 66:18, where the Psalmist states, “Even if I saw iniquity in my heart, HaShem Did Not Hear it.” But here too, an exception is listed, i.e., if the evil thoughts come to fruition and are actualized, as implied by Yirmiyahu
Perhaps it could be said that the ambivalence concerning man’s less than admirable thoughts—are they or are they not sinful—arises from our acknowledging that while the presence of such thoughts attest to man’s imperfections, when s/he resists acting upon them, they become manifestations of his/her self-control and discipline. In Ben Zomah’s words, “Who is a mighty individual? One who can control his/her own desires.” (11) The need for atonement for such thoughts might be designed to remind us that we are always susceptible to acting badly, to the extent that negative thoughts cross our minds. They are potential sins, just waiting to be actualized, a fulfillment of God’s Comments to Kayin, (Beraishit 4:7) “Sin crouches at the door.” But as long as we refrain from acting upon these thoughts, they become statements of personal heroism and self-control, illustrating the power of the will, and the capacity for restraint. Could it be that the same animal that might have had to be a sin offering or a guilt offering is being brought as an Olah, in order to say, “I realize how I have to continue my struggle against the inclination to sin, even after I have been victorious at one time or another. Only by my connecting to God in a total manner, will I continue to strengthen the resolve required to meet the future challenges that my Hirhurim will inevitably pose.”
Shabbat Shalom, and in a time when we are not afforded the opportunity to offer sacrifices in God’s Temple, that we nevertheless strive to live lives of redemption and holiness, resisting temptation, and striving to serve God idealistically and with total devotion.
(1) While Shechita (ritual slaughter) of even a sacrifice could at least theoretically be performed by a non-Kohen, the collection of the blood, the conveying of the blood to the proper area in the Temple, and the application of the blood to either an altar or a curtain, were tasks that could be fulfilled exclusively by Kohanim.
(2) This role is emphatically demonstrated in the rite of the Blessing of (by?) the Kohanim, appearing in BaMidbar 6:23-27.
(3) See e.g., Kiddushin 42b.
(4) Another aspect of the requirements for Kohanim indicating that they are more representatives of God than of man, would appear to be the extraordinary depersonalization of the Kohen Gadol (the High Priest) with regard to prohibiting him from engaging in mourning even for the closest of his relatives. See VaYikra21:10-12. While it could be countered that the ordinary Kohanim who comprise the overwhelming majority of those serving in this capacity are not restricted in this manner, the concept that even a single individual has to place issues of the
(5) Cited in Tora Shleima, ed. and annotated by R. Menachem Kasher, Vol. 26, Beit Tora Shleima, Yerushalayim, 5734, pp. 125-6.
(6) I am inspired daily by the liturgical line that we are to recite when we first wake up in the morning:
“I give thanks before you, Living King for Eternity, that You Have
Returned to me my soul. Great is Your Faith!”
Not only are we expected to have faith in Him; He constantly demonstrates His Faith in us! We must appreciate it that we have been granted another chance to set things right, to live up to our potential. Yet the fact that this is necessary also emphasizes our imperfections and shortcomings. Certainly these repeated “do-overs” benefit us, but hardly point to the perfection, at least present perfection, of God’s Creation.
(7) The first time that, in my opinion, such an interaction between God and man takes place, is recorded in Beraishit 8:20-21, when after Noach offers Olot following the flood, God ”Smells the pleasant smell” and Concludes that man indeed has redeeming qualities that serve to justify his existence.
(8) Tora Shleima, Vol. 26, p. 125, fn. 9*.
(9) While VaYikra 5:21 ff. does speak of bringing an Asham in response to not returning an object belonging to another, a similar sacrifice is also brought for a) inadvertently appropriating material belonging to the Mishkan/Mikdash for personal use (5:15 ff.), and b) performing an action that was thought to be permissible, only to discover at a later point that it may have been prohibited, but one remains unsure (5:17 ff.). While the former situation could be defined as stealing from the
(10) Shemot 20:12; Devarim 5:16; 22:7.
(11) Avot 4:1.