Even though the simple meaning of the phrase in Micha 7:20 “Titain Emet LeYaakov” (give truth to Yaakov) is interpreted by commentators as a plea for God to fulfill, i.e., make come true, the various promises given to Yaakov and his offspring, an alternative reading appears in the Midrash. In Beraishit Rabba 70:7, a Kuti (1) asks R. Meir a question concerning Yaakov’s apparently not making good on the vow that he took (Beraishit 28:20 ff.)(2) after awakening from the dream in which he saw the vision of the angels ascending and descending the Heavenly ladder (28:12). “Don’t you (the Jews and the Jewish tradition) say, ‘Yaakov was an honest man, since it is written ‘Titain Emet LeYaakov’’?
However, the assumption that Yaakov was honest at every turn throughout his life is difficult to demonstrate. How does one truly avoid coming to the conclusion that Yaakov was at least guilty of Geneivat Da’at (misleading another person), if not outright lying when he represents himself as Eisav to Yitzchak, in order to obtain the blessing meant for his brother (27:19 ff.)? Although Rivka encourages her son Yaakov to deceive Yitzchak (27:6 ff.), one gets the sense that lying and misrepresentation are not qualities that Yaakov possesses innately.
As opposed to Yaakov, who is described to us as “a simple man, sitting in tents” (25:27), it is Eisav who, from the time that the unique traits of his personality are discernable, is assumed to be the brother for whom subtle trickery is second nature. Commentators on 25:27-8, including the likes of RaShI, Ibn Ezra, Chizkuni and RaDaK, attribute to Eisav the cunning, nefariousness, and planning capability to track down and capture animals. They assume that just as animals can be entrapped by an individual who has perfected these skills, this same hunter can apply his talents to entrap human beings as well and manipulate them to do as he chooses. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the vocation of Nimrod, the first king to rule over a significant portion of human civilization, is also described as (10:9) “a mighty hunter before HaShem.” His hunting skills were put to use to organize, order, and control a vast number of people. Consequently, such commentators suggest, Yitzchak’s love for Eisav was misplaced; his oldest son, by means of deliberate and elaborate stratagems, “trapped” his father and made him think of him as worthy of particularly special treatment and blessings, when in fact, he was not.
Yet, however alien misrepresenting and lying may be to Yaakov at the outset, he seems to quickly come to recognize that honesty and compassion may be handicaps rather than virtues in certain circumstances. Consider the following incidents and behaviors:
a) Instead of offering to share the food that he has just made, he tempts his tired, hungry brother and agrees to give him a portion only after extracting Eisav’s birthright in return (25:29 ff.);(3)
b) even after much protestation,(4) he finally agrees to dress in Eisav’s clothing, bring Yitzchak food that rather than hunted, was prepared by Rivka, put goat skins on his arms to appear be as hairy as Eisav was, and even say to his father that he was Eisav;(5) c) Yaakov allows his father to think that the reason why he is leaving the family home in accordance with Rivka’s pretense, i.e., to seek out a wife much in the manner that Rivka and Yitzchak were brought together, rather than confiding to his father the true reason for his departure, i.e., Eisav’s threat against his life;
d) the Rabbinic interpretation of 29:12 in e.g., Megilla 13b, where Yaakov plots to outwit Lavan and marry Rachel instead of Leah;(6)
e) if it is assumed that when Yaakov approaches Lavan to return
to
f) Yaakov’s methodology by which he seems to elicit the birth of more speckled and spotted sheep and goats than would have naturally been born (30:37ff.) is not initially explained as the fulfillment of a Divine Directive. Only in 31:10, when Yaakov is trying to convince his wives that they have to leave Aram Naharaim, does he mention that the device of using peeled sticks to increase the number of animals that would be declared his, came to him in a prophetic dream. If Lavan had a certain expectation regarding the outcome of a business deal, would it have been Yaakov’s responsibility to disclose fully the means by which he was going to attempt to assure that things were not going to work out in the manner that Lavan expected?
g) the manner in which Yaakov and his family flee when Lavan has gone out to sheer his sheep is certainly devious—twice is the language of “Geneivat Da’at” (stealing someone’s mind, i.e., tricking another individual) mentioned, not only by Lavan himself in 31:26, where his claim could be easily brushed aside as yet another manifestation of his insincerity, but also by the Tora itself in 31:20.
This particular pattern of Yaakov’s actions brings us to a relatively obscure, but nevertheless potentially significant detail of his interchange with Eisav when they are finally standing face to face in Chapter 33. After hugs and kisses(8), introductions, and a negotiation regarding the gifts that Yaakov was offering, Eisav proposes that the two groups, i.e., Yaakov, his family, and his herds on the one hand, and Eisav and the 400 men accompanying him (32:7) on the other, travel together. Yaakov declines the offer, under the pretext that the typical rates of speed of the two groups are so radically different that this plan would not only be impractical, but perhaps even physically harmful (33:13). As an alternative proposal, Yaakov tells Eisav that they would be better off establishing a rendezvous point in Se’ir (33:14), and firmly declines Eisav’s final offer of assigning body guards for the rest of Yaakov’s family’s journey.
The problem that we encounter at this point in the Tora’s narrative is the fact that Yaakov never goes to Se’ir, despite his promise to Eisav. This leads us to contemplate whether Yaakov has again engaged in another subterfuge to get out of potential harm’s way? Will Eisav intone, “This is the third time that he has tricked me?”—See 27:36.
RaMBaN is obviously sensitive to the problem, but feels there is a relatively simple way to explain why Yaakov is not to be accused of dishonesty in this matter. The commentator proposes that Se’ir is on the way to
An alternate interpretation maintains that when one is in danger, lying is not prohibited. Midrash HaGadol (9) states that Yaakov’s exchange with Eisav is direct evidence that in order to keep the peace/prevent violence and bloodshed, one has the option to alter the truth. R. Natan goes even further, and states that in such a situation it is a Mitzva to change the truth, citing Shmuel I 16:2 as a paradigmatic proof text. Talmud Yerushalmi Avoda Zora Chapt. 2, Halacha 1 applies to a practical situation the principle presented in the Midrash. “It was taught: If an idolater is accompanying a Jew on the road, the latter should allow him to walk on the right side.(10) And if he asks the Jew, ‘Where are you going?’, he should respond with an exaggeration, in the same manner that Yaakov answered Eisav’s question with an exaggeration (he did not travel as far as Se’ir.)” Therefore according to this approach, Yaakov not only did nothing wrong, but may even have fulfilled a Mitzva.
In Beraishit Rabba 78:14, R. Abahu assumes a parallel attitude to that of the Kuti when he poses the question which we have been exploring: “We have scoured all of the Biblical written text and we cannot find where our father Yaakov ever went to Mt. Se’ir at any time during his life. How is it possible for an honest man like Yaakov to have lied to Eisav?” But his answer indicates that he thinks that Yaakov’s promise does constitute a binding vow, to be fulfilled by either the forefather or any of his descendents now or at any future time. “When will he come to him? In the distant future, as it is written, (Ovadia
We all realize that truth telling is not always an easy thing to do. And we are in sore need of role models who stand for this type of principle, and whose personal examples can inspire us. With regard to Yaakov, it’s as if the association between him and truth is ironic and paradoxical rather than actual fact. While this last case according to the first approach has nothing to do with personal honesty, the two interpretations that follow suggest the outer limits of the debate over truth telling, i.e., that lying can even be a Mitzva in certain circumstances, as opposed to in order to make sure that no one is guilty of an empty vow or a false oath, we are given an indefinite extension to make good on our commitments, either in person or vicariously through future members of our family. Ethics and morality, both in theory and practice, are complex rather than clear-cut. How we understand the actions of the Avot and Emahot as well as live our own lives should be informed by serious consideration of these perspectives.
Shabbat Shalom, and let us all strive for honesty in our relationships with God, our fellow man, and ourselves.
(1) A Samaritan. A member of a people that the King of Assyria settled in
(2) While in 28:22 Yaakov promises to give one tenth of everything that he has once he returns safely to Canaan, there is no textual record of his having done so, leading the Kuti to impugn Yaakov’s truthfulness.
(3) Even if one contends that birthrights are not susceptible to sale, this is a strange game to play. At the very least, it suggests that Yaakov was unhappy with his status as second born and was considering means by which his birth order position could be reversed, whether or not this particular sale had any legal significance.
(4) The basis for his objection to participating in the deception is that Yaakov is afraid that he will be detected and cursed by his father (27:12). This does not appear to be an argument against dishonesty in principle, but rather a pragmatic consideration.
(5) It is hard for me to understand how creative readings of 27:19, e.g., “I am (who I am.) Eisav is your firstborn”, can remove the stigma of at least a modicum of dishonesty from this interaction between father and son.
(6) Although “Ein Mikra Yotzei Midai Peshuto” (no text should be interpreted without first considering its ungarnished, bare meaning), in this case, the redundancy of the phrase “VeChi Achi Aviha Huh” (and that he was the relative of her father) when the text also has him saying about himself that he is the son of Rivka, and therefore obviously the relative of her father, seems to be accounted for by the Rabbinic assumption that Yaakov felt that he could compete with Lavan in terms of cunning and trickiness. Of course, he was mistaken, since he ends up marrying both Leah and Rachel. Yet, if the Rabbinic contention in Megilla 13b that Rachel was the one that undermined the plan in order that Leah not be embarrassed, that would indicate that Yaakov’s plan in and of itself was a good one, and would have succeeded had it not been for unforeseen compassion on the part of Rachel.
(7) An additional indication that Rivka indeed had summoned Yaakov was the presence of Devora, Rivka’s original nursemaid, in Yaakov’s entourage (see RaShI on 35:8). RaShI also quotes the Rabbinic interpretation of the plural form of “crying” in the verse as indicating that not was Devora mourned, but that Rivka died at the same time. By implication, had Yaakov returned at the time when Rivka sent for him, he would have had the opportunity to spend quality years with his mother, rather than return following her demise.
(8) The dots in the Tora text over the word “VaYashkeihu” in 33:4 are subject to two extremely opposite interpretations, i.e., either Eisav was so moved to see his brother after all these years that this was the most sincere of kisses, or the kiss was a pretense for Eisav’s attempting, but failing, to do Yaakov in.
(9) Quoted in Tora Shleima, ed. R. Menachem Kasher, p. 1310, #48.
(10) Since most people are right-handed, were the idolater to attack the Jew, his sword hand would be furthest from the Jew when he is standing to the Jew’s right.